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A familiar, received wisdom commonly surfaces when today's authors portray the history of twentieth-century family
law. According to the received account, family law through most
of the century displayed an overtly sexist, patriarchal orientation
which emphasized the superiority of male family heads and the
dependency of women and children.' As the story continues, a
new feminism born in the 1960's brought forth demands for gender equality, and the polity's acceptance of those demands
wrought revolutionary transformations in formal legal doctrines
regulating husband and wife, and parent and child.2 The received wisdom recognizes, however, that the changes induced by
the feminists paradoxically produced few tangible benefits for
women. Even today, men have retained their economic dominance, especially in the aftermath of family breakups, and single
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Hamilton College, 1962; LL.B., New York University, 1965; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1971. The author is indebted to all of the members of the Legal History Colloquium at New York University, but especially to Sarah Gordon, Hendrik Hartog,
and William LaPiana for their comments and criticisms. Research support was provided by the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund of
New York University School of Law.
' For the standard work, which effectively summarizes the earlier literature,
see LENORE J. WEiTZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL
AND EcoNoMIc CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 1-14 (1985).
2 See MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALTY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 20-35, 173-74 (1991); WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at 3151.
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women with children frequently live in poverty.3
The present author's ongoing research into the legal history
of New York between 1920 and 19804 suggests that the received

wisdom is correct, insofar as it goes, but is significantly incomplete. The half century prior to the feminist demands of the late
1960's was not a single uniform era devoid of substantial change.
On the contrary, it consisted of two distinct periods.
As Part I of this article will show, the decades between the
two World Wars did display a coherent patriarchal orientation
focused around preservation of the nuclear family. Adult men
were situated at the top of the family hierarchy, but their pri3 See FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 35-36, 90-94, 174-75; WE1TZmAN, supra note 1,

at 323-56.
4 See William E. Nelson, The Changing Meaning of Equality in TwentiethCentury ConstitutionalLaw, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (1995) (examining equality
issues between 1920 and 1970 under New York case law); William E. Nelson, Contract Litigation & the Elite Bar in New York City, 1960-1980, 39 EMORY L.J. 413
(1990) (noting striking increase in breach of contract litigation from early 1960s to
late 1970s in New York); William E. Nelson, Criminality and Sexual Morality in
New York, 1920-1980, 5 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 265 (1993) (examining influence of socio-political forces on law's treatment of gender-related violence and sexual immorality). The scope of my more general study of the legal history of New York dictates, in part, the coverage of this article, including its limitation only to New York
law. By focusing on this one state, which through most of the period under study
was the most populous state and the economic and cultural leader of the nation, it
becomes possible to analyze not only these leading cases but also the hundreds of
more mundane cases that applied their holdings on a day-to-day basis. While study
of any single state will provide only an incomplete sketch of developments in the
nation at large, I am convinced that the picture that will emerge from New York will
be less incomplete or distorted than that which would emerge from any other jurisdiction. A great advantage of New York is that it has a more complete set of lower
court opinions than any other state. Moreover, in one important respect it was more
typical of the nation as a whole than any other single state: with its metropolitan
center on the Atlantic coast, its upstate industrial cities little different from those of
the Midwest, its expanding suburbs, and its rural farmlands and environmentally
protected woodlands, New York contained locales similar to those in all the rest of
the nation except the Deep South and the Far West. One would accordingly expect
to find a wider variety of the socio-political forces that shape law in New York than
in other jurisdictions. Of course, those forces would converge differently in New
York than elsewhere, and the end legal product molded by them would differ: for
example, social forces emerging out of the metropolitan center would have greater
weight in New York, where the City typically contained nearly half of the state's
population, than in the nation at large, where New York City has never equaled
even five percent of total population. When adjustments are made for these differences in configuration, however, the findings that emerge from this study about how
socio-economic forces influenced family law in New York can serve as preliminary
hypotheses about more general national developments, at least until scholars examine in similar detail states such as California and Texas, and a Southern state like
Georgia.
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macy entailed the performance of duties as well as the enjoyment of privilege. Traditional mechanisms for maintaining the
dependence of women and children remained in place, but so too
did nineteenth-century concerns for family preservation and for
protecting the family's dependent members. Moreover, courts
during the 1920-1940 era retained a healthy respect for the vicissitudes of fortune, and they remained ready to deploy the law
in a practical fashion to address hardship and especially to provide help for children in need.
As Part II will show, the two decades after World War II
were a different time. They were decades of extraordinary optimism, when it seemed that all Americans who made the necessary effort could achieve their goals and obtain happiness. Like
many other doctrinal areas of the law, family law responded to
this optimism, abandoning many old strictures and moving in
the direction of recognizing individual rights and freedom. But
this exaltation of individuals had the unintended, though not
surprising, effect of favoring the strong at the expense of the
weak, and thus tended to favor adults over children and men
over women.
As Part III will explain, this unintended empowerment of
adult men introduced a new sort of sexism into the law-a macho attitude that individual men, by virtue of their inherent superiority, were entitled to seize and retain whatever they could
grab. Whereas consciously conferred sexist privilege had always
existed in conjunction with duty prior to World War II, the
privileges which adult men-and occasionally women-seized in
the postwar decades appertained to them of right. Since courts
merely recognized rights that existed in the nature of things, no
one had to confer privilege on men, and no one could exact the
performance of duties as the price for such conferral.
Thus, although the gender-related privileges that men enjoyed in the years after World War II were not consciously conferred, they existed in the consciousness of people, especially in
the consciousness of late 1960's and 1970's feminists who demanded their termination. In response to their demands, men's
formal legal privileges were terminated, but, as both the received
wisdom and the New York material discussed in Part IV will
show, the law continued to help men retain their practical economic and social dominance. The feminist drive for gender
equality even produced occasional advantages for men, such as
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increased recognition of their rights as fathers.
The fuller picture that this Article will sketch is important
because it points toward different answers than theorists typically give in response to the question of why the feminist efforts
of the late 1960's and the 1970's produced so few tangible benefits for women. This Article's more fulsome picture, it is hoped,
will suggest that feminism did not fail because of women's failure properly to perceive their goals5 or because men control the
legal system and have used it to advance their interests.6 On the
contrary, the Article will show that women failed to obtain tangible equality with men because of the deep commitment of all
Americans in the late twentieth century-women as well as
men-to the protection of individual rights and the pursuit of
individual happiness. This shared commitment to individualism
has limited the paths that reform can take and has excluded
from the political agenda practical approaches for attaining tangible gender equality.
This Article will also show that, while the overall dominance
of men and dependency of women remained constant between
1920 and 1980, the legal relationship of parent and child was
transformed over the same period. In the 1920's, the raison
d'Otre of family law had been the protection of children; by the
1970's, in contrast, the law ignored the well-being of children as
it focused on protecting the rights of parents. This transformation is especially important because it demonstrates the error in
the received wisdom's view that, since power relations between
men and women have not changed fundamentally over the
course of the twentieth century, the doctrinal changes that did
occur in the late 1960's have left family law in the main unchanged. Instead, this Article argues that family law has
changed, from a body of doctrine committed to preservation of
the patriarchal family to a law of rights transfixed by a macho
policy of enhancing male happiness.
I. FAMILY PRESERVATION IN THE 1920's AND 1930's

Well into the twentieth century, New York courts adhered to
the State's traditional policy of "preserv[ing] the family unit"7
' But cf.FINEMAN, supra note 2, at 175-80, 189-90.
6 But cf. id. at 13.
' Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E.2d 709, 720 (N.Y. 1965) (Scileppi, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971 (1996).
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and, through the family, "the morality of the citizens of the
state."8 In essence, the courts possessed two mechanisms for
achieving this policy goal. The one was to presume that men and
women cohabiting together were married, especially if they had
children. The other was to "promote the permanency of ... mar-

riage contracts"9 by making termination of marriage difficult. By
systematizing marriages and forcing couples to remain married,
judges hoped to insure that children would live in nuclear families and, as a result, receive proper economic support and moral
education.
The pursuit of these family values clashed, however, with
several social realities. First, there were men and women who
without the benefit of marriage engaged in sexual intercourse
that sometimes led to the birth of children. Second, there existed unhappy spouses, some of whom wanted a way out of their
marriages. Third, there were some parents who had enjoyed
happy marriages but who, especially during the Great Depression, proved unable to support and educate their children.
This Part will examine the interplay between the public
policy of protecting the family and the social realities which
during the 1920's and 1930's frustrated it. Section A will examine how the law strove to confine under the rubric of marriage as
much cohabitation as possible, especially that which led to the
birth of children. Section B will then turn to the law's "interest [
I ... in preserving the marriage status 1 ---an interest which the
legislature advanced by limiting the availability of divorce only
to provable cases of adultery. The section will also turn to the
responses of unhappy spouses. Finally, Section C will look at the
disheartening story of how the law dealt with parents who were
unable to support their children.
A. CreatingMarriages
At common law, a child born out of wedlock was "nullius
filius'"-the child of no one, entitled to neither rights nor standing in the community, and "not looked upon as [a] child [ I for
any civil purposes."" Bastardy was thus a stigma upon both a
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 126 N.E. 508, 509 (N.Y. 1920).
Id.
'0 Messing v. Messing, 76 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947).
" Grilo v. Sherman-Stalter Co., 186 N.Y.S. 810, 812 (App. Div. 3d Dep't), afftd,
132 N.E. 913 (N.Y. 1921).
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child and its parents. It was a stigma designed to deter couples
from engaging in sex or, if deterrence failed, to encourage them
to legitimize their relationship.
One way to encourage legitimation was for the judges themselves to declare children legitimate in borderline cases where
evidence of their status was indeterminate. This result was
achieved through what the New York Court of Appeals labeled
"an established legal presumption that every person is born legitimate." 2 The presumption was "described as 'one of the
strongest and most persuasive [presumptions] known to the
law,'" although it could "be rebutted where to do otherwise would
outrage common sense and reason."13
The general presumption of legitimacy had three subcategories. The first, and most frequently applied, held that "[a] child
born of a wife during marriage" was the "legitimate" child of the
wife's husband. 4 The second rendered children born out of wedre Estate of Fay, 375 N.E.2d 735, 737 (N.Y. 1978) (citations omitted).
"Id.
' Stillman v. Stillman, 148 N.E. 518, 519 (N.Y. 1925). Much of family law in
place in the 1920's remained unchanged in subsequent decades, as this and subsequent footnotes reflect. For cases applying the Stillman principle subsequent to its
date of decision, see Cerone v. Cerone, 395 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1977) (noting presumption of child's legitimacy when born to married parents); Orange v. Rose, 295 N.Y.S.2d 782, 783 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1968) (stating that child
born to married parents is presumed legitimate); People v. Lewis, 267 N.Y.S.2d 728,
730 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1966) (finding unsupported testimony of married woman
that husband was impotent not enough to overcome presumption of legitmacy of
child); Moy Mee Soo v. Leong Yook Yick, 248 N.Y.S.2d 61, 62 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1964) (holding presumption that child of married woman who lived with husband at
time of conception was legitimate was not rebutted); Kehn v. Mainella, 242 N.Y.S.2d
732, 737 (Fain. Ct. Rensselaer County 1963) (noting off-quoted presumption of legitimacy); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 132 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Bronx County
1954) (noting presumption of paternity of "child born in wedlock is very strong"); In
re Kotlik's Estate, 274 N.Y.S. 204, 208 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1934) (stating that
legitimacy of recognized offspring is true presumption); In re Wells' Will, 221 N.Y.S.
714, 724 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1927) (commenting that when child is born of
married parents, presumption is that father of child is mother's husband).
The presumption of legitimacy, which was "one of the strongest ... known to the
law," In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 472 (N.Y. 1930) (citations omitted), af/g in part,
284 N.Y.S. 1019 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1935); accord Commissioner of Pub. Welfare v.
Koehler, 30 N.E.2d 587, 589 (N.Y. 1940) (quoting Findlay, 170 N.E. at 472); Lockwood v. Lockwood, 62 N.Y.S.2d 910, 912 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1946) (finding
since not impossible that husband was child's father, presumption of legitimacy
stands); In re Simpson's Estate, 24 N.Y.S.2d 954, 956 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County) (noting
that presumption of legitimacy is one of strongest legal presumptions), affd, 30
N.Y.S.2d 843 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1941); In re Marcin's Estate, 280 N.Y.S. 665, 668
(Sur. Ct. Westchester County) (citing Findlay, 170 N.E. at 473.), afrd in part, 284
"In
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N.Y.S. 1019 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1935), could be overcome by evidence "convinc[ing]
to the point of entire satisfaction," GG v. HH, 325 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 (App. Div. 3d
Dep't 1971); accordHansom v. Hansom, 346 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998 (Farn. Ct. Richmond
County 1973) (stating that presumption of legitimacy can be overcome by competent
proof), such as blood test results excluding paternity, see C. v. C., 109 N.Y.S.2d 276,
278 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951) (commenting that blood test was conclusive in establishing that plaintiff was not father of disputed issue); Schulze v. Schulze, 35
N.Y.S.2d 218, 220 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1942) (determining blood grouping tests
excluded plaintiff as child's father); Wilferth v. Wilferth, 22 N.Y.S.2d 264, 264 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1940) (holding results of blood test admissible only where exclusion established); B. v. Ben, 334 N.Y.S.2d 229, 233 (Fain. Ct. Nassau County 1972)
(recognizing increasing value of blood grouping tests in paternity suits); Violet v.
John, 320 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773-74 (Faro. Ct. Bronx County 1971) (granting leave to respondent to obtain blood-grouping test to determine paternity); Crouse v. Crouse,
273 N.Y.S.2d 595, 595-96 (Fain. Ct. Nassau County 1966) (holding that blood
grouping test was sufficient to overcome presumption of legitimacy); Gilpin v. Gilpin, 94 N.Y.S.2d 706, 709 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. Kings County 1950) (stating that unborn child will have privilege of blood test to determine parenthood); Saks v. Saks,
71 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800-01 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. Kings County 1947) (discussing accuracy and admissibility of blood tests as evidence); by the fact that the husband
lacked access to his wife when the child was conceived, see People on Complaint of
Nicholaides v. Theodos, 300 N.Y.S. 32, 32 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1937) (noting that
husband was confined to hospital during child's conception); Altomare v. Altomare,
63 N.Y.S.2d 71, 72 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1946) (stating that husband was member
of Armed Forces); Benti v. Benti, 62 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1946)
(finding husband incompetent to testify as to non-access to wife during gestation
period of child); Cobnand v. Dailey, 359 N.Y.S.2d 409, 420 (Fain. Ct. Queens County
1974) (noting that spouses did not cohabit prior to child's birth); the fact that the
husband and wife had been divorced three years prior to the child's birth, see Urquhart v. Urquhart, 92 N.Y.S.2d 484, 489-90 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949) (stating that
recognition of divorce precludes presumption of legitimacy), affd, 97 N.Y.S.2d 200
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1950); or a letter from the wife's paramour declaring, "I love you
and our baby," Anonymous v. Anonymous, 269 N.Y.S.2d 653, 656 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1966) (holding that letter satisfied statutory requirement of written acknowledgment of paternity), affd, 227 N.E.2d 318 (N.Y. 1967). But evidence merely that the
husband was sterile subsequent to the child's birth, see Houston v. Houston, 99
N.Y.S.2d 199, 205-06 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Queens County 1950) (doubting accuracy of
sterility test); or that the wife had committed adultery was not sufficient to render
her offspring illegitimate, see Mannain v. Lay, 308 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't) (holding that proof of adultery is insufficient to overcome presumption of legitimacy), affd, 262 N.E.2d 216 (N.Y. 1970); Gray v. Rose, 302 N.Y.S.2d 185, 187
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 1969) (explaining that establishment of extra-marital relationship of wife does not overcome presumption of child's legitimacy); Buchanan v. Buchanan, 243 N.Y.S. 436, 437 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1930) (same); Lee v. Stix, 286
N.Y.S.2d 987, 992 (Fam. Ct. Ulster County 1968) (finding wife's proof of illicit love
affair insufficient to rebut presumption of legitimacy); Harding v. Harding, 22
N.Y.S.2d 810, 816 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Queens County 1940), affd, 25 N.Y.S.2d 525 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1941); Milone v. Milone, 290 N.Y.S. 863, 865 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y.
County 1936) (noting possibility of wife having committed adultery insufficient proof
to deprive child of legitimacy); unless the wife "had run away from ... [her husband's] home and was living apart from him in unconcealed adultery," Findlay, 170
N.E. at 474.
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lock legitimate if their parents were subsequently married. 5 The
third treated as legitimate children of parents who entered a
marriage in good faith even though courts subsequently held the
marriage void. 6
Another vehicle directed toward the same end as the presumption of legitimacy was the doctrine of common law marriage, which permitted a couple to marry without the formality
of a ceremony. The only prerequisite to the creation of a common
law marriage was the consent of a man and woman to take each
other at the time of the consent as husband and wife. Their present agreement to marry could be oral or in writing and could be
proved7 by circumstantial evidence, such as cohabitation and repute.1

" See People ex rel. Meredith v. Meredith, 69 N.Y.S.2d 462, 465 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't) (analyzing, in dictum, statute providing that child born out of wedlock becomes legitimate upon subsequent marriage of its parents), affd, 77 N.E.2d 8 (N.Y.
1947); In re Hoagland's Estate, 211 N.Y.S. 629, 631-32 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1925)
(holding daughter, born out of wedlock but legitimized upon subsequent marriage of
her parents, was entitled to remainder of trust under father's will).
'r See Polotti v. Flemming, 277 F.2d 864, 867 (2d Cir. 1960) (finding lower court
correctly declared child of invalid marriage to be legitimate where marriage was
contracted in good faith); In re Newins' Estate, 229 N.Y.S.2d 279, 285 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't) (holding child was legitimate despite invalidity of parent's marriage), affd,
187 N.E.2d 360 (N.Y. 1962); Christensen v. Christensen, 240 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963) (holding that child born into subsequently voided marriage was deemed legitimate since subsequent marriage was entered into in good
faith that former marriage was legally dissolved); Connors v. Connors, 226 N.Y.S.2d
106, 109 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1962) (determining although wife's second marriage was void, child born during second marriage deemed legitimate); Lamb v.
Lamb, 307 N.Y.S.2d 318, 326 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1969) (determining that children born to parents who entered into ceremonial marriage were legitimate despite
fact that ceremonial marriage followed husband's invalid divorce from first wife);
Bentley v. Bentley, 76 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Queens County 1948)
(finding child of annulled marriage still remained legitimate); In re Grossman's Estate, 248 N.Y.S. 791, 791-92 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1931) (holding child of invalid
second marriage the legitimate child of both its parents); In re Baker's Estate, 183
N.Y.S. 139, 142 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1920) (presuming legitimacy of child of second, invalid marriage). But see In re Wright's Estate, 243 N.Y.S. 538, 544 (Sur. Ct.
Tioga County 1930) (holding marriage contracted in good faith belief that former
marriage was dissolved by valid decree of divorce was not sufficient to legitimize
child); In re Bruington's Estate, 289 N.Y.S. 725, 729-30 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1936)
(refusing to legitimize a child of a polygamous marriage); In re Thomann's Estate,
258 N.Y.S. 838, 840 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1932) (determining children of foreign
second marriage illegitimate under the laws of New York where valid first marriage
in New York).
" See Kelly v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 352 F. Supp. 270, 273-74 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (finding that common-law marriage may be proven through, among other
things, actual cohabitation or general repute); Fisher v. Fisher, 227 N.Y.S. 345, 349
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The main impact of the doctrine of common law marriage
was to validate otherwise invalid marriages when a couple continued their agreement to live together as husband and wife at a
time and place where common law marriage was recognized. 8
This effect was illustrated by In re Seymour, 9 where a man and
woman who erroneously believed themselves to have been validly married in Pennsylvania came to live in New York in 1903,
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1928) (concluding that man and woman were legally husband
and wife due to marriage ceremony and subsequent cohabitation despite actual invalidity of marriage), affd, 165 N.E. 460 (N.Y. 1929); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 220
N.Y.S. 242, 244-45 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1927) (same); In re Crandall's Estate, 212
N.Y.S. 210, 212 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1925) (holding woman was common law wife of
decedent and was entitled to take share in his estate where they held themselves
out as married couple); Blair v. Blair, 220 N.Y.S. 372, 374-75 (Sup. Ct. Broome
County 1927) (finding common law marriage despite husband's incomplete divorce
from prior marriage where husband and second wife had marriage ceremony and
lived together for three years after valid marriage); Nani v. Nani, 198 N.Y.S. 207,
208 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1923) (concluding that continuous cohabitation constituted common-law marriage); Procita v. Procita, 190 N.Y.S. 21 (Sup. Ct. Fulton
County 1921) (finding declarations of parties stating they were married sufficient to
create presumption of marriage); In re Mandel's Estate, 108 N.Y.S.2d 922, 926 (Sur.
Ct. N.Y. County 1949) (noting marriage may be presumed from matrimonial cohabitation and acknowledgments of couple), affd, 103 N.Y.S.2d 674 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1951); In re White, 223 N.Y.S. 311, 313-14 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1927) (finding invalid ceremonial marriage to be validated by subsequent cohabitation); In re Seymour, 185 N.Y.S. 373, 376 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1920) (commenting that
cohabitation and repute are frequently cited as variables which, if present, constitute common law marriage).
The burden of proving the existence of a common law marriage was on the
party asserting its existence, see In re Pratt's Estate, 251 N.Y.S. 424, 429 (App. Div.
4th Dep't 1931), by "[clear, consistent, and convincing evidence," Boyd v. Boyd, 169
N.E. 632, 634 (N.Y. 1930). A common law marriage would not be found if such a
finding would produce an inequitable result. See Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 21
N.Y.S.2d 297, 298 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1940). Nor were cohabitation and repute alone
sufficient to create a marriage if the parties themselves intended only an illicit relationship. See Graham v. Graham, 207 N.Y.S. 195, 197-98 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1924); Taylor v. Taylor, 298 N.Y.S. 912, 915 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1937); Rodman v. Rodman, 251 N.Y.S. 470, 473 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1931); see also In re
O'Neil's Estate, 64 N.Y.S.2d 714, 720 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1946), affid, 71
N.Y.S.2d 720 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1947); cf In re Fresegna's Estate, 290 N.Y.S. 807
(Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1936). But a couple could agree to transform an illicit relationship into a marriage. See Zy v. Zy, 13 N.Y.S.2d 415,420-21 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Kings
County 1939).
'8 Thus, a common law marriage that was void in one state would become valid
if the parties traveled as husband and wife to another state where no bar existed to
common law marriage in general or to their marriage in particular. See In re Sokoloffs Estate, 2 N.Y.S.2d 602, 605-06 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1938) (noting that it
was within decedentfs power to marry validly in any state other than New York).
'9 185 N.Y.S. 373 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1920); accordIn re Haffner's Estate, 172 N.E. 483, 484 (N.Y. 1930); Farber v. United States Trucking Corp., 265
N.Y.S.2d 324, 326 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1965), affd, 256 N.E.2d 521 (N.Y. 1970).
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when common law marriage was not recognized in the state. As
of December 31, 1907, they were not husband and wife, but when
on January 1, 1908, common law marriage came back into existence in New York and the Seymours thereafter continued their
agreement to live as husband and wife, their marriage became
valid. °
Even after 1933 legislation refused to recognize as legal
common law marriage in New York,"' the State's courts continued to recognize the validity of common law marriages entered
into prior to 193322 or in other jurisdictions.3

Indeed, they even

went so far as to declare that New Yorkers with an uncertain
marital status who went to another state that allowed common
law marriage would be deemed to have gone there "for the express purpose of renewing their consents ... [so as] 'to remove

any doubt as to the validity of their marriage.'" 4
Through the presumption of legitimacy and the doctrine of
common law marriage, New York's courts did what they could to
regularize illicit unions and legitimize their offspring. Men and
women who went through invalid, ceremonial marriages or who
simply cohabited and produced offspring would be treated as
nuclear families unless they manifested a clear intent to the contrary. The law's preference for marriage could hardly have been
more clear.

20 For a similar case, see Applegate v. Applegate, 193 N.Y.S. 494 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1922).
21 See Bobb v. Secretary, Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 312 F. Supp. 225,

226 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); People v. Allen, 261 N.E.2d 637, 640 (N.Y. 1970); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 21 N.Y.S.2d 71, 72 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Bronx County 1940). But see Steele v.
Richardson, 472 F.2d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining that federal courts should not
allow presumption of marriage to be easily rebutted "in order to deny a surviving
spouse her claim to financial support after some period of cohabitation ... especially
when the claim is made under the Social Security Act, which should not be construed in a niggardly fashion to deny coverage").
See In re Benjamin's Estate, 311 N.E.2d 495, 496 (N.Y. 1974); Cavanaugh v.
Valentine, 41 N.Y.S.2d 896, 898 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1943).
2See
Mott v. Duncan Petroleum Trans., 414 N.E.2d 657, 658 (N.Y. 1980); In re
Estate of Watts, 294 N.E.2d 195, 197 (N.Y. 1973); People v. Haynes, 256 N.E.2d 545,
546 (N.Y. 1970); In re Frost's Estate, 316 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1970); McCullon v. McCullon, 410 N.Y.S.2d 226, 228 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1978).
But see Maiorana v. Salerno, 133 N.Y.S.2d 521, 523-24 (Sup Ct. Suffolk County
1954) (deciding that common law marriage will not be found where cohabitation in
other state brief and in absence of evidence at time thereof to take each other as
man and wife).
24In re Schneider's Will, 131 N.Y.S.2d 215, 219 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1954).
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B. PreservingMarriages

1. Adultery as the Sole Ground for Divorce
Not only did New York law encourage cohabiting couples to
enter into marriage; it also strove to keep them there by limiting
the grounds of divorce. Indeed, for the first two-thirds of the
twentieth century, only a single ground for divorce-adulteryexisted in New York." The fact that spouses had "acted in disregard of th[eir] marriage for a long period of time ... [would] not

destroy its validity" 6 provided their disregard had taken a form
other than adultery. Indeed, one case held that even a husband's
act of homosexual sodomy would not give a wife ground for divorce. While the court was "sympathetic with plaintiff [wife's]
plight," it felt "powerless to alleviate it."27
Moreover, not every act of adultery served as a ground for
divorce. Thus, if one spouse had procured or connived at the
other's adultery,28 had condoned or forgiven it,29 or had failed to
seek a divorce within five years of its discovery, 0 a suit for divorce would not lie. Further, a divorce would not be granted if
both spouses had been guilty of adultery.31
As has already been suggested, however, unhappy spouses
constantly attempted to maneuver around these restrictions by
2See
Greenberg v. Greenberg, 218 N.Y.S. 87, 94 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1926)
(commenting that adultery is only sufficient reason for divorce); Johnson v. Johnson,
261 N.Y.S. 523, 526 (Sup. Ct. Schenectedy County 1933) (reasoning that adultery is
only grounds in New York that dissolves marriage bond); Weir v. Weir, 226 N.Y.S.
115, 120 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1927) (stating that adultery was sole ground to
obtain absolute divorce).
2' In re Goode's Estate, 188 N.Y.S. 188, 189 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1921), aff'd,
197 N.Y.S. 916 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1922).
27 Cohen v. Cohen, 103 N.Y.S.2d 426,428 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1951).
2See Parsons v. Parsons, 181 N.Y.S. 642, 645 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1920)
(dictum); Hartman v. Hartman, 91 N.Y.S.2d 529, 530 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949).
2See
Paddleford v. Paddleford, 209 N.Y.S. 891 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1925) (per
curiam); Ryan v. Ryan, 229 N.Y.S. 511, 515 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1928); Abbott v.
Abbott, 228 N.Y.S. 611, 612 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1928); Pepin v. Pepin, 206 N.Y.S.
732, 733 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1924). But cf Braunstein v. Braunstein, 12
N.Y.S.2d 491, 492-93 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1939) (holding that release of claims in
separation agreement does not constitute condonation); Kinley v. Kinley, 115
N.Y.S.2d 341, 342-43 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1952) (deciding that single act of
intercourse by husband under influence of alcohol does not constitute condonation).
3' See Beauley v. Beauley, 191 N.Y.S. 398 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1921) (per curiam).
"' See Stillman v. Stillman, 187 N.Y.S. 383, 388 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County
1921).
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obtaining "collusive or fraudulent divorce[s]" 32 and "[dlivorces by
agreement."33 In response, the courts, "interested in preserving
the marriage status,"34 developed new strictures against easy divorce. For example, even if a defendant defaulted in a divorce
case, the plaintiff had to produce evidence of adultery in order to
obtain a judgment.35 It was likewise "well settled that mere
admissions by a defending spouse uncorroborated to a satisfactory degree" would not alone support a judgment for divorce.36
Finally, judges learned to be skeptical of testimony offered by
private detectives employed by one spouse to produce incriminating evidence against the other spouse 37 as well as other questionable sorts of witnesses, such as "prostitutes" and "persons [who]
consort openly, knowingly, and willfully with adulterers."38
As a result of these strictures, many courts ruled particular
evidence of adultery insufficient and declined to grant requested
divorces.39 In one case, for example, in which a man in military
32

Messing v. Messing, 76 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947); accord

Fuchs v. Fuchs, 64 N.Y.S.2d 487, 489 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1946).
" Crowley v. Crowley, 186 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1959); cf.
Aminoff v. Aminoff, 145 N.Y.S.2d 358, 360 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1955).
34Messing, 76 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
" See id. (stating that divorce will not be granted without formal proof of adultery); see also Simons v. Simons, 58 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1945)
(holding that rule that default divorce will not be granted based on uncorroborated
testimony is not followed in litigated cases). But cf Weiss v. Weiss, 238 N.Y.S. 36,
38 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1929) (concluding that temporary alimony should not be
granted to wife who fails to deny husband's claim of adultery).
3rIrwin v. Irwin, 69 N.Y.S.2d 780, 783 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1946); Mangine
v. Mangine, 67 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1946).
17 See Kruczek v. Kruczek, 35 N.Y.S.2d 289, 294 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1942)
(explaining that uncorroborated testimony of private detective must be carefully
scrutinized), affd, 47 N.E.2d 434 (N.Y. 1943); Braun v. Braun, 281 N.Y.S. 25, 29
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1935) (noting evidence of detectives in divorce case must be
evaluated in light of fact they were hired by opposing party); Elsworth v. Elsworth,
224 N.Y.S. 620, 621 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1927) (per curiam) (finding detective's testimony may be used in case but not determinative).
" Witchley v. Witchley, 226 N.Y.S. 95, 97 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1927). But
see Vartling v. Vartling, 203 N.Y.S. 753, 753 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1924) (reasoning
that divorce should not be denied on ground of immorality of witness who testified
he had committed adultery with defendant wife). Another arguable safeguard
against finding adultery too easily was the requirement that the issue be determined by a jury. See Smith v. Smith, 225 N.Y.S. 606, 607 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County
1927).
'9See Rolfe v. Rolfe, 279 N.Y.S. 796 (App. Div. 3d Dep't. 1935) (per curiam);
Nottingham v. Nottingham, 204 N.Y.S. 750, 752 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1924); Cohen v.
Cohen, 141 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1955); Brooks v. Brooks, 120
N.Y.S.2d 335, 337 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1953); Spafford v. Spafford, 36 N.Y.S.2d
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service had confessed to "adulterous relations with French girls,"
and his chaplain had written that he was "in the guardhouse for
going to see this girl without pass or furlough,"40 the court refused to grant his wife a divorce. In the court's view, the only
evidence was the defendant's own confession, with corroboration
from the chaplain proving "nothing more than that the defendant is undisciplined and disobedient."4
It is important to emphasize, though, that, at least in the
1920's, the rules for appraising evidence of adultery in the context of divorce were not manipulated in a fashion suggestive of
discrimination against women. On the contrary, judges expressed their awareness "of the frailties and viciousness of'
men.42 With that awareness, they were prepared to listen seriously to an accusation, for example, that a husband had committed adultery with his mother-in-law. Given their awareness,
they did not find the accusation "so inherently improbable as to
be beyond belief,"43 and they accordingly required the husband to
submit evidence of his innocence.
2. Circumventing Prohibitions on Divorce
The difficulty of obtaining divorce in New York induced
many unhappy spouses to seek other ways out of marriage. Two
such ways existed: suing for divorce in another state or seeking
340, 341 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1942).
"' Mathews v. Mathews, 69 N.Y.S.2d 875, 875-76 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1946).
at 876. Other cases, in contrast, allowed proof of adultery by circumstan41 Id.
tial evidence. See Cullen v. Cullen, 199 N.Y.S. 598, 599 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1923);
Trumpet v. Trumpet, 215 N.Y.S.2d 921, 924 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961); Fleck v.
Fleck, 163 N.Y.S.2d 218, 220 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1957). It was enough, said
one court, that the defendant spouse and the co-respondent "had the lascivious desire and ... the opportunity to gratify it" to create an inference that intercourse had
occurred. Kay v. Kay, 256 N.Y.S. 147, 155 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1932); accord Jacobstein v. Jacobstein, 201 N.Y.S. 1, 3 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1923), affid, 204 N.Y.S.
918 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1924), affd, 148 N.E. 761 (N.Y. 1925). Thus, a spouse found
in a hotel or bedroom partially disrobed or otherwise residing with a member of the
opposite sex could be found guilty of adultery, see Parkas v. Parkas, 39 N.Y.S.2d
836, 837 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1943); Baron v. Baron, 299 N.Y.S. 280, 282 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1937); Miller v. Miller, 208 N.Y.S. 113, 114-15 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1925);
Lorenzo v. Lorenzo, 197 N.Y.S. 474, 475 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1922); as could one
found kissing someone other than a spouse in a parked automobile, see Dickenson v.
Dickenson, 81 N.Y.S.2d 294, 295 (Sup. Ct. Herkimer County 1948); or one present in
his own apartment with one or more prostitutes, see Gannon v. Gannon, 45 N.Y.S.2d
260, 261 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1943).
42 Gelbman v. Gelbman, 184 N.Y.S. 902, 903 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1920).
4 Id. at 903.
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an annulment of their marriage in New York. The courts strove
to make both devices as unavailable as possible in recognition of
the threat that they presented to the State's policy of protecting
marriage.
a. Out-of-State Divorces

Central to the State's effort to restrict the effectiveness of
out-of-state divorces in New York was the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Federal Constitution." It determined whether
New York would be free to enforce its own divorce policies. Until
1943, when the United States Supreme Court held that states
were required to give full faith and credit to the divorce judgments of sister states," New York courts jealously guarded the
State's freedom to ignore out-of-state divorces and thereby bind
its own domiciliaries to the policies which the State had adopted
in regard to divorce.
46 in
The leading case in the 1920's was Hubbard v. Hubbard,
47
which the Court of Appeals declared the State's courts
"untrammeled" by the full faith and credit clause and hence free
to give divorce decrees of other states "the efficacy and effect
they deem rightful and salutary in view of the public policy of
the state."48 Observing that the policy of the State was "to promote the permanency of the marriage contracts and the morality
of the citizens of the state" by allowing divorce only on grounds of
adultery, the Court declared itself the final judge "of the occasions on which the exercise of comity [to recognize an out-of-state
divorce] will or will not make for justice or morality" and further
held that, in light of New York's policies, it would not enforce "a
divorce decree of a sister state which violates the principles of
morality, or the public policy, or municipal regulations established by it."49 In particular, New York courts generally would
not recognize divorces on grounds other than adultery granted by

4See
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (providing that "[fhull Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State").
45 See infra note 343 and accompanying
text.
46 126 N.E. 508 (N.Y. 1920).
" Throughout this article, Court of Appeals will be used to refer to the New
York State Court of Appeals, New York's highest court.
4Hubbard,
126 N.E. at 509.
49 Id.
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other states in the presence of only one spouse," although they
were prepared to recognize even a divorce granted by a foreign
nation for adultery.5 1
b. Annulments
In view of the difficulty of obtaining a divorce in New York
for adultery and of gaining recognition of an out-of-state divorce
on grounds other than adultery, many New Yorkers seeking an
end to their marriage turned to the third device available to
them-the device of annulment, a judicial declaration that their
marriage had never existed.52 An annulment could be obtained
on any of three grounds- duress, fraud, or incapacity.
Duress was the ground for annulment in Fratello v.

c See Stevens v. Stevens, 7 N.E.2d 26, 26 (N.Y. 1937); Lowe v. Lowe, 192 N.E.
291, 292 (N.Y. 1934); Fischer v. Fischer, 173 N.E. 680, 681 (N.Y. 1930); Dean v.
Dean, 149 N.E. 844, 844 (N.Y. 1925); Ball v. Cross, 132 N.E. 106, 107 (N.Y. 1921);
McCall v. McCall, 228 N.Y.S. 347, 348 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1928) (per curiam);
Greenberg v. Greenberg, 218 N.Y.S. 87, 94 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1926); Beeck v.
Beeck, 208 N.Y.S. 98, 103 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1925); Kelsey v. Kelsey, 197 N.Y.S.
371, 372 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1922); Kaiser v. Kaiser, 182 N.Y.S. 709, 710 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1920), affd, 135 N.E. 902 (N.Y. 1922); Johnson v. Johnson, 261 N.Y.S. 523,
526 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1933); Weir v. Weir, 226 N.Y.S. 115, 120-21 (Sup.
Ct. Onondaga County 1927); Knill v. Knill, 195 N.Y.S. 398, 400 (Sup. Ct. Fulton
County 1922); In re Bennett's Estate, 238 N.Y.S. 723, 736 (Sur. Ct. Kings County
1929). But see Beischer v. Beischer, 235 N.Y.S. 652, 653 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1929);
Hatch v. Hatch, 187 N.Y.S. 568, 568 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1921); Rocco v. Rocco,
228 N.Y.S. 405, 407 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County 1928); Moody v. Soper, 191 N.Y.S.
425, 427 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1921), aff/d, 198 N.Y.S. 933 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1923).
" See Gould v. Gould, 138 N.E. 490, 493 (N.Y. 1923); Boissevain v. Boissevain,
231 N.Y.S. 529, 532 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1928), affd, 169 N.E. 130 (N.Y. 1929).
52 See Butler v. Butler, 198 N.Y.S. 391, 395-96 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1923). A
court granting an annulment, however, could make an appropriate decree for the
wife's support, see Martin v. Martin, 282 N.Y.S.2d 31 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1967);
Newburger v. Newburger, 228 N.Y.S.2d 323, 325 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1961), affd, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1962); Fleck v. Fleck, 237
N.Y.S.2d 116, 117 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1963); Schaefer v. Schaefer, 158
N.Y.S.2d 204, 207 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1956); Shaw v. Shaw, 81 N.Y.S.2d
684, 686 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948); Medici v. Medici, 279 N.Y.S.2d 910, 912-13
(Fain. Ct. Dutchess County 1967), or declare the legitimacy of children of the marriage, even in proceedings subsequent to those brought to obtain the annulment, see
Hiser v. Davis, 137 N.E. 596, 598-99 (N.Y. 1922); Ohlson v. Ohlson, 54 N.Y.S.2d 900,
902 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1945); Bracy v. Bracy, 3 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 (Dom. Rel.
Ct. Queens County 1938); but cf McCarter v. McCarter, 227 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1962) (stating child born out of wedlock who is legitimized by parents' marriage would be declared illegitimate if father obtained annulment from
court).
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53 where the groom and his relatives threatened that if
Fratello,
the plaintiff did not marry him, "they would kidnap her, take her
to New York, disfigure her face by cutting it, and would also destroy the house of plaintiffs father by blowing it to pieces."54 The
plaintiff and her family "not only believed that these men would

carry into execution this threat, but ...
were justified in such be-

lief."55 Fortunately, after the marriage ceremony, the bride was
able to escape, go into hiding, and bring suit.
More importantly, annulments could be had for fraud. The
basic rule, proclaimed by the Court of Appeals, was that a valid
marriage required "consent by ...
[the] parties" thereto, that "[ilf

either party consent[ed] by reason of fraud there [was] no reality
of consent," and that "[h]ence the marriage [was] voidable."56
Annulments for fraud were usually difficult to obtain, however,
because they would be "decreed, not for any and every kind of
fraud," but only for frauds deemed by the courts "'vital' to the
marriage relationship.""7
In determining the issue of the importance of any particular
fraud, courts focused, in a categorical fashion, on the type of
fraud perpetrated rather than on the significance of the fraud in
the injured spouse's individualized hierarchy of values. One
category of fraud that was always held to vitiate a marriage, but
probably produced few annulments, was sexual impotence. 8
"Capability of consummation [was] an implied term in every
marriage contract; and in the case of marriages between young
persons, capacity for lawful sexual indulgence [was] regarded as
of special importance to the happiness of the wedded state and to
the fulfillment of the ends of matrimony, viz. a lawful indulgence
of the passions in order to prevent licentiousness."59 Thus, if a
husband lacked "potentia copulandi" and was incapable of
"copula vera," defined as "ordinary and complete intercourse" or
"natural and perfect coition,"" a wife was entitled to an annul5' 193 N.Y.S. 865 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1922).
14 Id.
at 867.
s'Id.

"Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 184 N.E. 60, 61 (N.Y. 1933); Caleca v. Caleca, 103
N.Y.S.2d 752, 753 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1951).
17 Woronzoff-Daschkoff v. Woronzoff-Daschkoff,
104 N.E.2d 877, 880 (N.Y.
1952).
58 The impotence cases can also be analyzed as cases of incapacity.
Vanden Berg v. Vanden Berg, 197 N.Y.S. 641, 642 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1923).
"Steinberger v. Steinberger, 33 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
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ment.6" Similarly, if a wife was suffering from "a nervous condition, an uncontrollable tension"6 2 or from "an erratic nervous
condition characterized by a contraction of the sphincter muscles
of the vagina" which made her "incapable of sexual intercourse
with the plaintiff, though not with other persons, if such be possible, a decree of nullity [could] be granted."6 3
A similar category of cases consisted of those in which one
spouse refused to engage in sexual relations with the other.
Only a few such cases, however, found this to be grounds for annulment. An annulment would not be granted, for instance, if
there was "an adequate excuse" for a wife's "refusal to cohabit,"
such as a husband's failure "to perform his marital obligations of
Even an unjustified reproviding a home and maintenance."'
fusal to engage in sexual relations constituted no more than a
ground for separation,6 5 unless the refusal resulted from some
condition preexisting the marriage, such as homosexuality6 6 or a
1940); accord Jerosolimski v. Jerosolimski, 188 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1959) (per curiam) (granting annulment of marriage based upon fraud in inception by concealment by defendant of his sexual impotence); Rubin v. Joseph, 213
N.Y.S. 460, 461 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1926) (affirming annulment where it was clearly
shown that defendant had been physically incapable of entering into the marriage);
Shaff v. Shaff, 23 N.Y.S.2d 651, 653 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1940) (enforcing contract
whereby wife would receive support in exchange for bringing annulment proceedings on basis of husband's impotency); see also Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325
N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1971) (granting annulment to husband who
discovered on wedding night that his "wife" had male sexual organs, even though
"she" promised to have them removed). But cf. Gabriel v. Gabriel, 79 N.Y.S.2d 823,
825 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1948) (denying annulment because of insufficiency of proof
that husband was "entirely and permanently incapable of performing marital functions").
61 But see Anonymous v. Anonymous, 74 N.Y.S.2d 899, 901 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County (1947), which refused to grant an annulment to "a woman past middle life"
who had married "a man much her senior" obviously "in feeble health" with "a
tremor"and "difficulty walking." Id. (emphasis in original). In the court's view "her
expectations of sexual enjoyment should not [have] be[en] judged by the standards
of youth but proportioned to their years." Id.
62 Hiebink v. Hiebink, 56 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), affd, 56
N.Y.S.2d 397 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1945).
' Vanden Berg, 197 N.Y.S. at 642. But cf. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 49
N.Y.S.2d 314, 317 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1944) (denying annulment for incapacity
arising after marriage even though marriage was never physically consummated
before incapacity occurred).
4 Kershner v. Kershner, 278 N.Y.S. 501, 504 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1935), affld,
200 N.E. 43 (N.Y. 1936).
See Eldredge v. Eldredge, 43 N.Y.S.2d 796, 798 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1943).
cSSee Sophian v. Von Linde, 253 N.Y.S.2d 496, 499 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1964),
affd, 209 N.E.2d 823 (N.Y. 1965). But see Freitag v. Freitag, 242 N.Y.S.2d 643, 643
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desire for some form of "unnatural and perverted" sex with one's
spouse which a court found "disgusting and deserving of utmost
condemnation."6 7 A refusal of sexual relations would otherwise
constitute a ground for annulment only if an intent to refuse had
been formed secretly prior to the marriage.6 8
A similar kind of fraud occurred when an unmarried, pregnant woman coerced a man into marrying her by telling him
falsely that he was the father of her child. Courts uniformly
granted annulments to such husbands upon their discovery of
the fraud,69 provided they could prove that the woman was actually pregnant 0 and that they were not the father.71 But, normally, the courts would not grant an annulment of a marriage
between the actual parents of a child conceived prior to mar(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963) (denying annulment despite husband's concealment of
"prior homosexuality" when couple had "a not unhappy honeymoon and an uneventful three weeks of cohabitation upon their return" before he became impotent);
Shapiro v. Shapiro, 136 N.Y.S.2d 870, 871 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954) (denying annulment despite husband's concealment that "he was not a normal person sexually"
because couple had cohabited for eight years and had child).
67 Becher v. Becher, 74 N.Y.S.2d 44, 48 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1947). But
see Lyman v. Lyman, 87 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1949)
(refusing annulment for want of proof of husband's premarital propensity to molest
wife's children by prior marriage).
68 See De Baillet-Latour v. De Baillet-Latour, 94 N.E.2d 715, 717 (N.Y. 1950);
Florio v. Florio, 143 N.Y.S.2d 105, 107 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955); Miller v. Miller,
228 N.Y.S. 657, 657-58 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1928). But see Johnson v. Johnson,
169 N.Y.S.2d 97, 99 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957) (finding evidence insufficient to
prove preexisting intent not to have sexual relations); Lopez v. Lopez, 169 N.Y.S.2d
74, 76 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957) (finding husband's refusal to have ordinary marital relations was not sufficient grounds for annulment); Eldredge, 43 N.Y.S.2d at
797 (refusing annulment absent allegation that defendant entered into marriage
with no intention of consummating it).
"9See Carlson v. Carlson, 164 N.Y.S.2d 462, 463 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1957); Gordon v. Gordon, 232 N.Y.S. 541, 541 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1929) (per curiam); A.C. v.
B.C., 176 N.Y.S.2d 794, 796 (Sup. Ct. Chenango County 1958); Cuneo v. Cuneo, 96
N.Y.S.2d 899, 906 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950).
" See Garfinkel v. Garfinkel, 191 N.Y.S.2d 574, 575 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1959)
(per curiam); Donovan v. Donovan, 263 N.Y.S. 336, 337 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1933).
71 See Kingsbury v. Kingsbury, 75 N.Y.S.2d 699, 702 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County
1947) (finding that man's knowledge that child was not his to give up for adoption
was not sufficient grounds for annulment); Iati v. Iati, 272 N.Y.S. 32, 33 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1934) (holding that question of child's paternity coupled with husband's
cohabitation after birth of child precluded annulment based on fraud); see also
Guido v. Guido, 175 N.Y.S.2d 634, 635 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1958) (denying
annulment when husband testified he never had premarital relations with his wife
and thus could not have been misled by her assertion that he was father of her
child).
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Annulments were routinely granted on such rare grounds as
concealment of drug addiction,7 3 of a prior conviction for rape,74 of
a "pathologic sexuality known as voyeurism," 5 of a venereal disease 76 or some other "loathsome contagious disease,"77 or of a
known incapacity to bear children.78 More complex, however,
72

See Figueroa v. Figueroa, 110 N.Y.S.2d 550, 556 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1952);

Senator v. Senator, 42 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1941), affd, 42
N.Y.S.2d 433 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1943); Smith v. Smith, 221 N.Y.S. 672, 676 (Sup.
Ct. Onondaga County 1927). But an annulment has been granted where both parties
lacked the intent to enter into a valid marriage and did not cohabit after the ceremony occurred. See Amsden v. Amsden, 110 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309-10 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1952). But see Erickson v. Erickson, 48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. Chautauqua
County 1944) (denying annulment to wife); Delfino v. Delfno, 35 N.Y.S.2d 693, 696
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1942) (denying annulment when parties cohabited after
marriage).
73See Leventhal v. Liberman, 186 N.E. 675, 676 (N.Y. 1933); O'Connell v.
O'Connell, 194 N.Y.S. 265, 269-70 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1922); Courreges v. Courreges, 229 N.Y.S.2d 73 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1961); Lockwood v. Lockwood,
220 N.Y.S.2d 718, 719 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1961).
74See Giannotti v. Giannoti, 60 N.Y.S.2d 74, 76 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1946)
(allowing annulment where husband failed to reveal his prior conviction for rape);
see also Rosano v. Rosano, 94 N.Y.S.2d 717, 718 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1950)
(granting annulment to wife of habitual criminal serving long sentence who had
promised to "go straight"). But cf Trefry v. Trefry, 76 N.Y.S.2d 323, 323 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester County 1947) (refusing to grant annulment for failure to reveal two
convictions for intoxication); Smith v. Smith, 44 N.Y.S.2d 826, 827 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1943) (refusing to allow annulment where husband induced wife into marriage by claiming he was a law-abiding citizen).
75Potter v. Potter, 275 N.Y.S.2d 499, 499 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1966).
76See Licato v. Licato, 298 N.Y.S. 768, 770 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1937)
(granting annulment where husband concealed having "a chronic contagious and
hereditary venereal disease" at time of marriage); see also Jacobson v. Jacobson, 202
N.Y.S. 96, 98 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1923) (suggesting husband had disease entailing
"'dire and disastrous possibilities, directly affecting the marital relation").
77Lapides v. Lapides, 171 N.E. 911, 913 (N.Y. 1930) (holding that epilepsy is not
"loathsome contagious disease"); accord Leventhal, 186 N.E. at 676. But cf Lustig v.
Lustig, 56 N.Y.S.2d 284, 285 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1945) (denying annulment on
grounds that misrepresenting reasons for draft classification did not constitute
fraud); Greco v. Greco, 59 N.Y.S.2d 320, 321 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1945)
(refusing to grant annulment for "nervousness and headaches" which first developed
one year after marriage).
a See Williams v. Williams, 11 N.Y.S.2d 611, 614 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1939) (holding that husband's concealment of inability to beget children was
grounds for annulment on the basis of fraud); see also Marks v. Marks, 77 N.Y.S.2d
269, 270 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1948) (finding that allegation of fraudulent concealment of heart condition rendering pregnancy dangerous raises issue of fact for
jury). But see Lapides, 171 N.E. at 913 (concluding that mere inability to bear children, without fraudulent concealment, does not warrant annulment); see also
Kronman v. Kronman, 286 N.Y.S. 627, 629 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1936) (finding claim
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were suits for annulment on the much more common ground of
insanity. Of course, an insane person could never give consent to
a contract of marriage, and hence a proper representative of
someone who was insane at the time of marriage could always
sue to annul the marriage.79 By judicial decision, on the other
hand, the sane spouse could not sue for an annulment,0 unless
proof was available to show that the insane spouse, in a lucid
moment, had fraudulently given assurances of sanity.8 ' Subsequent legislation, however, allowed either spouse to sue even in
the absence of a lucid moment of fraud. 2
Incapacity, as already noted, was the final basis for annulment. Two forms of incapacity were the nonage of one or both
spouses 8 or their consanguinity.' Probably the most common
form of legal incapacity was that one of the spouses was lawfully
married to a third person."5 In this last situation, sorting out
of fraudulent concealment of sterility was insufficient for annulment absent allegation of material nature of fact to plaintiff); Korn v. Korn, 242 N.Y.S. 589, 591 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1930) (per curiam) (deciding that mere sterility is not ground for annulment).
" See Rattray v. Raynor, 180 N.E.2d 429, 430 (N.Y. 1962); Van Wyck v. Stapp,
13 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1939) (per curiam); cf. Kaplan v. Kaplan,
176 N.E. 426 (N.Y. 1931). But see Kemmelick v. Kemmelick, 186 N.Y.S. 3, 4 (Sup.
Ct. Erie County 1921).
" See Hoadley v. Hoadley, 155 N.E. 728, 730 (N.Y. 1927); Reed v. Reed, 186
N.Y.S. 897, 898 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1921); Chaddock v. Chaddock, 226 N.Y.S. 152,
156-57 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1927). But see Whitney v. Whitney, 201 N.Y.S.
227, 234-35 (Sup. Ct. Jefferson County 1923).
8' See Sleicher v. Sleicher, 167 N.E. 501, 503 (N.Y. 1929) (dictum); Smith v.
Smith, 184 N.Y.S. 134, 137 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1920); see also Goldsmith v.
Goldsmith, 107 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1951) (per curiam).
12 See 1928 N.Y. Laws, c. 83 (amending law to allow
for annulments); see also
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 7 (1928) (listing types of voidable marriages).
See Keegan v. Keegan, 204 N.Y.S. 405, 406 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1924); Nealon
v. Nealon, 187 N.Y.S. 295, 296 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1921); Wolf v. Wolf, 185 N.Y.S.
37, 39 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1920); Ranaudo v. Ranaudo, 190 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1959); Selakoff v. Selakoff, 92 N.Y.S.2d 144, 145 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1949); Retan v. Mathewson, 226 N.Y.S. 80, 85 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1927); Kellogg v. Kellogg, 203 N.Y.S. 757, 762 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1924);
Foley v. Foley, 203 N.Y.S. 674, 676 (Sup. Ct. Oswego County 1924); Kuykendall v.
Kuykendall, 182 N.Y.S. 308, 310 (Sup. Ct. Tioga County 1920). But a court, in its
discretion, could deny such an annulment. See Short v. Hotaling, 225 N.Y.S.2d 53,
55 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962); Todaro v. Todaro, 200 N.Y.S. 567, 568 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1923). Such a marriage could also be validated by its continuation after
the under-age spouse came of age. See Matturro v. Matturro, 111 N.Y.S.2d 533, 53738 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1952).
See Audley v. Audley, 187 N.Y.S. 652, 653 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1921) (finding
marriage between uncle and niece void).
" See Blek v. Blek, 114 N.E.2d 192, 193 (N.Y. 1953); Landsman v. Landsman, 96
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which of two marriages should be recognized as valid often presented courts with difficult problems.
Consider, for example, two cases arising out of the chaos of
World War I. In the first, a young woman named Annastasia in
1903 married Steve Schultz in Dubra, then part of AustriaHungary and now part of Bosnia.8 6 She bore a daughter in 1905,
and she lived with her husband until she came to New York in
1912, with every expectation that he would follow. However, the
outbreak of war in 1914 prevented his coming, and in 1918 she
learned that he had died. She then married Conrad Chayka,
with whom she lived until she learned in 1932 from her daughter

in Austria that Steve Schultz was still alive. She immediately
left Chayka. Then in 1938 her Austrian daughter wrote from
Russia that Schultz had just died in Yugoslavia. On her testimony to these facts, the court held her still to be married to
Chayka'
A similar case arose from Emanuel Hayden's marriages. In
1913 in Russia he had married Molly Hayden, to whom a child
was born the next year. Emanuel was drafted into the Russian
army, captured by the Germans, and confined as a prisoner of
war in Germany, where he heard that "his wife had been murN.E.2d 81, 82 (N.Y. 1950); Johnson v. Johnson, 68 N.E.2d 499, 499 (N.Y. 1946);
D'Arcangelo v. D'Arcangelo, 102 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1951); Canwright v. Canwright, 76 N.Y.S.2d 10, 12 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1947); In re Frost's Will,
37 N.Y.S.2d 921, 923 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1942); Strobel v. Strobel, 233 N.Y.S.2d 81,
82 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1962); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 232 N.Y.S.2d 467, 468
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 228 N.Y.S.2d 4 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1962); Richards v. Richards, 153 N.Y.S.2d 979, 983 (Sup. Ct. Washington County 1956); Weis v. Weis, 108 N.Y.S.2d 396, 399 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1951); Amsterdam v. Amsterdam, 56 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945);
Bamberger v. Bamberger, 217 N.Y.S. 675, 677 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1926); In re
Liebman's Estate, 253 N.Y.S.2d 461, 466 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1963); Brown
v. Brown, 274 N.Y.S.2d 484,488 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1966); People ex rel. Bolinski
v. Bolinski, 122 N.Y.S.2d 16, 18 (Utica City Ct. 1953); cf. In re Estate of Brown, 358
N.E.2d 883, 886 (N.Y. 1976). A good deal ofjudicial hostility arose to claims made by
someone other than a spouse when two spouses had cohabited in a "decent and orderly" fashion over a long period of time. Esmond v. Thomas Lyons Bar & Grill, 274
N.Y.S.2d 225, 228 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1966); accordIn re Peart's Estate, 97 N.Y.S.2d
879, 888 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1950); Dunham v. Dunham, 150 N.Y.S.2d 752, 753
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1956); In re Gropen's Estate, 294 N.Y.S. 558, 560 (Sur. Ct.
Bronx County 1937).
" See GARY MOKOTOFF & SALLYANN AMDUR SACK, WHERE ONCE WE WALKED:
A GUIDE TO THE JEWISH COmdUNITIES DESTROYED IN THE HOLOCAUST 78 (Teaneck,
N.J.: Avotaynu, Inc., 1991); THE COLUMBIA LIPPINCOTT GAZETTEER OF THE WORLD
537 (Leon E. Seltzer ed., 1952).
"' See Chayka v. Chayka, 41 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488-90 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1943).
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dered in one of the many 'pogroms' incidental to Jewish life in
Russia during the late war."88 At the end of the war he escaped
to the Netherlands and in 1920 migrated to New York, from
where he continued to try to contact his wife. In 1921, however,
he received confirmation through a cousin in New York that his
wife and child had indeed been murdered in the pogrom. Believing Molly dead, he married Ida Hayden in 1922, with whom he
promptly had a second child in 1923. In the same year, Molly
contacted him, he ceased cohabiting with Ida, and finally in 1925
he was able to bring Molly and his first child to the United
States. On this evidence, the court validated his marriage with
Molly and annulled his marriage with Ida, concluding that he
had always acted "in good faith" and had simply been a victim "of
the chaotic and disturbed social, economic, and political conditions which existed in Russia" resulting in a "dislocation of the
normal channels of communication." 89
The legislature sought to provide a remedy in cases such as
these,"0 and incidentally to make annulments more difficult to
obtain, by a 1922 statute91requiring a person who believed his or
her spouse to be dead to conduct an investigation, present the
results of the investigation to a court, and obtain a court order
declaring the first marriage null before proceeding to take a new
spouse. But the only impact of the statute was to increase legal
expenses for a party seeking to remarry following the undocumented death of a first spouse and to create a possibility that
court orders
would be erroneously and perhaps even fraudulently
92
procured.
88

Hayden v. Hayden, 215 N.Y.S. 326, 327 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1926).
Id. at 328.

"See Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 220 N.Y.S. 420, 422 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1927); VanWyk v. Realty Traders, Inc., 213 N.Y.S. 28, 30 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1926);
In re McNell's Estate, 66 N.Y.S.2d 227, 229-30 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1946); cf.De
Yong v. De Yong, 32 N.Y.S.2d 505 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1942); Sorenson v. Sorenson,
202 N.Y.S. 620, 625 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1924), affd, 220 N.Y.S. 242 (App. Div.
2d Dep't 1927).
81 See Laws of 1922, c. 279 (amending Domestic Relations Law to require search
for spouse absent for five consecutive years before dissolution of marriage); see also
In re Santos, 230 N.Y.S. 395, 400 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1928) (stating that mere
passage of five years does not authorize spouse to remarry, as determination of
death of prior spouse must be made by court).
92 See In re Magaraci, 215 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1961); Dye v.
Dye, 93 N.Y.S.2d 95, 101 (Sup. Ct. Chautauqua County 1949). Another area of confusion surrounding the annulment doctrine involved promises of a religious nature.
One issue was whether an annulment was appropriate when a spouse prior to a civil
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In all other cases, courts typically, although not invariably,
denied annulments. As the Court of Appeals declared, "[m]ere
nondisclosure as to birth, social position, fortune, good health,
and temperament [could] not vitiate the marriage contract."9 3 It
later reiterated that annulments were available only "for fraud
as to matters 'vital' to the marriage relationship .... Premarital
falsehoods as to love and affection [were] not enough, nor disclosure that one partner 'married for money."'9 4 As to matters such
as these, the "rule of caveat emptor still ha[d] some application
to the parties contracting marriage."9 5
Judges, in short, were always aware that they could "not
grant annulments solely because of sympathy... ."" They knew
that plaintiffs often "resort[ed] to the process of annulment" out
of "a desire for freedom from marital bonds" rather than because
marriage ceremony fraudulently agreed to be married again in a subsequent religious ceremony and then failed to honor the agreement. Prior to the 1950s, some
cases granted such annulments, see Rutstein v. Rutstein, 222 N.Y.S. 688, 690 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1927); Watkins v. Watkins, 189 N.Y.S. 860, 861 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1921); Rozsa v. Rozsa, 191 N.Y.S. 868, 869 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1922), while others
did not, see McHale v. McHale, 67 N.Y.S.2d 794, 794 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1947);
Morris v. Morris, 67 N.Y.S.2d 760, 762 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1947); Vonbiroganis
(Von Brack) v. Von Brack, 64 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1946). Then,
in 1958, the Court of Appeals declared it "settled" that such annulments were appropriate. See Brillis v. Brillis, 149 N.E.2d 510, 511 (N.Y. 1958). The courts were
also split on whether to grant annulments for one spouse's failure to honor a commitment to adopt the other spouse's religion, compare Williams v. Williams, 86
N.Y.S.2d 490, 491 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1947) (granting annulment), with Nilsen
v. Nilsen, 66 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1946) (denying annulment),
and declared that similar promises to raise children in a particular religion "cannot
be treated lightly," Ross v. Ross, 149 N.Y.S.2d 585, 589 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1956),
even when they were declining to enforce them, accord Martin v. Martin, 68
N.Y.S.2d 41, 42 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1947). Another religious issue that
came before the courts in the 1970's was whether Orthodox Jewish men could be
compelled to provide their wives with a "Get," or Jewish religious divorce, upon
their wives obtaining a secular divorce. See Waxstein v. Waxstein, 395 N.Y.S.2d 877,
879 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1976), affd, 394 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1977).
03 Lapides v. Lapides, 171 N.E. 911, 913 (N.Y. 1930);
accord Harris v. Harris,
161 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1957) (per curiam); Baxter v. Baxter, 169
N.Y.S.2d 871, 874 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957); Ozark v. Ozark, 75 N.Y.S.2d 430,
434 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1947).
Woronzoff-Dascbkoffv. Woronzoff-Dashkoff, 104 N.E.2d 877, 880 (N.Y. 1952);
accord Washburn v. Washburn, 62 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1946); Griffin v. Griffin, 204 N.Y.S. 131, 136 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), affd, 205
N.Y.S. 926 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1924).
9' Chaddock v. Chaddock, 226 N.Y.S. 152, 157 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1927)
(dening annulment for lunacy).
Darling v. Darling, 105 N.Y.S.2d 475, 478 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1951)
(refusing to grant annulment despite mutual consent).
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of some "fundamental fraud," and therefore they were always on
guard "to weigh each case to determine whether it [was] honestly
within the law, or [was] a sham carefully tailored and camouflaged to circumvent and defeat law."9 7 Accordingly, judges routinely refused to grant annulments because a spouse allegedly
had married for money98 or social status99 rather than love."'
In the end, the cases on annulment, like those on divorce
and full faith and credit, reflected the judiciary's constant con97 McLean
98 See

v. McLean, 143 N.Y.S.2d 129, 130 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1955).

Avery v. Avery, 236 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1962)

(denying annulment despite fact that one party married other for money); Cantor v.
Cantor, 234 N.Y.S.2d 600, 602 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1962) (stating that hidden
intent to marry for money was not so detrimentally vital to marriage to be ground
for annulment); Protopapas v. Protopapas, 47 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Sup. Ct. Erie County),
affd, 47 N.Y.S.2d 287 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1943) (refusing to grant annulment
merely because husband failed to procure a good living, absent misrepresentation of
that fact); Berardino v. Berardino, 280 N.Y.S. 13, 16 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1935)
(finding misrepresentation of prospective husband's wealth not so essential to marriage contract to warrant annulment); Smelzer v. Smelzer, 265 N.Y.S. 220, 221
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1933) (finding future husband's misstatement of financial
condition insufficient to invalidate marriage).
See Pawloski v. Pawloski, 65 N.Y.S.2d 413, 414 (Sup. Ct. Cayuga County
1946) (denying annulment where defendant represented self to be of German rather
than Polish descent).
'0o But see Tuchsher v. Tuchsher, 184 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1959) (discussing facts where defendant misrepresented to spouse income and insurance situation); Madden v. Madden, 125 N.Y.S.2d 384, 385 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1953) (commenting on situation where defendant covertly placed chattel
mortgage on wedding gifts after promising not to keep secrets); Feynman v. Feynman, 4 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1938) (analyzing circumstances
where defendant married for financing of medical education without intention of
cohabiting with spouse); Ryan v. Ryan, 281 N.Y.S. 709, 710-11 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1935) (discussing facts where wealthy American married rich foreigner scheming to
take his money).
Judges also tended to be sympathetic to annulment suits when a defendant had
lied about love solely to marry an American citizen and thereby gain entry into the
United States in circumvention of the immigration law and where the marriage had
not been consummated by cohabitation. See, e.g., Brillis v. Brillis, 149 N.E.2d 510,
511 (N.Y. 1958); Miodownik v. Miodownik, 19 N.Y.S.2d 175, 175 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1940); Bracksmayer v. Bracksmayer, 22 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1940); Rubman v. Rubman, 251 N.Y.S. 474, 488 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1931); see
also Fusco v. Fusco, 107 N.Y.S.2d 286, 288 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1951). Marriages would also be annulled when one spouse falsely claimed to have United
States citizenship. See Shapiro v. Shapiro, 36 N.Y.S.2d 532, 533 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1942); Laage v. Laage, 26 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941);
Truiano v. Truiano, 201 N.Y.S. 573, 574 (Sup. Ct. Warren County 1923). For cases in
which evidence did not warrant a finding of fraud, see Harley v. Harley, 185
N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1959); Novick v. Novick, 185 N.Y.S.2d
388, 389 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959).
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cern to prevent "the floodgates of litigation" from being "thrown
wide open" in ways that would ease the termination of marriages
and thereby produce "an extension of the legislative enactment
by judicial decree.""' The courts were always careful to avoid
"legislation by the judiciary." 02

Hence, annulments, like di-

vorces, remained difficult to obtain throughout the 1920's and
1930's.
C. Protectingthe Childrenof Marriage
1. Custody
Despite the untiring efforts of judges to protect children by
legitimizing cohabitation as marriage and by preventing marriages from terminating, some children nonetheless found themselves heir to broken marriages. At that point, judges had to determine to whom custody of a child would be awarded.
Throughout the twentieth century, judges have always invoked a vague standard, such as "the welfare of the child" 10 3 or
"what is best for the interest of the child,"' 4 as determinative of
custody disputes. But, in fact, the standard has proved somewhat different, as judges have developed more precise rules for
determining custody. They have, for example, always held it "in
the best interest of the child to avoid shifting custody from one
parent to another" or otherwise "to disturb the existing custodial
arrangements."'
'0'
Darling v. Darling, 105 N.Y.S.2d 475, 478 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1951).
10Id.
3 People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 2 N.E.2d 660, 661 (N.Y. 1936) (per curiam);
accordLincoln v. Lincoln, 247 N.E.2d 659, 661 (N.Y. 1969); People ex rel. Cachelin v.
Cachelin, 238 N.Y.S.2d 869, 870 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1963); Shuffnan v. Shuffman,
200 N.Y.S.2d 949, 950 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1960), affd, 175 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1961);
People ex rel. Templeton v. Lynn, 107 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1951)
(per curiam); People ex rel. Spreckels v. DeRuyter, 269 N.Y.S. 100, 103 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1934).
"' Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925); accord People ex rel. Herzog
v. Morgan, 39 N.E.2d 255, 256 (N.Y. 1942); Frank F. v. Geraldine F., 386 N.Y.S.2d
127, 128 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1976); In re Hellman, 42 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1943), affd, 53 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y. 1944); In re Thoemmes' Guardianship, 264
N.Y.S. 829, 830 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1933); Cooke v. Cooke, 220 N.Y.S. 550, 551
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1927).
' De Francesco v. Mac Nary, 425 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1980).
"Priority," it was said, "should, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, be
accorded to the first custody awarded in litigation or by voluntary agreement." Nebra v. Uhlar, 372 N.E.2d 4, 4 (N.Y. 1977); accord Corradino v. Corradino, 400
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More precise rules also developed for making initial custody
determinations as distinguished from decisions whether to alter
existing ones. In formulating these rules, courts in the 1920's
started from the proposition that "the rights of the husband and
wife to the custody of their infant children [were] equal,"" 6 although the "primary right to ...
custody ...
[was] in the father." 7
But judges did not permit the rights of the parties to become dispositive. The moral protection of children remained their primary concern, and hence they focused on moral fault as evidence
of the fitness of each parent for custody. For example, it was
"unusual to award the custody of the children to the unsuccessful
party" in a divorce action on grounds of adultery, "in the absence
of clear and convincing evidence that the successful party was
unfit.""°8 Thus, when a mother obtained a divorce on the grounds
of the father's cohabitation with another woman, and their 14year-old son testified "that he could no longer stay with the father, because of his open and continuous association with her,"
custody was granted to the mother, as she was found to be "a
woman of good character, of a degree of refinement, of strict notions of the propriety of relationships, such as were being maintained by the defendant with the correspondent, having great affection for the children, and anxious to do all in her power for
their well-being, education, and correct moral training." 9 In anN.E.2d 1338 (N.Y. 1979); Ebert v. Ebert, 346 N.E.2d 240, 242 (N.Y. 1976); DiBello v.
DiBello, 432 N.Y.S.2d 32, 32 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1980); Noel v. Derrick, 418
N.Y.S.2d 481, 482 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1979); Austin v. Austin, 410 N.Y.S.2d 688, 689
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 1978); Sandman v. Sandman, 407 N.Y.S.2d 563, 564 (App. Div.
2d Dep't 1978); People ex rel. Selbert v. Selbert, 400 N.Y.S.2d 586, 587 (App. Div. 3d
Dep't 1977); Papernik v. Papernik, 390 N.Y.S.2d 337, 338 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1976);
McAteer v. McAteer, 389 IV.Y.S.2d 491, 491 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1976); Schuler v.
Schuler, 286 N.Y.S.2d 69, 70 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1968); People ex rel. Chuz v. Reiter,
125 N.Y.S.2d 328 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1953) (per curiam); In re Alaimo, 233 N.Y.S.2d
508, 515 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1962); Burns v. Burns, 205 N.Y.S.2d 448, 453
(Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1960); Wise v. Aldrich, 431 N.Y.S.2d 791, 796 (Fain. Ct.
Rensselaer County 1980); Coleman v. Coleman, 386 N.Y.S.2d 928, 930 (Faro. Ct.
Rockland County 1976). Custody would be altered only in response to a material
change in circumstances. See Sheil v. Sheil, 298 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1969); see also Lazar v. Lazar, 283 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1967) (per
curiam); Consaul v. Consaul, 63 N.Y.S.2d 688, 690 (Sup. Ct. Jefferson County 1946);
Odette R. v. Douglas R., 399 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1977).
106 Haskell v. Haskell, 194 N.Y.S. 28, 30 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1922), af/d, 142
N.E. 314 (N.Y. 1923).
'07Cariola v. Cariola, 225 N.Y.S. 692, 694 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1927)
(citation omitted).
'0See id. (citations omitted).
"69
Id. at 695.
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other case, however, where the evidence showed that a mother
had "sustained improper relations" with her employer "at divers
times and places, and particularly at a hotel in the city of Corning,""' the court awarded custody of her eight-year-old daughter
was somewhat
to the child's father, even though his "health ...

shattered,""' because the court found him "a man of good habits,
good reputation, and both morally and financially a fit and
proper person to have the care, custody, and control of his little
daughter."" Similarly, in a third case, a mother addicted to
morphine was denied custody of her child."'
Another common issue in custody cases was whether children who had been left in the care of other relatives should remain in the custody of those relatives or returned to the custody
of one of their parents. Although courts sometimes declared that
[their] children, and
parents were "the natural guardian[s] of ...
under ordinary circumstances ...entitled to their custody and

control,"' judges also observed that they had the "duty, to act at
all times for the best interests of the children, and, if their welfare require[d] that their custody be given to their grandparents"
or other collateral relatives," 5 the latter would retain custody."6
"0People ex rel. Jones v. Johnson, 199 N.Y.S. 695, 697 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1923).
Id. at 697.
...
112 Id.

"3

See Darlington v. Cobb, 239 N.Y.S. 301, 302 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1930); see

also People ex rel. Glendening v. Glendening, 288 N.Y.S. 840, 847 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1936).
114 People ex rel. Roberts v. Kidder, 242 N.Y.S. 108, 109 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1929); accord Tyrrell v. Tyrrell, 415 N.Y.S.2d 723, 724 (App. Div. 4th Dep't), aff/d,
393 N.E.2d 1041 (N.Y. 1979); Isaacs v. Murcin, 327 N.Y.S.2d 126, 127 (App. Div. 4th
Dep't 1971); In re Connors, 321 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1971); People
ex rel. Linton v. Linton, 112 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1952); People ex
rel. Pizzitola v. Ciccosillo, 108 N.Y.S.2d 447,448 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1951); In re Boses, 105 N.Y.S.2d 569, 569-70 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1951); People ex rel. Hausler v.
Stegmeier, 267 N.Y.S. 428, 430 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1933), affd, 191 N.E. 526 (N.Y.
1934); In re Dailey, 204 N.Y.S.2d 321, 323 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1960); People ex
rel. Hacker v. Strongson, 141 N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1955);
People ex rel. Elkins v. St. Coleman's Home, 131 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1954). The same principle applied in cases where children were in the care
of foster parents. In re Sanjivini K., 385 N.Y.S.2d 350 (App. Div. 2d Dep't), rev'd on
other grounds, 359 N.E.2d 1330 (N.Y. 1976); State ex rel. Wallace v. Lhotan, 380
N.Y.S.2d 250 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1976); Darrow v. Weston, 223 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1961).
m"Kidder, 242 N.Y.S. at 110; accord Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 283
(N.Y. 1976); Guzzo v. Guzzo, 411 N.Y.S.2d 408,410 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1978); People
ex rel. Gallinger v. Gallinger, 391 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1977); In re
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Cleaves, 175 N.Y.S.2d 736, 740 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1958); In re Hill, 161 N.Y.S.2d
379, 382 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1957); Laub v. Caltobelotta, 219 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961); see also In re Bush, 91 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sup. Ct.
Steuben County 1949), modified, 103 N.Y.S.2d 341 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1951); Ex
parte Vzga, 104 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup. Ct. Columbia County 1951); Ex parte Szczygiel,
51 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1944); People ex rel. Pitcher v. Powell, 37
N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1942); People ex rel. Pascale v. Lanza, 2
N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1938); cf State v. Lascaris, 322 N.Y.S.2d 426
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1971) People ex rel. Brussel v. Brussel, 119 N.Y.S.2d 149 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't), modified, 121 N.Y.S.2d 256 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1953); Dick v. Scarfia, 183 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1959); Spade v. Spade, 163 N.Y.S.2d
146 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1957).
"6 Receipt of custody was important because a custodian enjoyed substantial
control over a child's life. Custodians, for example, were entitled to a child's earnings. See In re Laponzina, 116 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1952)
(granting right to earnings despite finding that father had exploited son). They
could control the child's religious upbringing. See Ross v. Ross, 430 N.Y.S.2d 712,
713 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1980); Garvar v. Faltings, 389 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1976); Mester v. Mester, 296 N.Y.S.2d 193, 198 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1969); O'Neill v. O'Neill, 255 N.Y.S.2d 776, 779 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965); Paolella
v. Phillips, 209 N.Y.S.2d 165, 167 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1960); Gluckstern v.
Gluckstern, 158 N.Y.S.2d 504, 508 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1956), af'd, 165 N.Y.S.2d
432 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1957), affd, 151 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1958); Romano v. Romano, 283 N.Y.S.2d 813, 816 (Fain. Ct. Kings County 1967). But see Robert 0. v.
Judy E., 395 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352 (Fain. Ct. Erie County 1977); Battaglia v. Battaglia,
172 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1958). It was within the court's discretion, however, to permit the child to determine his or her own religion. See Martin v. Martin, 123 N.E.2d 812, 812 (N.Y. 1954); Hehman v. Hehman, 178 N.Y.S.2d
328, 331 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1958); In re Vardinakis, 289 N.Y.S. 355, 361
(Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1936). Under appropriate circumstances, however, a
custodial parent would be held to the terms of a separation agreement respecting
religious upbringing. See Perlstein v. Perlstein, 429 N.Y.S.2d 896, 900 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1980). Noncustodial parents, however, did have a right to participate in educational determinations affecting their children. See G. v. G., 345 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1973); People ex rel. Delany v. Mt. St. Joseph's Academy of Buffalo, 189 N.Y.S. 775, 778 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1921), aff'd, 138 N.E. 448 (N.Y. 1922).
But see Margaret B. v. Jeffrey B., 435 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (Fain. Ct. Warren County
1980). Of course, parents could bind themselves by agreement, see Haskell v.
Haskell, 202 N.Y.S. 881 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1924), af/'d, 173 N.E. 870 (N.Y. 1930),
but they were required to educate their children in a fashion consistent with state
law, see In re Auster, 100 N.Y.S.2d 60, 65 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1950), affd, 102
N.Y.S.2d 418 (App. Div. 2d Dep't), affd, 100 N.E.2d 47 (N.Y. 1951). No contract by
which a parent placed his or her children under the control of an educator or educational institution was specifically enforceable; a parent could always regain custody
of his children and, if the regaining of custody constituted a breach of contract, was
responsible for the breach only in damages. See People ex rel. Rich v. Lackey, 248
N.Y.S. 561, 566 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1930). Noncustodial parents also had a right
of visitation. See Chirumbolo v. Chirumbolo, 429 N.Y.S.2d 112, 114 (App. Div. 4th
Dep't 1980); Marciano v. Marciano, 392 N.Y.S.2d 747, 749 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1977); Petraglia v. Petraglia, 392 N.Y.S.2d 697, 698 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1977); Farhi
v. Farhi, 407 N.Y.S.2d 326, 327 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1978); Murnane v. Murnane,
221 N.Y.S.2d 28, 28 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1961); Doe v. Doe, 30 N.Y.S.2d 141, 141
(Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1941). Indeed, a custodial spouse who interfered with
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2. Support

Thus, the law concerning child custody was, in general, consistent with the judiciary's practice of protecting children. So too
was the law concerning economic support. Traditional doctrines
of alimony and child support, as they existed into the 1970's, required former husbands to support their wives, and parents, especially fathers, to support their children.
The law of support started with the principle that a husband
and wife, upon separation or divorce, could enter into an agreethe visitation rights of the other spouse could be held in contempt of court, see
Berkman v. Berkman, 393 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1977); deprived of
support, see Doe v. Doe, 378 N.Y.S.2d 269, 277-78 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1975); D. v.
0., 352 N.Y.S.2d 842, 846 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1974); or even denied custody, see
Entwhistle v. Entwhistle, 402 N.Y.S.2d 213, 215-16 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1978); Calhoun v. Calhoun, 79 N.Y.S.2d 702, 705 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), affd, 79 N.Y.S.2d
514 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1948) (modifying divorce decree to provide for children's stay
at boarding school so that both husband and wife would have equal access rights),
but cf. Hotze v. Hotze, 394 N.Y.S.2d 753, 755-57 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1977) (denying
visitation when harmful to child's emotional health); Wolf v. Wolf, 220 N.Y.S.2d 472,
473 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1961) (refusing visitation while parent undergoing treatment); People ex rel. Strauss v. Steindler, 227 N.Y.S. 726, 729 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1928) (commenting that visitation should not be granted after more than eight years
of abandonment of child); Kesseler v. Kesseler, 178 N.Y.S.2d 811, 812 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1958) (stating that visiting parent can be prohibited from exposing child to
exploitation for publicity purposes during visitation), af/d, 201 N.Y.S.2d 194 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 180 N.E.2d 402 (N.Y. 1962); Pottish v.
Pottish, 88 N.Y.S.2d 394, 396 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948) (suspending visitation
temporarily when extremely inconvenient for custodial spouse), modified, 89
N.Y.S.2d 893 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1949); Homer v. Homer, 49 N.Y.S.2d 720, 725
(Dom. Rel. Ct. Bronx County 1944) (temporarily suspending visitation which seemed
threatening to child during litigation). Finally, a noncustodial parent who removed
children from a custodial spouse in excess of visitation rights was guilty of a crime.
See People v. Obertance, 432 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476-77 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx County
1980); cf Pereira v. Pereira, 319 N.E.2d 413, 418 (N.Y. 1974). Under special circumstances, even grandparents and collateral relatives could obtain visitation rights.
See LoPresti v. LoPresti, 387 N.Y.S.2d 412, 415 (N.Y. 1976); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 269 N.Y.S.2d 500, 504 (Fain. Ct. Queens County 1966). But see People ex rel.
Scalise v. Naccari, 118 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1953); Noll v. Noll, 98
N.Y.S.2d 938, 941 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1950).
Proceedings to determine custody were not always of a strictly adversarial nature. Although the fundamental due process rights of all parties had to be honored,
see Allers v. Allers, 139 N.E. 777, 780 (N.Y. 1923); Borkowski v. Borkowski, 396
N.Y.S.2d 962, 965 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County 1977), the judges' concern for promoting the interests of children authorized them to use some rules different from those
applicable in the typical adversarial context, see P. v. P., 403 N.Y.S.2d 680, 682
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978). For other cases resolving procedural issues in the context of custody disputes, see People ex rel. McCanliss v. McCanliss, 175 N.E. 129
(N.Y. 1931); In re Thorne, 148 N.E. 630 (N.Y. 1925); In re Kernan, 288 N.Y.S. 329
(App. Div. 4th Dep't), affd, 4 N.E.2d 737 (N.Y. 1936); Chamberlin v. Chamberlin,
184 N.Y.S. 464 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1920).
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ment for the husband to make "regular, substantial, periodic
payments" for the support of his wife and any minor children." 7
It was "the policy of the courts to encourage parties to settle
their differences privately,"" 8 and therefore, separation agreements were routinely enforced,"' especially to bar husbands from
"7 Jackson v. Jackson, 49 N.E.2d 988, 990 (N.Y. 1943); accord McGahee v. Kennedy, 400 N.E.2d 285, 285 (N.Y. 1979); Hirsch v. Hirsch, 333 N.E.2d 371, 372-73
(N.Y. 1975); Fabrikant v. Fabrikant, 225 N.E.2d 202, 203 (N.Y. 1967); Kuniholm v.
Kuniholm, 183 N.E.2d 692, 693 (N.Y. 1962); Nichols v. Nichols, 119 N.E.2d 351, 354
(N.Y. 1954); Hettich v. Hettich, 105 N.E.2d 601, 603 (N.Y. 1952); Weintraub v. Weintraub, 96 N.E.2d 724, 726 (N.Y. 1951); In re Rhinelander's Estate, 47 N.E.2d 681,
684 (N.Y. 1943); Schmelzel v. Schmelzel, 38 N.E.2d 114, 115-16 (N.Y. 1941); Kelly v.
Kelly, 31 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1940); Clayburgh v. Clayburgh, 185 N.E. 701, 702 (N.Y.
1933); Pelkey v. Pelkey, 435 N.Y.S.2d 138, 140 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1980); Stoneberg
v. Stoneberg, 433 N.Y.S.2d 860, 861 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1980); Mann v. Wasserberger, 410 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1978); Berzins v. Berzins, 407
N.Y.S.2d 899, 900 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1978); Sears v. Sears, 21 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 1940); In re Warren, 202 N.Y.S. 586, 590 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1924); Kendall v. Kendall, 193 N.Y.S. 658, 660 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1922); Van Horn
v. Van Horn, 188 N.Y.S. 98, 100 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1921); Clurman v. Clurman,
373 N.Y.S.2d 951, 953 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975), affd, 382 N.Y.S.2d 281 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1976); Levine v. Levine, 359 N.Y.S.2d 744, 745 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1974); Hartigan v. Hartigan, 219 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1961), affd,
226 N.Y.S.2d 31 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1962); Dubin v. Dubin, 22 N.Y.S.2d 246, 249
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1940), aff'd, 27 N.Y.S.2d 446 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1941); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 225 N.Y.S. 431, 434 (Sup. Ct. Cayuga County 1927); Leith v.
Leith, 206 N.Y.S. 687, 688 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1924); Everitt v. Everitt, 201
N.Y.S. 305, 306 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1923); Jewett v. Jewett, 359 N.Y.S.2d 441,
444 (County Ct. Broome County 1974); In re Porter's Estate, 137 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sur.
Ct. N.Y. County 1954); O'Brien v. Springer, 107 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (Sup. Ct.
Herkimer County 1951). A "lump sum" separation agreement was held void under
New York law. Von Tresckow v. Von Tresckow, 181 N.Y.S.2d 406, 407 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1958); accord Kyff v. Kyff, 35 N.E.2d 655, 657 (N.Y. 1941); Spector v.
Spector, 267 N.Y.S.2d 959, 962 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County), affid, 265 N.Y.S.2d 632
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1965); Norris v. Norris, 140 N.Y.S.2d 217, 220 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1955); Adams v. Adams, 91 N.Y.S.2d 886, 888 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1949).
"" Martin v. Martin, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1005 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1980); accord
Goldman v. Goldman, 26 N.E.2d 265, 267 (N.Y. 1940); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 188
N.Y.S.2d 455, 457 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1959); cf Lacks v. Lacks, 189 N.E.2d 487,
489-90 (N.Y. 1963) (Dye & Fuld, JJ., concurring). But see Seelau v. Seelau, 198
N.Y.S. 41, 42-43 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1923) (distinguishing agreements to deal
with consequences of separation from agreements to separate, which are void as
against public policy).
"9 See Nopper v. Nopper, 409 N.E.2d 1355, 1356 (N.Y. 1980); Shedler v.
Shedler, 187 N.E.2d 361, 362 (N.Y. 1962); Mohrmann v. Kob, 51 N.E.2d 921, 922-23
(N.Y. 1943); Alexandre v. Davis, 394 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976);
Berkley v. Berkley, 142 N.Y.S.2d 273, 278 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1955); cf. Paul
S. v. Roberta S., 397 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570 (Fam. Ct. Queens County 1977). However, if
a separation agreement had been merged into and thus superseded by a subsequent
divorce decree, it would be treated like any other part of the decree. See Horne v.
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seeking reductions in their support payments.2 However, a wife
could sue to set aside an agreement if it "exonerate[d] the husband ... from his obligation or 'diminish[ed]' it"'" or was otherwise "unconscionable,"2 or if the wife was "actually unable to
Home, 239 N.E.2d 348, 349 (N.Y. 1968); Rehill v. Rehill, 116 N.E.2d 281, 285 (N.Y.
1953); Resslhuber v. Resslhuber, 393 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1977);
Jaeckel v. Jaeckel, 40 N.Y.S.2d 491, 493 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1943); Schacht v.
Schacht, 62 N.Y.S.2d 488, 490 (Doam. Rel. Ct. Queens County 1946); In re Moller's
Estate, 283 N.Y.S. 365, 367 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1935).
'2 See Bowmer v. Bowmer, 406 N.E.2d 760, 763 (N.Y. 1980); Kleila v. Kleila, 406
N.E.2d 753, 756-57 (N.Y. 1980); Iseman v. Iseman, 369 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1975); Monfette v. Van Sickle, 351 N.Y.S.2d 46, 48 (Fain. Ct. Ulster County
1973). Agreements were also enforced against wives seeking additional support
money. See Silver v. Silver, 327 N.E.2d 816, 817-18 (N.Y. 1975); Heaney v. Heaney,
403 N.Y.S.2d 687, 690 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1978); Berenberg v. Berenberg,
148 N.Y.S.2d 169, 172 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1956); Sommer v. Sommer, 94 N.Y.S.2d
23, 24 (Sup. Ct. Queens County), affd, 100 N.Y.S.2d 141 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1950).
But see Boden v. Boden, 366 N.E.2d 791, 793-94 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that separation
agreement does not bar claim for increased support for children); La Scala v. La
Scala, 422 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1979) (holding that alimony provided for in separation agreements would not be increased absent showing that wife
was unable to support herself); Kern v. Kern, 319 N.Y.S.2d 178, 183-84 (Fain. Ct.
N.Y. County 1970) (holding court not bound by separation agreement if evidence established a change in circumstances regarding the need for child support); Earle v.
Earle, 130 N.Y.S.2d 238, 240-41 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1954) (stating that
separation agreement did not preclude filing of petition for child support); cf. Gould
v. Hannan, 380 N.E.2d 145, 145 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that improved financial circumstances of father alone did not warrant upward modification of child support);
Jarvis v. Jarvis, 415 N.Y.S.2d 557, 558-59 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978) (noting court
without authority to alter child support for brain damaged adult child); Natalie M.
v. Philip M., 396 N.Y.S.2d 752, 753 (Fain. Ct. Queens County 1977) (holding father
liable for child support payments past stipulated date of termination due to child's
handicap).
12' Haas v. Haas, 80 N.E.2d 337, 339 (N.Y. 1948); accord Hoops v. Hoops, 55
N.E.2d 488, 490 (N.Y. 1944); Garlock v. Garlock, 18 N.E.2d 521, 522 (N.Y. 1939);
Henderson v. Henderson, 405 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1978); Slocum
v. Slocum, 345 N.Y.S.2d 188, 190 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1973); La Porte v. La Porte,
381 N.Y.S.2d 752, 755-56 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1976); Thorn v. Thorn, 263
N.Y.S.2d 184, 186-87 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965); Stampler v. Stampler, 224
N.Y.S.2d 185, 190 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961); Burkhardt v. Burkhardt, 215
N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1961); Blaufarb v. Blaufarb, 186
N.Y.S.2d 806, 810 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), modified, 191 N.Y.S.2d 785 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1959); Deitch v. Deitch, 149 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955);
Strahl v. Strahl, 64 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1946); Dee v. Dee, 169
N.Y.S.2d 789, 793 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Bronx County 1957). But see Kromberg v. Kromberg, 376 N.E.2d 923, 924 (N.Y. 1978) (upholding agreement granting wife marital
residence in lieu of periodic support).
122Hamlin v. Hamlin, 230 N.Y.S. 51, 57 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1928); accord Pomerance v. Pomerance, 93 N.E.2d 832, 833 (N.Y. 1950); Tirrell v. Tirrell, 133 N.E. 569
(N.Y. 1921); Donnarumma v. Donnarumma, 420 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1979); Tillinghast v. Tillinghast, 16 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1940); Heaney v. Heaney, 7 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1938), affd, 20
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Additionally,

judges would never allow a couple undergoing an annulment,
separation, or divorce "to actually conspire to require a spouse to
apply for and receive public assistance for herself and one's children when the other spouse ...[was] unquestionably capable of

supporting his family." 24
If a support agreement had been set aside or repudiated"s or
if none had ever existed, it was the duty of the court in a divorce
or separation action to fix the amount of support.126 Here again,
N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 1939); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 199 N.Y.S.2d 207, 210-11 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County), af/'d, 202 N.Y.S.2d 225 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1960); Oppenheimer v.
Oppenheimer, 192 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959), modified, 205
N.Y.S.2d 936 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1960), affd, 182 N.E.2d 119 (N.Y. 1962); City
Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Macfadden, 131 N.Y.S.2d 232, 239 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1954); Friedman v. Friedman, 114 N.Y.S.2d 874, 880-81 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1952); cf Stewart v. Stewart, 223 N.Y.S. 603, 605 (Sup. Ct. Livingston
County 1927). If a portion of an agreement was invalid, a court could nonetheless
enforce the remainder of the agreement. See Ferro v. Bologna, 286 N.E.2d 244, 246
(N.Y. 1972). But see In re Wilson's Estate, 405 N.E.2d 220, 223 (N.Y. 1980)
(commenting that severability of provisions depends on intent). For a case where a
husband pleaded fraud and collusion, see Pisano v. Pisano, 419 N.Y.S.2d 15 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1979).
m McMains v. McMains, 206 N.E.2d 185, 186 (N.Y. 1965); accord Goldring v.
Goldring, 424 N.Y.S.2d 270, 272 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1980); Apkarian v. Apkarian,
331 N.Y.S.2d 239, 239-40 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1972).
"2 La Porte, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
See Rennie v. Rennie, 38 N.E.2d 143 (N.Y. 1941); Cavellier v. Cavellier, 168
N.Y.S.2d 65 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1957); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 299 N.Y.S. 511 (App. Div.
4th Dep't 1937); Zysman v. Zysman, 251 N.Y.S. 355 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1931);
Newport v. Newport, 228 N.Y.S. 313 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1928); Nilsson v.
Nilsson, 108 N.Y.S.2d 954 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1951).
2'6In order to obtain information required for calculating the amount of support,
a court could demand disclosure of financial information by the parties, even before
trial, despite the ordinary prohibition on pretrial discovery in matrimonial matters.
See Schiffman v. Schiffman, 407 N.Y.S.2d 221 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1978); Billet v.
Billet, 384 N.Y.S.2d 826 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1976); Roussos v. Roussos, 434
N.Y.S.2d 600, 603-04 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1980); Rubin v. Rubin, 391 N.Y.S.2d
37 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1976); Grant v. Grant, 375 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975); Sagnard v. Sagnard, 370 N.Y.S.2d 446 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1975); Becker v. Becker, 234 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1962); Rann v.
Rann, 283 N.Y.S.2d 426, 429 (Fam. Ct. Bronx County 1967). But see Brenner v.
Brenner, 385 N.Y.S.2d 547 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1976); Meyerhoff v. Meyerhoff, 341
N.Y.S.2d 667 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1973); Campbell v. Campbell, 184 N.Y.S.2d 479
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1959). Furthermore, a court could take tax consequences into
account by allocating an award between alimony, which was taxable income to a
wife, and child support, which was taxable to a husband. See Kraunz v. Kraunz, 56
N.E.2d 90, 91-92 (N.Y. 1944); Covello v. Covello, 414 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1979); Rothschild v. Rothschild, 339 N.Y.S.2d 428 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1972). But cf Yates v. Yates, 51 N.Y.S.2d 135, 138 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1944).
Incident to granting support, a court could also adjudicate the disposition of jointly
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concepts of moral fault and male duty dominated judicial decision making. Thus, if a wife had been the guilty party responsible for the separation or divorce, then support would be fixed
only at a minimum amount that would keep her from becoming a
public charge.' If, on the other hand, a husband had been the
guilty party or both parties had been guilty,'s then his wife was
entitled to a greater amount of support on the basis of her income and needs 9 (including her requirements for legal servheld property. See Kahn v. Kahn, 371 N.E.2d 809, 812 (N.Y. 1977); Tsavaris v.
Tsavaris, 359 N.E.2d 331 (N.Y. 1976); Perry v. Perry, 434 N.Y.S.2d 496, 498 (App.
Div. 4th Dep't 1980); Mazzarelli v. Mazzarelli, 391 N.Y.S.2d 443 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1977), affd, 377 N.E.2d 738 (N.Y. 1978); Bonardi v. Bonardi, 389 N.Y.S.2d 135, 136
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1976); Scampoli v. Scampoli, 387 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1976); Wages v. Wages, 332 N.Y.S.2d 94 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1972); Mazur v.
Mazur, 331 N.Y.S.2d 449, 450 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1972); McLaughlin v. McLaughlin,
295 N.Y.S.2d 963, 964 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1968); Cox v. Cox, 43 N.Y.S.2d 707 (App.
Div. 3d Dep't 1943); Susan W. v. Martin W., 392 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1977); Garthley v. Garthley, 194 N.Y.S.2d 557 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1959); Levine v. Levine, 187 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1959); McDonald
v. Driscoll, 426 N.Y.S.2d 678, 679-80 (Far. Ct. Onondaga County 1980); King v.
King, 418 N.Y.S.2d 531, 535-36 (Fain. Ct. Schoharie County 1979). But cf Zeitler v.
Zeitler, 348 N.Y.S.2d 448 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1973) (granting foreign divorce same
effect as domestic divorce and holding that wife was entitled to maintain partition
action).
"2 See Kayser v. Kayser, 420 N.Y.S.2d 412 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1979); Schwatzman v. Schwatzman, 403 N.Y.S.2d 317 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1978); Leif v. Leif, 390
N.Y.S.2d 429 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1976); Krane v. Krane, 373 N.Y.S.2d 275, 276-77
(Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1975); Milton v. Milton, 361 N.Y.S.2d 825, 826 (Fain. Ct.
Queens County 1974); Glover v. Glover, 314 N.Y.S.2d 873, 877 (Faro. Ct. Queens
County 1970); Camhi v. Camhi, 25 N.Y.S.2d 559, 560 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Kings County
1941); Sternheim v. Sternheim, 20 N.Y.S.2d 823, 824 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County
1940). But see Mammon v. Mammon, 387 N.Y.S.2d 882, 883 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1976). Of course, a husband had no duty to provide support if his wife at the time of
divorce possessed resources sufficient to avoid becoming a public charge, see McKay
v. McKay, 371 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Fain. Ct. Ontario County 1975); Salvatore v. Salvatore,
57 N.Y.S.2d 564, 568 (Doam. Rel. Ct. Queens County 1945); Peterson v. Peterson, 52
N.Y.S.2d 907, 909-10 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Kings County 1945); People ex rel. Ford v. Ford,
207 N.Y.S. 245, 247 (Erie County Ct. 1924), even if she subsequently became a public charge, see Mellen v. Mellen, 361 N.Y.S.2d 28 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1974) (by implication); Reed v. Thompson, 355 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Fam. Ct. Monroe County 1974).
123 See Madderom v. Madderom, 355 N.Y.S.2d 24 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1974);
Taylor v. Taylor, 430 N.Y.S.2d 29 (Sup. Ct. Orleans County 1980); Germer v. Germer, 4 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1938). But see Belandres v.
Belandres, 395 N.Y.S.2d 458 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1977); Recht v. Recht, 321
N.Y.S.2d 398 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1971).
'2See D'Andrea v. D'Andrea, 379 N.Y.S.2d 147 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1976); Prospero v. Prospero, 331 N.Y.S.2d 318, 320-21 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1972); Kane v. Kane,
201 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1960); Seitz v. Seitz, 183 N.Y.S. 79 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1920); Winter v. Winter, 328 N.Y.S.2d 46, 48 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1971), modified, 331 N.Y.S.2d 747 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1972), affd, 293 N.E.2d 561
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(N.Y. 1973); Wolfson v. Wolfson, 284 N.Y.S.2d 328, 330 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1967); Carole K. v. Arnold K., 385 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 (Fano. Ct. N.Y. County 1976).
130 See Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 520
(2d Cir. 1973); Weitz v. Weitz, 249 N.E.2d 768, 769 (N.Y. 1969); Dravecko v. Richard, 196 N.E. 17 (N.Y. 1935); Fox v. Fox, 188 N.E. 160, 161 (N.Y. 1933); Elder v. Rosenwasser, 144 N.E. 669, 669-70 (N.Y. 1924); Rosensteil v. Rosensteil, 280 N.Y.S.2d
624, 626 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), affd, 233 N.E.2d 292 (N.Y. 1967); Friou v. Gnetes,
204 N.Y.S.2d 836, 838 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1960); Schifferdecker v. Schifferdecker,
220 N.Y.S. 229, 229 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1927); Posner v. Stone, 182 N.Y.S. 564, 565
(App. Term 2d Dep't 1920); Quinn v. Gerber, 368 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1975); Tompkins & Lauren v. Glass, 253 N.Y.S.2d 465, 467 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1964). But cf. Kramrath v. Kramrath, 247 N.Y.S. 493, 495 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1931)
(court may not award counsel fees when there is subsisting separation agreement),
Ascher v. Ascher, 210 N.Y.S. 515, 517-18 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1925) (holding payment of counsel fees unauthorized by separation agreement); Bishop v. Bishop, 205
N.Y.S. 542, 543 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1924) (refusing to award wife's counsel fees incurred defending husband's motion to amend separation agreement); Pincus v. Pincus, 205 N.Y.S. 425, 426-27 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1924) (stating that wife's attempt to
entrap husband in compromising situation warranted the exclusion of wife's legal
fees). At least by the 1970's, courts were unwilling to award interim counsel fees if a
wife was capable of paying them on a temporary basis. See Handwerger v.
Handwerger, 403 N.Y.S.2d 266, 266-67 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1978).
131 See Banks v. Banks, 415 N.Y.S.2d 874, 875 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1979); Gallo
v. Gallo, 376 N.Y.S.2d 590, 590-91 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1975); McKay v. McKay, 213
N.Y.S.2d 560, 560-61 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1961); Winkler v. Winkler, 207 N.Y.S.2d
940, 942 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960), affd, 180 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1962); Kolmer v.
Kolmer, 191 N.Y.S.2d 324, 331 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959); Klein v. Klein, 87
N.Y.S.2d 293, 295-97 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1949); Lorenzo v. Lorenzo, 50
N.Y.S.2d 191, 195 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Bronx County 1944); Prindle v. Dearborn, 291
N.Y.S. 295, 297-98 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1936). A husband could not avoid his
obligation of support by voluntarily retiring from remunerative work. See Villano v.
Villano, 414 N.Y.S.2d 625, 629 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1979).
132 See Kover v. Kover, 278 N.E.2d 886, 889 (N.Y. 1972).
133 Bellanca v. Bellanca, 99 N.Y.S.2d 507, 509 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1950);
accord Neubauer v. Neubauer, 380 N.E.2d 170, 170 (N.Y. 1978); Hickland v. Hickland, 346 N.E.2d 243, 245-46 (N.Y. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976); Kay v.
Kay, 339 N.E.2d 143, 145-46 (N.Y. 1975); Hunter v. Hunter, 198 N.Y.S.2d 1008,
1013 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1960); Borchard v. Borchard, 171 N.Y.S.2d 983, 988 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1958); Urdaneta v. Urdaneta, 44 N.Y.S.2d 142, 144 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
N.Y. County 1943). But see Rockwell v. Rockwell, 351 N.Y.S.2d 416, 417-18 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1974). Courts could also grant temporary support pending final adjudication of a divorce or separation action. See Steinberg v. Steinberg, 223 N.E.2d
558 (N.Y. 1966); Bannon v. Bannon, 1 N.E.2d 975, 977 (N.Y. 1936); Hyman v. Hyman, 392 N.Y.S.2d 455, 465-67 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1977); Saltzman v. Saltzman,
388 N.Y.S.2d 605 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1976); Krohn v. Krohn, 377 N.Y.S.2d 544, 544
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1975); Havender v. Havender, 360 N.Y.S.2d 703 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1974); Bernstein v. Bernstein, 319 N.Y.S.2d 376 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1971);
Wyzenbeek v. Wyzenbeek, 141 N.Y.S.2d 569, 569-70 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1955);
Conklin v. Conklin, 186 N.Y.S. 191, 194 (Sup. Ct. Otsego County), modified on other
grounds, 188 N.Y.S. 141 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1921). But a court would not grant
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Of course, courts would always enforce the "natural obligation""

of a father to support his minor children on the basis of his
"means and station in life."135
temporary alimony unless a wife demonstrated both immediate need and a probability of ultimate success on the merits. See Polley v. Polley, 403 N.Y.S.2d 321 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1978); Nobel v. Nobel, 373 N.Y.S.2d 615 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1975);
Lewis v. Lewis, 323 N.Y.S.2d 864, 865 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1971); Mendelsohn v.
Mendelsohn, 321 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1971); Spellman v. Spellman, 305 N.Y.S.2d 842, 843 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1969); Swinson v. Swinson, 287
N.Y.S.2d 142, 143-44 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1968); Schoonheim v. Schoonheim, 250
N.Y.S.2d 931, 932 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1964); Wightman v. Wightman, 182 N.Y.S.2d
31, 33 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1959); Downes v. Downes, 233 N.Y.S. 39 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1929); Werner v. Werner, 198 N.Y.S. 701, 701-02 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1923);
Tornambe v. Tornambe, 413 N.Y.S.2d 577, 580 (Sup. Ct. Allegany County 1979); cf
Fink v. Fink, 333 N.Y.S.2d 655 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1972); Kronenberg v. Kronenberg, 203 N.Y.S.2d 217 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1960); Rothenberg v. Rothenberg, 185
N.Y.S.2d 594, 594-95 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1959). Power to grant temporary support
existed even where a husband had commenced an action. See Karrass v. Karrass, 66
N.Y.S.2d 919, 919 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1946); Kiel v. Kiel, 261 N.Y.S. 162, 162
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1932); see also Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 332 N.Y.S.2d 958
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1972).
1"4Kommel v. Karron, 273 N.Y.S. 226, 227 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1934); accord
Laumeier v. Laumeier, 143 N.E. 219, 221 (N.Y. 1924).
'5 Benedict v. Benedict, 115 N.Y.S.2d 352, 356 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Bronx County
1952); accord Walker v. Buscaglia, 423 N.Y.S.2d 81, 84 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1979);
Thompson v. Thompson, 419 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1979); Drazin v.
Drazin, 295 N.Y.S.2d 183, 184 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1968); Santasiero v. Briggs, 103
N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1951); Gold v. Gold, 409 N.Y.S.2d 114, 116 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1978); Cronk v. Cronk, 94 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (Sup. Ct. Madison
County 1950); People ex rel Wagstaff v. Matthews, 5 N.Y.S.2d 516, 517 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County), affd, 7 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1938); Ammermuller v.
Ammermuller, 282 N.Y.S. 891, 893 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1935), affd, 292 N.Y.S.
177 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1936); In re Bylow, 400 N.Y.S.2d 451, 454 (Fain. Ct. St.
Lawrence County 1977); Bates v. Bates, 310 N.Y.S.2d 26, 32-33 (Fain. Ct. Westchester County 1970); County of Santa Clara, Cal. v. Hughes, 251 N.Y.S.2d 579, 584
(Fain. Ct. Ulster County 1964); Petras v. Petras, 118 N.Y.S.2d 131, 134-35 (Broome
County Ct. 1952); cf Lewis v. Lewis, 381 N.Y.S.2d 631, 633 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1976); Blake v. Berger, 380 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1976);
Wener v. Wener, 301 N.Y.S.2d 237, 240 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1969), affd, 312
N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1970). No agreement could release a father from
his duty to support a child. See Michaels v. Flach, 186 N.Y.S. 899, 902-03 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County), aff/d, 189 N.Y.S. 908 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1921); Smith v. Jones, 250
N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (Fain. Ct. Kings County 1964). But a father did not have to support a child who reached the age of majority, see Gallagher v. Gallagher, 356
N.Y.S.2d 343, 344 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1974); Sloan v. Sloan, 145 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1955); Malamat v. Malamat, 35 N.Y.S.2d 199, 200 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1942); Halsted v. Halsted, 239 N.Y.S. 422, 424 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1930); St.
Lawrence County Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Menard, 381 N.Y.S.2d 939, 941 (Faro. Ct. St.
Lawrence County 1975); Martin v. Martin, 296 N.Y.S.2d 453, 464 (Fain. Ct. Ulster
County 1968); Kinsey v. Kinsey, 107 N.Y.S.2d 212, 218-19 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y.
County 1951); Szilagyi v. Szilagyi, 11 N.Y.S.2d 469, 475-76 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Bronx
County 1939), affd, 15 N.Y.S.2d 107 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1939), or otherwise became
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emancipated, see Greene v. Greene, 336 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1972), modified, 340 N.Y.S.2d 664 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1973), but cf. Wayne
County Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Schultz, 366 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847-48 (Farn. Ct. Wayne
County 1975). Absent special circumstances, a father did not need to provide a college education, or an education in a private school. See Wayne v. Wayne, 430
N.Y.S.2d 367, 368 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1980); Gamble v. Gamble, 418 N.Y.S.2d 800,
802-03 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1979); Di Martino v. Di Martino, 418 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1979); Francis v. Francis, 403 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1978); Berry v. Berry, 391 N.Y.S.2d 120, 121 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1977); Enos
v. Enos, 340 N.Y.S.2d 783, 784 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1973); Wagner v. Wagner, 273
N.Y.S.2d 572, 574 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966), affd, 282 N.Y.S.2d 639 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1967); Forman v. Forman, 127 N.Y.S.2d 17, 22 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Kings
County 1954); In re Lapides, 258 N.Y.S. 799, 803 (Sur. Ct. Livingston County 1932).
But see Benson v. Benson, 434 N.Y.S.2d 277, 278 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1980) (holding
that father must pay private school tuition for handicapped child); Kaplan v. Wallshein, 394 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1977) (noting that father must
furnish education when both parents had college and professional degrees, father
had means, and child was high performance student); Kapner v. Kapner, 388
N.Y.S.2d 123, 123-24 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1976) (deciding that father must reimburse
mother for educational expenses of handicapped son); Roth v. Roth, 414 N.Y.S.2d
485, 488 (Fam. Ct. Queens County 1979) (requiring husband to pay 80% of child
support due to his superior financial condition, despite wife's financial means); L. v.
State, 335 N.Y.S.2d 3, 10 (Fam. Ct. Westchester County 1972) (concluding that father must contribute to private school tuition of handicapped child); Weingast v.
Weingast, 255 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (Fam. Ct. Nassau County 1964) (holding that father with sufficient income must pay for college education of son with high college
board scores); Herbert v. Herbert, 98 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847-48 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y.
County 1950) (commenting that family's wealth and station in life required father to
support children in college); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 24 N.Y.S.2d 613, 619 (Dom.
Rel. Ct. Bronx County 1940) (deciding that father must support son through public
high school education); see also Roe v. Doe, 272 N.E.2d 567, 570 (N.Y. 1971) (holding
that father, in return for child support, may establish reasonable regulations for the
child). In the absence of a father, the mother was held to be responsible for a child's
support. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 18 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y.
County 1940). For cases involving the possibility of criminal and quasi-criminal liability for nonsupport, see People v. Jansen, 191 N.E. 17 (N.Y. 1934); People ex rel.
Gottschalk v. Brown, 143 N.E. 653 (N.Y. 1924); People v. De Pue, 217 N.Y.S. 205
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 1926); Andrews v. Andrews, 2 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Bronx
County 1938). But see Saratoga County Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d
1009, 1013-14 (N.Y. 1979); People v. Wolf, 215 N.Y.S. 95, 96 (App. Div. 2d Dep't),
affd, 154 N.E. 607 (N.Y. 1926). A father was liable for the support of stepchildren,
as distinguished from children, only as required to prevent them from becoming a
public charge. See Dep't of Welfare of N.Y. v. Siebel, 161 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 1959);
Slochowsky v. Shang, 412 N.Y.S.2d 923, 926 (App. Div. 2d Dep't), af'd, 400 N.E.2d
1348 (N.Y. 1979); People ex rel. Deming v. Williams, 292 N.Y.S. 458, 462-63 (Sup.
Ct. Oneida County 1936); Morgan v. Morgan, 76 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
Bronx County 1948); Jones v. Jones, 292 N.Y.S. 221, 224 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County
1937); see also In re Lobdell, 57 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Children's Ct. Chenango County 1945).
Of course, the parents, especially the father, of a child born out of wedlock had an
obligation to provide support for such a child, if for no other reason than to save the
locality in which the child resided from liability. See Commissioner of Pub. Welfare
ex rel. Stuart v. Chandler, 204 N.Y.S. 187, 188 (Special Sess. N.Y. County 1922).
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A decree providing for support could be modified on account
of substantial changes in circumstances,'36 especially those, such
as a wife's remarriage137 or her living with a man held out by her
as her husband, 38 which made her seem less deserving.'39 On the
other hand, deserving women had a variety of devices available
to help them enforce decrees in their favor. 4 °
3'See Langlitz v. Langlitz, 423 N.Y.S.2d 276, 277 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1979);
Hickland v. Hickland, 393 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1977); Marshall v.
Marshall, 368 N.Y.S.2d 360, 362 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1975); Sabatino v. Sabatino, 71
N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1947); McCarthy v. McCarthy, 94
N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (Doam. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1950).
"3 See Kirkbride v. Van Note, 9 N.E.2d 852, 854 (N.Y. 1937); Severance v. Severance, 183 N.E. 909 (N.Y. 1933); Johnson v. Johnson, 284 N.Y.S.2d 33, 34-35 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1967); Schneider v. Schneider, 125 N.Y.S.2d 739, 742 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1953). Remarriage ended a prior husband's duty of support even if the
later marriage was subsequently annulled or if the second husband died. See Gaines
v. Jacobsen, 124 N.E.2d 290, 294-95 (N.Y. 1954); Denberg v. Frischman, 264
N.Y.S.2d 114, 115 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1965), affd, 217 N.E.2d 675 (N.Y. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 884 (1966); Kahler v. Searl, 18 N.Y.S.2d 246, 247 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1940); Brown v. Brown, 297 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Fain. Ct. Ulster County 1969); see
also Andrews v. Andrews, 58 N.Y.S.2d 20, 25 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Bronx County 1945);
D.E. v. A.C., 36 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122-23 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1942).
m See Northrup v. Northrup, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 1224 (N.Y. 1978); Hall v. Hall,
389 N.Y.S.2d 448 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1976). But cf Krawczuk v. Krawczuk, 374
N.Y.S.2d 70 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1975); Miklowitz v. Miklowitz, 435 N.Y.S.2d 116
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 1980); Stern v. Stern, 389 N.Y.S.2d 265, 268 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1976); see also Waddey v. Waddey, 49 N.E.2d 8, 9-10 (N.Y. 1943); Morris v.
Morris, 222 N.Y.S.2d 355, 357 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1961).
" Support could also be modified if there was a change in the needs of a wife or
children or in the earnings of a husband. See Kurr v. Kurr, 418 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1979); Toliver v. Toliver, 413 N.Y.S.2d 454, 455 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1979); Edelstein v. Edelstein, 283 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1967); Covert v. Covert, 264 N.Y.S.2d 820, 823 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1965);
Weinel v. Weinel, 391 N.Y.S.2d 795, 797 (Faro. Ct. Rockland County 1977); Lawrence R. v. Muriel R., 392 N.Y.S.2d 178, 179-80 (Faro. Ct. Onondaga County 1976);
Dunn v. Wescott, 366 N.Y.S.2d 291, 293 (Faro. Ct. Erie County 1975); S. v. C., 332
N.Y.S.2d 773, 776-77 (Faro. Ct. Richmond County 1972); Pinto v. Pinto, 91 N.Y.S.2d
124, 128 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Kings County 1949). But see Best v. Baras, 382 N.Y.S.2d
318, 320 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1976); Windwer v. Windwer, 333 N.Y.S.2d 205, 206
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1972), affd, 301 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1973); Pierson v. Pierson, 404
N.Y.S.2d 265, 266 (Faro. Ct. Dutchess County 1978). Finally, a support order would
be modified if a husband proved unable to pay the required amount. See Dep't of
Soc. Serv. of St. Lawrence County v. Arquiette, 425 N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (App. Div. 3d
Dep't 1980); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 414 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1979); Pehush v. Pehush, 401 N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1978); Dula v. Dula, 217
N.Y.S. 224, 224 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1926); Bamboschek v. Bamboschek, 270 N.Y.S.
741, 746 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), affd in part, rev'd in part, 271 N.Y.S. 1097 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1934). But see De La Ferriere v. De La Ferriere, 94 N.Y.S.2d 147, 148
(Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1950).
' Decrees could be enforced alternatively, through contempt proceedings, see
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Rosenblum v. Higgins, 193 N.E. 276 (N.Y. 1934); Stacy v. Speanbury, 385 N.Y.S.2d
875, 876 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1976); Didero v. Didero, 200 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1960); Bruce v. Bruce, 89 N.Y.S.2d 94, 96 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1949);
Smith v. Smith, 11 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1019-20 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1938), provided a husband's violation of a court order was clear and intentional, see Klein v.
Klein, 384 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1006 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1976), and a judge was willing to
exercise discretion to impose punishment for contempt, see Hibbard v. Hibbard, 137
N.Y.S.2d 412, 413 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1955); Thaw v. Thaw, 389 N.Y.S.2d 753, 754
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1976); Greenfold v. Greenfeld, 284 N.Y.S.2d 719, 720 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1967); Thomsen v. Thomsen, 82 N.Y.S.2d 533, 535-36 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1948); but cf Okun v. Okun, 320 N.Y.S.2d 137, 139 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1971) (finding alimony provisions could not be enforced by contempt), or
other methods could be used to enforce decrees, such as giving surety, see Baumann
v. Stetten, 178 N.E. 764, 765 (N.Y. 1931) (posting stock as guarantee); Talbot v. New
Amsterdam Casualty Co., 142 N.E. 600, 601 (N.Y. 1923) (giving surety); Hofinan v.
Malcolm, 335 N.Y.S.2d 938, 939 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972) (posting bond), or sequestering wages, see LoCascio v. LoCascio, 421 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1979); Doe v. Doe, 234 N.Y.S.2d 688, 690 (Fain. Ct. Bronx County 1962); but
see Patterson v. Patterson, 296 N.Y.S. 311, 312 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1937); Daniello
v. Daniello, 219 N.Y.S.2d 641, 643 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1961); Langus v. Langus, 183 N.Y.S.2d 922, 923-24 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1959), or sequestering assets
within the court's jurisdiction, see Geary v. Geary, 6 N.E.2d 67, 71-73 (N.Y. 1936);
Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 182 N.E. 8 (N.Y. 1932); Matthews v. Matthews, 159 N.E.
713, 714 (N.Y. 1928); Haslett v. Haslett, 268 N.Y.S.2d 809, 812 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1966); Robinson v. Robinson, 264 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1965); Scott
v. Scott, 220 N.Y.S. 93, 94 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1927); Neidorf v. Neidorf, 252
N.Y.S.2d 354, 357-58 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1964); but see Flanagan v. O'Dwyer,
94 N.Y.S.2d 162, 167 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950); Rubin v. Whitney, 295 N.Y.S.
255, 267 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1937); or reduction of accrued arrears to a judgment
and execution thereon, see Boissevain v. Boissevain, 169 N.E. 130, 131 (N.Y. 1929);
White v. White, 231 N.Y.S. 146, 142 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1928); Wilder v. Wilder,
402 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1978); Ostrin v. Posner, 215 N.Y.S. 259,
260 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1925); Bailey v. Bailey, 196 N.Y.S. 340, 341 (Sup. Ct.
Onondaga County 1922); Hatoff v. Hatoff, 246 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713-14 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1964); In re Bassford's Will, 91 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County
1949), affd, 101 N.Y.S.2d 136 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1950); cf Elliott v. Elliott, 365 F.
Supp. 450, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Claims for support could also be assigned. See Phair
v. Mead, 83 N.Y.S.2d 657, 659 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948); Procter v. Curchin, 273
N.Y.S. 821, 822 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1934). But a wife's continued acquiescence in
her husband's failure to provide mandated support barred a suit for enforcement,
see Swanton v. Curley, 7 N.E.2d 250, 252 (N.Y. 1937); Ambrose v. Kraus, 9 N.Y.S.2d
857 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1939), as did the husband's death, see, e.g., Rice v. Andrews,
217 N.Y.S. 528, 530 (Sup. Ct. Lewis County 1926). A wife's performance of her obligations under a decree, usually by not interfering with a husband's visitation rights,
was not a condition precedent to her enforcement of the husband's support obligations. See Babin v. Babin, 228 N.Y.S.2d 434, 435-36 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1962);
Strecker v. Strecker, 199 N.Y.S.2d 111, 114 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1960); Tamny v.
Tamny, 129 N.Y.S.2d 41, 42 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1954); Heimbold v. HelImbold,
217 N.Y.S. 379, 380 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1926); Hambleton v. Palmer, 283
N.Y.S.2d 404, 408 (Fain. Ct. Monroe County 1967). But see Benjamin B. v. Rivka M.,
396 N.Y.S.2d 137, 137 (Fain. Ct. Queens County 1977); Nicolette G. v. Raymond S.,
396 N.Y.S.2d 134, 135 (Fain. Ct. Queens County 1977). But, if the wife were seeking
to enforce support under a separation agreement, her denial of visitation rights con-
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3. Adoption
Some of the most disheartening cases arose when parents
found themselves utterly unable to support their children and
gave custody of them to relatives or even strangers who subsequently tried to adopt them. Consider, for example, In re Davis'
Adoption,'4 1 described by the court as involving "a battle for a life
with grim reality."' 2 The story begins with Margaret O'Donnell,
who resided in an orphanage in Hoboken, where she attended
school until the age of ten and then went to work as "a kitchen
drudge" until she was sixteen.143 At that age, in 1912, a Miss
Stinson took her from the orphanage on some charitable pretext,
but she soon ended up in the arms of one William Stinson, who
was then separated from his wife. Over the course of approximately a decade, Margaret and William had six children, including Russell, the subject of the case, born on May 4, 1923. William finally married Margaret on June 20, 1923, but almost
"
immediately after the ceremony, he disappeared.
With "'nothing in the house,""' Margaret, who "'was sick at
that time,""'46 placed the following advertisement in a New York
newspaper: "'Nice Baby Boy given for adoption to Catholic family.""47 A middle-aged woman named Florence Davis answered
the letter, to which Margaret O'Donnell Stinson replied as follows:
I got your letter about my baby I would be glad to go over to
yow but I have no money to go with I would be afraid to take a
tax because yow may not whant to pay for it so what wood I do,
why dont yow come yourself, to my home then if yow like the
baby yow can take him.... if yow can come now all right as I
to come she sent me a telegram an is grazie
ecpest an other lady
48
to get the baby.
After Mrs. Davis came, Margaret agreed to give her the child, as
stituted breach of a dependent condition precedent to her right to payment. See
Hudson v. Hudson, 412 N.Y.S.2d 242, 244 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978); Skydell v.
Wedding, 219 N.Y.S.2d 359, 360 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), aftd, 222 N.Y.S.2d 1020
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1961).
'4' 255 N.Y.S. 416 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1932).
142 Id. at 418.
149

Id.

14 Id. at 418-19.
15 Id. at 419.

'4 Davis' Adoption, 255 N.Y.S. at 421.
147 Id.
148

id.
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was indicated in the following:
The baby is on the bottle and no trouble a real good baby. I am
a poor woman with four other children and I cannot keep him I
have all I can do to get a long. I am willing
to sine him to yow
149
he a nice baby and I no yow will like him.
Sometime after receiving Russell, Mrs. Davis took him to
Florida, where she died in 1928, when Russell was five years old.
On her deathbed she directed that Russell be adopted by her
married son and his wife, which was accomplished by court order
in 1929 without any notice to the natural parents, who were said
to be unknown to the adoptive parents."' Meanwhile William
Stinson had returned and become a produce peddler. He wanted
his son also to be returned, and after an unsuccessful attempt by
Margaret to kidnap the boy, the adoptive parents brought an action to confirm the earlier adoption proceedings."'
The legal issue in the case was whether the Stinsons had
abandoned Russell, in which case the 1929 adoption proceedings
were valid even in the absence of notice to them and consent.
The real issue in the case, however, was social class. The adoptive parents resided "in a nicely furnished and well-kept apartment of eight rooms" 5 ' and the father was "in business for himself and enjoy[ed] a good income. " "' They had "ample means to
give the child good care, attendance, and education." 5 4 The
natural father, in contrast, was "an admitted adulterer and seducer of an immature orphan girl"'55 who had "demonstrated his
utter insensibility to the ordinary dictates of decency or obligation by abandoning his wife and five small children in a state of
utter destitution.""'
The court concluded that the natural
mother "had not seen the child for seven years " "' and did not
want "to take him back as she could not support him.""' But the
father "wanted him and continually beat her" 5' because "he was

at 419.
1"0Id.
"'. Davis'Adoption, 255 N.Y.S. at 419.
12 Id. at 420.
149 Id.

13 Id.
14 Id.
".. Id. at 421.
1" Davis'Adoption, 255 N.Y.S. at 421.
"5 Id. at 422.

"' Id.
159 Id.
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now old enough to help ...on his peddler's cart."6 ° Concluding

that it could believe the testimony of the middle-class adoptive
parents but not of the lower class natural parents, the court
and hence that the 1929
found that Russell had been abandoned
161
adoption proceedings had been valid.

The Davis case was not unique. People ex rel. Lentino v. Feser 6 2 was quite similar. Elsa, the natural mother, had married
one Phillips in 1893 and had had two children by him, including
Louise, the child at issue, in July, 1915. Phillips, however, died
the next month, and soon thereafter Elsa "married one Lentino,
a gambler by profession,"'6' who in 1919 was imprisoned on a
gambling conviction. During the difficult years after her natural
father's death, Louise was left in the custody of several people,
the last of them being Mr. and Mrs. Feser, who wished to adopt
her. After protracted negotiations, Elsa signed a document
authorizing Louise "to live with, and be brought up by" the Fesers, "as I do not love or care for her."" The Fesers, without
giving any notice to Elsa, subsequently obtained an adoption order. As between Elsa, who was married to a professional gambler serving time in state prison and who "had no means and
earned nothing," and the Fesers, who were "respectable people
and ha[d] sufficient financial ability properly to care for" Louise,
it was not surprising that the court affirmed the right of the latter to adopt Louise. 65
Yet another similar case was In re Miller,6 6 where one Frances Sabo turned her 10-day-old child over to the Millers for
adoption. When the Millers brought their adoption petition,
Mrs. Sabo contested it, but the court granted the petition over
her objection. In doing so, it described her as having "deserted
.... her husband and six other children," as being "in poor finan-

cial circumstances," and as having "worked as a waitress in resas housekeeper for a man by the name of Allen
taurants, and ....

at 1763 Broadway, where she was known as Mrs. Allen."" 7 The
Millers, in contrast, were "reputable, orderly people" who were
lCo
Id.
'

Davis'Adoption,255 N.Y.S. at 427-28.
443 (App. Div. lstDep't 1921).

1c2 186 N.Y.S.
16 Id. at 444.
14 Id. at 445.

...
Id. at 444-48.
197 N.Y.S. 880 (Erie County Ct. 1922).
...
6 Id. at 881.

476
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"well regarded in their community, ....
regular church attendants, and ha[d] taken excellent care of the child."'68
In re Cohen's Adoption69 presented similar facts, with one
important difference-namely, the natural mother's ability to
earn income and thereby obtain respectability. In November
1933, a Brooklyn mother, "in dire trouble, substantially destitute, ....
abandoned by the father of the child, ....
critically ill and
7
°
apprehend[ing] death," gave birth to a daughter and four days
later signed a document authorizing her adoption. But soon
thereafter, she recovered her health, obtained employment, and
within the six month period she believed was available to reopen
her surrender of her daughter, sought to regain custody of the
child. 7 ' This demonstration "in a reasonable, seasonable, and
unmistakable manner [of] her desire to resume her parental duties, " 172 together with the court's desire to avoid "an endless
struggle with the instinct of mother love,"'73 won the natural
mother custody of her child. 74 On the other hand, an upstate
judge in a 1932 case denied custody to a "courageous and resourceful,"'7 5 but nonetheless impoverished mother who along
with her husband had abandoned her child when they were both
gravely ill. The court acted, at least in part, because the two
children whose custody the mother had retained were "underfed
and underweight,"'7 6 and because, as a result "of adversity,"'77 the
mother had had to wait six years before reclaiming her child.'78
Other cases involved natural parents who, upon appreciating their inability to take proper care of their offspring, gave custody, at least temporarily, to relatives or trusted family friends,
who subsequently sought to adopt the children. Typically the
natural parents lost.'79 The reality of class differences came to
168

Id.

169279

N.Y.S. 427 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1935).

171Id. at 429-30.
171

Id. at 430.

172Id. at 434.
113

Id. at 435.

174Cohen's Adoption, 279 N.Y.S. at 435.
175People

1932).

176

Id. at 120.

177Id. at
178

ex rel. Walters v. Davies, 257 N.Y.S. 118, 121 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County

Id.

179See

121.

People ex rel. Pickle v. Pickle, 213 N.Y.S. 70, 76 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1925); Myers v. Myers, 188 N.Y.S. 527, 529 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1921); Wainman v.
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the surface in these cases as well: thus, the trial judge could not
help but observe in the case of In re Bistany,8 ° as he authorized
adoption by the trusted friends, that they were "respectable
people," who "own[ed] a comfortable and commodious home, with
about three acres of land, in a highly respectable country locality."181 They had "an annual income of $5,000 from a profitable
rug business, with excess profits that are left in the business,
which is of a permanent character."'82 In contrast, the natural
parents lived in a "section of New York City, which [was] populated largely by people of foreign birth or descent, who speak the
English language only to a limited extent. 83 Even without the
adopted child, there remained "five children ... in an apartment

that ha[d] only two bedrooms," and the father had wages of only
"$3,380 yearly for a family of seven, if he ... [remained] steadily
employed and ... in good health."'
The child was ultimately

saved from adoption only by the insistence of a divided Court of
Appeals, in a majority opinion by Judge Cardozo, that "such
considerations ... [were] foreign to the [sole legal] issue" in the

case-whether the natural parents' "silence and inaction [had
been] prolonged to such a point than an intention" to abandon
the child could be found from the facts as "an inference of law."'85
A divorced mother sought to recover a son on similar facts in
the case of In re Duffy.'88 "[UMnwilling to be burdened with the
care and maintenance of'87 her 17-month-old, Mary Duffy gave
him, together with "all the child's clothing and playthings," to "a
respectable, prudent, industrious, well thought of young married
couple" who for five years "generously, humanely, and carefully
88
administered" to the boy's needs with "painstaking devotion."
Although Duffy had said "she would never claim the child,"'89 she
did ultimately decide that she wanted him back. Finding in
Duffy "a want of maternal instincts," the court could not view the
Richardson, 196 N.Y.S. 262,264 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1922).
"" 201 N.Y.S. 684 (Erie County Ct. 1923), rev'd, 204 N.Y.S. 599 (App. Div. 4th
Dep't), rev'd, 145 N.E. 70 (N.Y. 1924).
"' Id. at 688.
162 id.

m Id.

lu Id.
1' Bistany, 145 N.E. at 72.
".. 202 N.Y.S. 323 (Sup. Ct. Livingston County 1923).
"7

Id. at 323.

"'

Id. at 323-24.
Id. at 323.
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child's future with her "with much pleasure and satisfaction,"
whereas his new middle-class home "promise[d] to be clean,
healthful, industrious, [and] honest."19 ° Hence the court refused
to return him to his mother.
Understood, as in the cases above, chiefly as a means for
raising and supporting destitute children,191 adoption did not
necessarily entail the complete termination of the rights of natural parents or their total supplanting by adoptive parents. Nor
did it require the termination of all emotional bonds between the
child and its natural parents. As noted in the Wainman case,
one of those which had permitted adoption by a child's relatives
over its natural father's objections, adoption resulted in "no
hardship to the parent," since he could "visit this child as often
as he desire[d] .... , but all the time it will be ... under the protection of a close relative." 92 Adoption also did not destroy an
adopted child's right to inherit from its natural kindred, 93 nor
did an adopted child become next of kin so as to be entitled to
inherit from the adoptive parents' collateral relatives.' Finally,
adoption was not final: an adoption could "be abrogated" if a
child was "ill-behaved and ... violated her duty toward her foster
parents." 95
Nothing, perhaps, illustrates the value structure of 1920's
family law more clearly than the cases on adoption that we have
just examined. In their efforts to create nuclear families and
hold them intact as society's primary, if not sole mechanism, for
providing sustenance and moral training to the young, judges
abandoned to "grim reality"196 those families and children whom
death, destitution, or divorce had rendered unable to live by soci1'9Id.

at 324.

91 See In

re Souers, 238 N.Y.S. 738, 745 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1930).

Wainman v. Richardson, 196 N.Y.S. 262, 264 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1922).
m In re Monroe's Executors, 229 N.Y.S. 476, 478 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County
1928) (referencing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §114 as amended (1916)).
'9 See In re Powell's Estate, 183 N.Y.S. 939, 940-41 (Sur. Ct. Oneida County)
(holding that adopted child cannot inherit through adoptive parent from collateral
relative), aff/d, 184 N.Y.S. 945 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1920). But cf Ryan v. Sexton,
181 N.Y.S. 10 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1920) (stating that foster mother can inherit from
adopted child whose natural parents were deceased).
19 In re Anonymous, 285 N.Y.S. 827, 829 (Sur. Ct. Queens County 1936)
(construing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW); accord Souers, 238 N.Y.S. at 746 (holding that
child who declined to inform adoptive parents of his whereabouts for months
breached his duty to adoptive parents and adoption should be abrogated).
'9 In re Davis' Adoption, 255 N.Y.S. 416,418 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1932).
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ety's dominant values. The judiciary of the 1920's and early
1930's willingly inhabited a profoundly inegalitarian world divided between respectable, monogamous couples and their children, who had every opportunity for success and happiness, and
destitute children, typically without two parents and also without hope or security. The best that judges could do for the latter
was to separate them from their natural families and place them
with respectable, monogamous couples which, it was hoped,
would lift them up to the moral and social heights at which
"respectable" people lived.'97
One should not be too critical, though, of family law's inequities. They were merely a product of more general inequities in
society at large. Socio-economic realities made it impossible for
every one to live by the family values that the judiciary strove to
impose. Accordingly, it was inevitable that some would benefit
from the imposition of those values, while others would suffer
harm. Only structural social change of the sort that began to occur in the late New Deal could begin to alter the nature of family
law.

II. INDIVIDUALISM

AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

Many of the values and attitudes that characterized family
law in the 1920's and 1930's persisted into the 1940's and 1950's
and even beyond.19 On the issue of child custody, for example,
courts frequently continued to take the fault of a failed marriage
into account in determining which parent should receive the
child. The "past conduct of the parents, the unwillingness of one
or both to carry out their marital obligations," as the Court of
Appeals declared in 1943, simply could "not be disregarded in determining which parent [would] provide the better home." 9'
Thus, one woman was denied custody of her daughter because
she had lived in a boarding house which was also the residence
of her son who "without the benefit of a divorce from his wife ...
"9For a discussion of other devices created in the early decades of the twentieth
century to put children in as homelike a situation as possible, see MICHAEL B. KATZ,
IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA

124-29, 145 (1986).
"3 See generally supra, notes 14-196 (pertaining to the years between 1920 and
1940, citing many cases from the decades after 1940 that continued to apply older
law).
"o Harrington v. Harrington, 290 N.Y. 126, 130 (1943); accord Fitzgerald v.
Fitzgerald, 65 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286-87 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Bronx County 1946).
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was living there with another woman," a second man who was
"living apart from his wife, and addict[ed] to the grossly excessive use of intoxicants;" and a third man who had "a mottled
marital history.""' In another case, the Court of Appeals refused
to grant custody to a mother who had "stated her considered belief in the propriety of indulgence, by a dissatisfied wife such as
herself, in extramarital sex experimentation." The court found
such beliefs "repugnant to all normal concepts of sex, family, and
marriage," on which the "State of New York ha[d] old, strong
policies."0 1 Although the mother "was ever a good and devoted
mother," and the father "was inordinately preoccupied with his
professional duties," gave "little of his time or of himself to the
children," and often "treated them brusquely, impatiently and
even intemperately," 2 the court nevertheless concluded that the
best interests of "those impressionable teen-age girls" would not
be served by giving custody of them to a mother "who proclaim[ed], and live[d] by, such extraordinary ideas of right conduct."0 3 Another case refused to award custody of a child to a father "contaminated with the germ of Nazism," which the court
found "a diseased and depraved phenomenon-a plague which
flourishe[d] and thrive[d] on the destruction and obliteration of
everything American" and "as loathsome in effect as leprosy."2"
A. The Waning of TraditionalFamily Values
At the same time, the late 1930's and 1940's witnessed signs
of change. One of the earliest of such signs occurred in a 1937
case where it was conceded that a mother was "[g]enerally [ I the
proper guardian for children of ...tender age...

,,2o5

Within a

decade, this view had become established law.00 A related prin200

Walch v. Walch, 52 N.Y.S.2d 697, 700, 705-06 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County

1945).
201
212
203
204
205

Bunim v. Bunim, 83 N.E.2d 848, 849 (N.Y. 1949).
Id. at 395 (Fuld, J., dissenting)
Id. at 394.
Reimann v. Reimann, 39 N.Y.S.2d 485, 485 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1942).
Abeles v. Abeles, 299 N.Y.S. 206, 207 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1937); ac-

cord People ex rel. Mahoff v. Matsoui, 247 N.Y.S. 112, 117 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1931). In Mahoff, the court had mentioned that a "child at tender age is entitled to
have such care, love, and discipline as only a good and devoted mother can usually
give," id. at 117, but the court then divided custody between a putative father and a
mother of a child born out of wedlock, id. at 118.
201 See Radeff v. Radeff, 74 N.Y.S.2d 749, 750 (App. Div.
4th Dep't 1947); accord
In re Bopp, 58 N.Y.S.2d 190, 209 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County 1945); Moses v. Moses,
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ciple emerging at the same time was that every daughter should
"receive feminine care and attention in her bringing up," and
thus girls should be placed in the custody of their mothers." 7
Meanwhile, a second doctrinal change appears to have resulted from the experience of World War II. One consequence of
the war was family instability. Although political and economic
conditions had always created some instability, judges in the
1940's perceived an increase in "marriage[s] torn asunder by a
disordered society under the stress and strain of war."0 8 They
sensed that, as young men and women involved in the war left
"home in a village in the mountains and strayed into a large
city," they were "beguiled by false allurements of tinsel, glitter,
lights and the glamour and fanfare of war," they "misbehaved,"
and they "disregarded the usual peacetime social conventions,
with ... tragic result[s].""9 They "committed sins of passion but
not of evil purpose," as had "Mary Magdalen and Hester Prynne"
and "countless others before and after them."21 From these realizations, it followed that it "would not be realistic" to "assume
a sanctimonious or puritanical attitude." Since judges were
"dealing with humans and not angels," they had to "take human
frailties into account, especially when dealing with 'parties' of
Continental background." The "mission of the law," after all,
was not a "blind and merciless casting of the first stone," but
"justice ... seasoned with compassion." 11
Acting out of mercy and compassion, judges began to rule
that custody should not be denied for a "mild ... vice" such as
gambling or for one or two "adulterous relationships" that fell
short of "promiscuity."21 If custody was not to be determined on
the basis of fault, as it had been during the interwar decades,
what new standard would replace it?
In a few cases, nationalism born of a vague, World-War II

15,21 (Dor. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1948).
85 N.Y.S.2d
207 In re Eckstrom, 15 N.Y.S.2d 158, 158 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1939), affd, 17
N.Y.S.2d 620 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1940).
20' Clair v. Clair, 64 N.Y.S.2d 889, 890 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1946).
219 Id. at 891.
210 Id.

211People

ex rel. Geismar v. Geismar, 54 N.Y.S.2d 747, 756 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.

County 1945).
212 Orafv. Oraf, 47 N.Y.S.2d 45,46 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1944).
21 Geismar, 54 N.Y.S.2d at 755; accord Kruczek v. Kruczek, 29 N.Y.S.2d 385,
386 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941).
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confidence in American virtue " became the standard. Judges
declared that American children had "as a part of their birthright ... a right to be raised and educated in this country," 15 and

for that reason, among others, they routinely granted custody to
a parent residing in the United States rather than to one planning to live in a foreign country. 16 Thus, one judge refused to
allow a father to bring children born in the United States with
him when he returned to his native land-Soviet Armenia.217
"IN]othing," according to the judge, "had greater value and was
more to be cherished" than American citizenship, which conferred "a right to the full enjoyment of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."18 Indeed, "many regarded" American citizenship "as the highest hope of civilized men."219 Since the children
could lose "their right to avail themselves of the privileges of
their American citizenship" if they were moved to Armenia, the
judge would not let them go.22 '
Another judge had a comparable reaction in Ex parte Djurovic.221

Slavoljub Djurovic was a Yugoslav citizen assigned to

work for a government-operated company in New York.'
He
and his wife had two sons living with them in New York at the
time they separated."a The sons were in a Brewster, New York
boarding school when the Yugoslav Vice Consul in New York, together with the mother, picked them up in a car owned by the
consulate and driven by its chauffeur, and brought them to a se-

214

See MICHAEL S. SHERRY, IN THE SHADOW OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES SINCE

THE 1930's, 88-90 (1995).
215 People ex rel. Foussier v. Uzielli, 260 N.Y.S.2d 329, 333 (App. Div. 1st Dep't),
affd, 213 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1965).
216 See People ex rel. Ragona v. De Saint-Cyr, 137 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1955); see also Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). But see
Hoyt v. Boyar, 429 N.Y.S.2d 792 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1980); Duncan v. Hitti, 281
N.Y.S. 285 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1935); Mundy v. Mundy, 108 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County), affd, 108 N.Y.S.2d 977 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1951); Y. v. Y., 403
N.Y.S.2d 855 (Fano. Ct. Kings County 1978).
217 People ex. rel. Choolokian v. Mission of Immaculate Virgin, 76 N.Y.S.2d
509,
513 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947), affd, 86 N.Y.S.2d 462 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1949),
modified, 88 N.E.2d 362 (N.Y. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 912 (1950).
218 Choolokian, 76 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
219 Id. at 513.
220 Id.
221 130 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), affd, 131 N.Y.S.2d 888 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1954).
= Id.
223Id. at 392.
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cret hiding place in New York City. 4 Several days later they
were secretly transferred to a boat about to set sail to Yugoslavia." The father then sought a writ of habeas corpus to remove
them from the boat; the court granted the writ and gave custody
of the sons to the father. 6
A third case, Seley v. Seley, 7 involved a 17-year-old child
living with her mother in Sault Ste. Marie, Canada, who petitioned the court to allow her to live with her father in New York
City. She felt "bored with small town life in Canada," where she
had "very few friends" and was "was wasting her time in a small
town where she ha[d] little if any opportunities to meet people."" She had a "keen urge to come to live in New York," where
she felt "that by education and social contact here she will have
the opportunity to better herself in every way. " "' Of course, the
judge agreed. °
In most cases, though, nationalistic beliefs about the superiority of life in America provided no basis for choosing one parent
as custodian in preference to the other. Of necessity, courts in
most cases had to turn to the only other standard in existencethe gender-based standard of preferring mothers over fathers.
This standard, which dated back to the nineteenth century," had begun to attain preeminence in the years immediately before the war. The law, it was then said, had "an almost
reverential regard for mother love as an ingredient in the sound
upbringing of a child.... ,=2 This reverential regard, in turn, was
reified into a general presumption "that when it becomes necessary to make a choice between mother and father it is to the
child's best interest and welfare to be brought up and reared by
his mother .... ,"3 "[A] widely held belief' thereupon emerged
224

id.

2Z

id.

at 394.
178 N.Y.S.2d 988, 989 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958).

2p Djurovic, 130 N.Y.S.2d
2
22Id.

2id.
221

at 989.
Id. at 990.

221 See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURYAMERICA 238-53 (1985).

In re Feigin, 163 N.Y.S.2d 812,813 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957).
People ex rel. Himber v. Himber, 136 N.Y.S.2d 456, 458 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1954); accord Cavalleri v. Cavalleri, 236 N.Y.S.2d 304, 307 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1962); Ex parte Djurovic, 130 N.Y.S.2d 389, 392 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County),
affd, 131 N.Y.S.2d 888 (App. Div. Ist Dep't 1954).
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"that a mother [was] favored over a father in a legal custody proceeding,"2 34 and that belief remained in place at least until the
mid-1970's.
The reported cases lent support to this belief. 5 For example, a mother with "schizophrenia, paranoid type," was held fit to
receive custody,23 6 and one 1952 case even upheld custody in a
mother who had been adjudicated guilty of neglecting her children as a result of her alleged "affiliation, or at least sympathy,
with the Communist Party.... 237 Indeed, not even a mother's
sexual lifestyle would cost her the preference for maternal custody. Starting in the 1950's with adherence to the older dictum
that a mother's "single deviation from the orbit of marital rectitude should not alone deprive" her "of the natural right to the
custody of the child, " 8 courts by the 1970's had come to recognize that a mother's exercise of "the right of a divorced woman to
engage in private sexual activities, which in no way involve or affect her minor children" would not result in her loss of custody, 9
even when the activities involved "female homosexuality." 40
2u Hechemy v. Hechemy, 368 N.Y.S.2d 709, 713 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1975).
2"" See Weiss v. Weiss, 278 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1967); Miles
v. Liebolt, 230 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1962); In re Kades, 202 N.Y.S.2d
362 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960); Exparte Kordes, 52 N.Y.S.2d 410 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1944); In re Bologna, 102 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1950). Of
course, fathers, in response to the specific facts of cases, sometimes received custody. See FF v. FF, 325 N.Y.S.2d 291 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1971); In re Reinhart, 227
N.Y.S.2d 39 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1961); Jones v. Jones, 187 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1959); Whittemore v. Whittemore, 109 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1951).
2" In re Richman, 227 N.Y.S.2d 42, 50, 52 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962); see also
Gorra v. Gorra, 387 N.Y.S.2d 895 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1976).
2' In re Dubin, 112 N.Y.S.2d 267, 269 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Queens County 1952).
People ex rel. Newitt v. Newitt, 117 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1952) (emphasis in original), modified, 119 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1953); accord People ex
rel. Ragona v. DeSaint-Cyr, 137 N.Y.S.2d 275, 279 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955).
23 Feldman v. Feldman, 358 N.Y.S.2d 507, 511 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1974); accord
People ex rel. Olecharski v. Nepereny, 259 N.E.2d 923, 924 (N.Y. 1970); CC v. CC,
322 N.Y.S.2d 388, 390 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1971); S. v. J., 367 N.Y.S.2d 405, 410-11
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1975); cf Kesseler v. Kesseler, 236 N.Y.S.2d 472, 475 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1963); People ex rel. Repetti v. Repetti, 377 N.Y.S.2d 571, 573 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1975). But see T v. U, 318 N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1971);
People ex rel. Bishop v. Bishop, 312 N.Y.S.2d 87 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1970); Johnson
v. Johnson, 263 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1965), affd, 268
N.Y.S.2d 403 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1966); Newitt, 117 N.Y.S.2d 711; In re Anonymous,
238 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Fain. Ct. Rensselaer County 1962).
4oIn re Mara, 150 N.Y.S.2d 524, 525 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Queens County 1956). But
see DiStefano v. DiStefano, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636, 638 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1978); In re
Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 860-61 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1976).
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Change occurred even more rapidly and dramatically in the
law governing adoption. As we have seen, adoption during the
1920's and 1930's had often served the function of providing
children of poverty with a means of livelihood and support." 1
But with the enactment of the New Deal welfare system in the
mid-1930's, with its guarantee of support for destitute children," - adoption was no longer needed for such a purpose. The
"statutory allowance for a dependent child" made it possible for
single mothers of low income to exercise their "natural rights" to
raise their children under the protection of " 'the connecting
links of direct kinship-blood, flesh and bone .... .243 As a result,
the very nature of adoption began to change.
The relation between welfare and adoption emerged with
particular clarity in the 1936-1937 case of Betz v. Horr.2" Edna
Betz had been adopted by her maternal grandparents at the age
of 12, apparently following the death of her mother. Eleven
years later, with her grandmother also dead and her grandfather
(i.e., her adoptive father) "destitute and incapable of contributing
to her support,"245 Edna was suffering from tuberculosis. The issue was whether her natural father had some continuing duty to
support her.
Under the traditional view that adoption did not totally
terminate all ties between a child and its natural parents, the father did retain a duty. Thus, the majority of the Appellate Division thought it "contrary to natural law" "to relieve the natural
parents of their moral obligation to support their helpless offspring and to impose that burden upon the public in the event
the adoptive parents died or became destitute."24 6 But a unanimous Court of Appeals, implicitly recognizing the primary obligation of the public to support the destitute and not to foist the
obligation upon anyone who happened to be at hand to save a
few dollars for the fisc, took a different view. The court held that
241See In re Souers, 238 N.Y.S. 738, 745 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1930).
242 See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE

HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890-1935, 253-306 (1994).
2' In re New York Ass'n for Jewish Children, 44 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880-81 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1943) (quoting People ex rel. Van Dyk v. Van Dyk, 33 N.Y.S.2d 766,
771 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1942)).
290 N.Y.S. 500 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Queens County 1936), affd, 294 N.Y.S. 546
(App. Div. 2d Dep't), rev'd, 11 N.E.2d 548 (N.Y. 1937).
2"Betz, 294 N.Y.S. at 547-48.
26 Id. at 549.
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adoption made "the adopted child the natural child of the adoptive parent"24 gave that" 'child the same legal relation to the foster parent as a child of his body,' "148 and totally " 'divest[ed] the
natural parents of the relation which they had theretofore sustained toward the infant .... '

"249

It followed from this holding that "a consummated adoption
[was final and] unassailable" and that the natural parents had
no capacity to reopen it.25 Once an adoption had been consummated, the natural parents were not even entitled to information
about the whereabouts of the child since courts feared that a
natural mother "could be a source of great annoyance to the foster parents," who "deserve[d] every protection which the court
[was] capable of giving them in their exclusive custody of [their]
child.""' Similar interests of finality dictated that adopted children not be given access to information about their natural parents.252
The most important doctrinal change that followed from "the
policy of the law that adopted children be placed on a level with
natural born offspring"23 involved the rules for abrogation of
adoptions. Although occasional cases continued to occur in
which abrogation was permitted,M most cases made abrogation
difficult to obtain. 5 In particular, abrogation would not be
27 Betz, 11 N.E.2d at 550 (citing Carpenter v. Buffalo Gen. Electric Co., 106
N.E. 1026 (N.Y. 1914)).
2
Betz, 11 N.E.2d at 550 (quoting In re Cook's Estate, 79 N.E. 991, 993 (N.Y.

1907)).

249 Betz,

11 N.E.2d at 550 (quoting In re MacRae, 81 N.E. 956, 957 (N.Y. 1907)).

m People ex rel. McGaffin v. Family & Children's Serv. of Albany, 153 N.Y.S.2d
701, 703 (Sup. Ct. Albany County) (emphasis in original), modified, 158 N.Y.S.2d 45
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 1956). Indeed, the new view of adoption warranted giving adoptive parents rights even before adoptions had been finalized. Thus, those who had
contracted with an adoption agency were given the right to sue the agency for damages if the agency breached its contract. See Bardorf v. Rebecca Talbot-Perkins
Adoption Soc'y, Inc., 269 N.Y.S. 794, 798 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1934).
?-"People ex rel. Swasing v. Rebecca Talbot Perkins Adoption Soc'y, Inc., 296
N.Y.S. 778, 780 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), affid, 298 N.Y.S. 500 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1937).
252 See, e.g., In re Linda F.M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638 (Sur. Ct. Bronx
County 1978),
affid, 442 N.Y.S.2d 963 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1979), affd, 418 N.E.2d 1302 (N.Y.
1981).
2 In re Weller's Will, 165 N.Y.S.2d 531, 538 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1957).
2 See In re Anonymous, 352 N.Y.S.2d 743, 745-46 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1968);
In re Abrogation of Adoption of Anonymous, 167 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473 (Sur. Ct. Ulster
County 1957).
See, e.g., In re Eaton, 111 N.E.2d 431 (N.Y. 1953).
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permitted on the ground of vague allegations of immoral behavior by an adoptive parent,"6 on the ground that a natural father
was better able than an adoptive father to support the child," or
on the ground of disrespectful behavior by the child of a sort that
was "not unusual" among "teenagers," such as "not readily and
willingly respond[ing] to household chores," having "a desire
and
25 8
tendency to leave home," and "fall[ing] into bad company."
With these cases, the principal ends served by the law of
adoption changed. In the context of the new welfare state that
matured in the aftermath of World War II, judges reacted differently than their predecessors had a mere two decades earlier
when parents unable to support children gave them up for adoption; indeed, one judge reacted as if the world of the 1920's and
1930's had never existed. His own words best convey the change
that had occurred:
[T]here is still a further point which this Court considers to be
of great moment. Here a young couple, already having two children, consent to the adoption of a third child and placed the
child with the proposed adoptive parents almost immediately
after birth, and the only excuse given for the adoption and
placement is that they cannot afford to rear the third child. It is
against the conscience of this Court to countenance such an act
upon the part of the natural parents. The parents should make
every effort to provide for the child and to give it the natural
love and affection to which the child is entitled. This Court
cannot and will not countenance an adoption of this nature
based upon such a flimsy excuse and thus avoid a duty and an
obligation imposed upon the parents!"
People ex rel. Cocuzza v. Cobb26 was a similar case. There a
woman during World War II had a child born out of wedlock
from an interracial union with a member of the armed forces.26 '
She found herself "in desperate circumstances ..., living in
2
See In re Sherman's Adoption, 78 N.Y.S.2d 794, 797 (Sur. Ct. Cortland
County 1948).
27 See In re Anonymous, 213 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13-14
(Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1961).
' Abrogation ofAdoption of Anonymous, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
29 Adoption of Anonymous, 137 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722 (County Ct. Saratoga County
1955). For a similar case in which at least one judge gave every encouragement to a
young couple to raise their own child rather than permit the child to be adopted, see
In re Hahn, 149 N.Y.S.2d 140, 143-45 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), rev'd on other grounds,
149 N.Y.S.2d 407 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1956), affd, 135 N.E.2d 723 (N.Y. 1956).
2" 94 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1950).
2" Cocuzza, 94 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
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squalor" and
under conditions which one witness characterized
"as filth."62 After telling the father that the child had died, the
mother surrendered it to a married woman and her husband,
who were "childless" and "religious" and "gave it every advantage
of care, maintenance and affection.""' After the end of the war,
however, the interracial couple married and had more children,
and the father obtained "a good position," which made the family
"financially secure" and the children "properly cared for."
Meanwhile, the husband of the woman who had taken the child
died. When she applied for welfare assistance, public officials
notified the natural father that his child was not dead, and he
sought custody. 65 The court decided in his favor, declaring that
the requirements of the adoption statute had never been met and
hence that he remained the father of the child.266
In re 0.67 was an almost identical case two decades later, in
which an African-American woman was forced into an institution to be treated for a nervous disorder "caused by the constant
harassment of neighbors and disinterested people because of
[her] interracial marriage."266 While she was institutionalized,
her husband, who was in military service, gave temporary custody of the children to the Department of Social Services without
informing his wife, who, of course, recovered custody of the children as soon as she was released.26
With adoption thus no longer available for the lasting
placement of children whom their parents could not afford to
raise, its primary end became the provision of childless couples27 °
with infants born out of wedlock-infants who would become, in
every respect, the children of the adopting couple. 1 The
262
263

id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
266 Cocuzza, 94 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
294

265

337 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Farn. Ct. Richmond County 1972).
Id. at 141.
2619Id. at 141, 146.
270 On the hesitancy of courts to allow adoptions by single parents, see In re
267

266

Adoption of H., 330 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1972); In re Hipps, 333
N.Y.S.2d 846 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1972). But see In re Anonymous' Adoption, 31
N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sur. Ct. Monroe County 1941).
271 See In re Upjohn's Will, 107 N.E.2d 492, 496-97
(N.Y. 1952); cf. People ex rel.
Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 386 N.E.2d 235, 238-39 (N.Y. 1978).
One element of the matching process was to find parents who had the same religion
as that into which the child had been born. The Court of Appeals upheld the consti-
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procedure[s] which [would] promote, encour"development of ...
adoption[s]" was explicitly recognized as "a
age and facilitate ....
legitimate area of state concern."272
In this context, the first major issue faced by the courts was
the elaboration of standards for determining whether a natural
mother had acted in a fashion that warranted depriving her of
custody of her child and delivering it to another. The blackletter law was clear: a natural mother could be deprived of custody only if she had freely surrendered her child,273 had abandoned it, or was unfit to retain custody.2 74 However, in an effort
to facilitate adoptions by "good people,"275 judges as late as midcentury, who put themselves "in the position of a 'wise, affectionate, and careful parent'" seeking "to do what [was] best for
the interests of the child,"276 had readily found these requirements satisfied. One wise, affectionate and careful judge, for instance, could not help but notice when adoptive parents maintained an "entirely satisfactory home in an atmosphere and an
environment that [were] pleasant, cultured, religious and understanding" with a "family income ...adequate to provide for all
the needs of the child," or when the natural mother was
"unemployed, ha[d] been trained for no gainful occupation, and
ha[d] made no serious attempt at employment." 7 7 Hence he
concluded that "it would be an act of cruelty to take this child out
tutionality of using religion as "a relevant and important, though not controlling,
consideration ....
in the placement of children for adoption," Dickens v. Ernesto, 281
N.E.2d 153, 154 (N.Y. 1972), but that same court and the lower courts had also previously held that religious matching was not guaranteed, see In re Adoption of Maxwell, 151 N.E.2d 848, 853-54 (N.Y. 1958); In re Adoption of Child, 322 N.Y.S.2d 532,
533 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1971); In re Efrain C., 314 N.Y.S.2d 255, 262-66 (Faro. Ct.
N.Y. County 1970).
272 In re Linda F.M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 643 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1978), affd,
442 N.Y.S.2d 963 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1979), affd, 418 N.E.2d 1302 (N.Y. 1981).
Thus, once adoptable infants became scarce in the United States, procedures were
developed to allow childless couples to find infants overseas and to facilitate their
immigration to and adoption in the United States. See In re Chin Thloot Har Wong,
224 F. Supp. 155, 162-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); In re Adoption of Pyung B., 371 N.Y.S.2d
993, 996 (Fain. Ct. Onondaga County 1975).
2, See In re Adoption of Anonymous, 143 N.Y.S.2d 90,
93-94 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1955).
274See People ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 179 N.E.2d 200, 201 (N.Y.
1961).
...
People ex rel. Anonymous v. Rebecca Talbot Perkins Adoption Soc'y, Inc., 68
N.Y.S.2d 238, 241 (App. Div. 2d Dep't), affd, 74 N.E.2d 480 (N.Y. 1947).
276
In re Selover, 106 N.Y.S.2d 758, 759 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1951) (citing
Queen v. Gyngall, 2 Q.B.D. 232 (1893)).
27 Id.
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of her present happy environment and place her with those who
spurned her when her need was greatest."2 78 Likewise, another
judge after finding that the adoptive parents had "nursed" the
child "through a severe illness with loving care and at substantial financial expense, " "' that the natural mother was willing to
consent to the adoption if she was paid the right "price," and
hence that "the moral and temporal interests of the child and his
future happiness [would] be promoted" by the adoption,28 concluded that the natural mother had abandoned her son, even
though
she had hired an attorney in the effort to obtain his re28
turn.

1

Both downstate departments of the Appellate Division took
the same approach. Thus, in sending back for retrial a case in
which a natural mother had not executed a valid consent, the
First Department identified the "welfare of the child" as "the
controlling consideration."2"2 The court also commented on the
fact that the natural mother, despite her stated intention to
marry the child's father, had not done so over a three-year period
since the child's conception,8 3 and on the fact that she was to receive $675 from the adoptive parents on the completion of the
adoption-a payment that raised questions about "her fitness to
have custody"
or whether she should "be charged with abandon2
ment." 8
The Second Department also agreed in a case where the
natural mother, a divorcee with custody of one child from her
first marriage, "became pregnant as the result of intercourse
with another man," while her second husband was overseas in
the military, as a consequence of which her second husband also
divorced her.28 The court observed that, if she were granted custody of her illegitimate son, she "would have to give up her occupation ... or engage someone else to take care" of him.2
In con278

Id. at 760; see also Ex parte O'Carroll, 45 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct. Westchester

County 1943).
279In re Marino's Adoption, 5 N.Y.S.2d 328, 330 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1938).
280 Id. at 329-30
281 Id. at 330.
212 People

ex rel. Hydock v. Greenberg, 79 N.Y.S.2d 389, 391 (App. Div. 1st Dep't

1948).

23 Id. at 391-92.
"

Id. at 392.

281 People

ex rel. Anonymous v. Rebecca Talbot Perkins Adoption Soc'y, Inc., 68
N.Y.S.2d 238, 240-41 (App. Div. 2d Dep't), affd, 74 N.E.2d 480 (N.Y. 1947).
288 Id. at 241.
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trast, the boy could remain "in the care of good people with
whom" he was then residing during "the trial period prior to legal adoption," and if the adoption was ultimately completed, he
would "have a happy home and receive a thorough education,"
which might help him "overcome the disadvantages of his origin
and serve to better his prospects in life."" 7 On this basis, the
court concluded that the mother had freely executed an agreement to surrender her child.'
Judges decided a few of the early cases in favor of natural
mothers, however, when special factors made the conduct of
those mothers appear as "striking example[s]" of "the basic sentiment of mother love." 9 One case290 involved a woman who
during World War II had served in the military, where she had
met a young soldier who, after promising to marry her, had gotten her pregnant.291 When he deserted her, she proved resourceful, obtained employment for $50 per week, and "paid for a considerable length of time for the care of her offspring" until she
became ill and found herself with "insufficient funds ... for the

care of her child."292 At this point, her employer and his wife took
the child into their home, with the understanding that the
mother was welcome to visit and have the child "from time to
time, as she chose."293 Later the employer's attorney brought a
document for her signature to the place of her employment, and
she signed it without understanding its "nature and ... conse-

quences."294 The court thereupon concluded that the document in
question did not constitute a valid consent to adoption.295
In another case, a college student who found herself pregnant "sought out the services of a woman doctor" in an effort to
avoid disclosing "her condition" to her father and her siblings. 296
The doctor arranged for the child to be adopted and, upon its

2Id.
SId.

9 In re Adoption of Anonymous, 88 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 (Sur. Ct. Schenectady
County 1949).
'Id.
'

Id. at 831-32.

Id. at 831.

2
233 Id.

2 Adoption ofAnonymous, 88 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
9 Id.
People ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 91 N.Y.S.2d 591, 592 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1949).
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birth, it was turned over to the prospective adoptive parents. 297
Five months later, however, the natural mother confessed her
secret to her sisters, and her entire family promised to "stand by
her financially and morally if she would take steps to obtain the
baby."298 Her married brother offered her a home, she obtained a
job, and she brought a writ of habeas corpus 299 to recover the
child. Declaring that " '[plarents have the natural, God-given
right to the control and custody of their children,' ,,"0 the court
concluded that the mother had neither abandoned her child nor
given the final consent to adoption required by statute at the
adoption proceeding, which had not yet occurred.0 1 Thus, the
child was returned to the mother's custody.
B. The Emergence of IndividualRights
1. The Right of Parents to Children
Next the Court of Appeals entered the fray, at first indirectly by addressing the issue of whether children, who had been
left in the care of other relatives, especially their grandparents,
should remain in the custody of those relatives or be returned to
the custody of one of their parents. In the past, it will be recalled, the courts typically had held that parents were "the natural guardian[s] of ... [their] children, and under ordinary circumstances ... entitled to their custody and control."30 2 But courts at
297 id.

28
299

Id. at 593.
id.

.0.
Id. at 592-94 (quoting People ex rel. Flannagan v. Riggio, 85 N.Y.S.2d 534,
536 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1948)); see also People ex rel. Loomis v. Des Jarden, 113
N.Y.S.2d 96, 98 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1952) (stating that "natural parent has the
paramount right of custody of the child as against all others").
.01
See Anonymous, 91 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
302 People ex rel. Roberts v. Kidder, 242 N.Y.S. 108, 109 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1929); accord Gomez v. Lozado, 356 N.E.2d 287, 288 (N.Y. 1976); Isaac v. Greenberg,
182 N.E.2d 290, 290 (N.Y. 1962); Tyrrell v. Tyrrell, 415 N.Y.S.2d 723, 724 (App. Div.
4th Dep't), affd, 393 N.E.2d 1041 (N.Y. 1979); Isaacs v. Murcin, 327 N.Y.S.2d 126,
127 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1971); In re Connors, 321 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739-40 (App. Div.
4th Dep't 1971); People ex rel. Meyrowitz v. Alpern, 215 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1961); People ex rel. Linton v. Linton, 112 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1952); People ex rel. Pizzitola v. Ciccosillo, 108 N.Y.S.2d 447, 448 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1951); In re Boses, 105 N.Y.S.2d 569, 569-70 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1951);
People ex rel. Marks v. Grenier, 293 N.Y.S. 364, 365 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), affd, 10
N.E.2d 577 (N.Y. 1937); People ex rel. Hausler v. Stegmeier, 267 N.Y.S. 428, 430
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1933), affd, 191 N.E. 526 (N.Y. 1934); Hoffmann v. Hoffmann,
229 N.Y.S 489, 490 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1928); In re Custody of Dailey, 204 N.Y.S.2d
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the same time had declared that judges had the "duty, to act at
all times for the best interests of the children, and, if their welfare require[d] that their custody be given to their grandparents"
or other collateral relatives. °3
The Court of Appeals ended this indecisiveness by taking a
strong stand on the side of parental rights in the 1952 case of
People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser!" In May 1945, a young Jewish
couple had become the parents of Robin Strasser, who lived in
their home until they separated a year later.0 5 Robin and her
mother then went to live with Robin's maternal grandmother,
until Robin's mother obtained an apartment of her own two
years later and took the child to live with her.0 8 There was no
custody battle when Robin's mother obtained a divorce from her
father and was awarded custody of the child.0 7
Trouble began only in 1949, when Robin's mother married a
second husband, an African-American man "of fine character,
steadily employed at a good salary."38 At that point, the mater321, 323 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1960); People ex rel. Hacker v. Strongson, 141
N.Y.S.2d 859, 860 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1955); People ex rel. Elkins v. St. Coleman's Home, 131 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349-50 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1954); People ex rel.
Woolston v. Woolston, 239 N.Y.S. 185 (Sup. Ct. Genesee County 1929). Courts have
applied the same principle in cases where children were in the care of foster parents. See In re Sanjivini K, 385 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351-52 (App. Div. 2d Dep't), rev'd on
other grounds, 359 N.E.2d 1330 (N.Y. 1976); State ex rel. Wallace v. Lhotan, 380
N.Y.S.2d 250, 256 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1976).
" Roberts, 242 N.Y.S. at 110; accord Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 28283 (N.Y. 1976); Guzzo v. Guzzo, 411 N.Y.S.2d 408, 409-10 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1978);
People ex rel. Gallinger v. Gallinger, 391 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1977); Laub v. Caltobelotta, 219 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961);
In re Cleaves, 175 N.Y.S.2d 736, 739-40 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1958); In re Hill, 161
N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1957); In re Vanderbilt, 281 N.Y.S. 171, 17374 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1935), cert. denied sub nom, 297 U.S. 724 (1936); In re Del
Rosso, 162 N.Y.S.2d 403, 403-04 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1956); In re Bush, 91
N.Y.S.2d 315, 325-27 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County 1949), modified, 103 N.Y.S.2d 341
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1951); Ex parte Szczygiel, 51 N.Y.S.2d 699, 702-03 (Sup. Ct.
Oneida County 1944); People ex rel. Pitcher v. Powell, 37 N.Y.S.2d 643, 643-44 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1942); People ex rel. Pascale v. Lanza, 2 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403-04 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1938); cf. In re T., 271 N.E.2d 215 (N.Y. 1971); Ex parte Vzga,
104 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup. Ct. Columbia County 1951); People ex rel. Brussel v. Brussel,
119 N.Y.S.2d 149, 150 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), modified, 121 N.Y.S.2d 256 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1953); Dick v. Scarfia, 183 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1959); Spade v. Spade, 163 N.Y.S.2d 146, 149 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1957); State
v. Lascaris, 322 N.Y.S.2d 426,426-27 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1971).
3 104 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1952).
'o Id. at 897.
3 Id.
307id.
sc3 Id.
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nal grandmother brought suit to obtain custody of Robin on
grounds that Robin's mother-the petitioner's own daughterwas "a communist, without any regard for religious upbringing
of the child, and that she [was] married to a second husband who
[was] of a race ...different from that of the child."" 9 A referee

appointed by the Supreme Court granted custody to the grandmother "based on one or more of these considerations: first, that
communistic activities occupied the mother's attention; second,
that the mother went out to work and left the infant in a day
nursery and nursery schools, and, third, that the child was not
being trained in the religion in which it was born," 3'0 and the Appellate Division affirmed. " '
A unanimous Court of Appeals, probably wishing neither to
approve,312 nor "frown upon an interracial marriage, " 3 13 avoided

completely the racially sensitive issues which the grandmother
had raised. " Nevertheless, it reversed the Appellate Division.
In doing so, it relied on a rights-based rhetoric which, as shown
in detail elsewhere,319 was yet another outgrowth of World War
II. Citing only the inapposite case of Meyer v. Nebraska, 6 the
Court of Appeals held that "the right of a parent, under natural
309Portnoy, 104 N.E.2d at 896.
310Id. at 897.

31Portnoy, 105 N.Y.S.2d 905, 905 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1951), rev'd, 104 N.E.2d
895 (N.Y. 1952).
312 See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), where the Supreme
Court refused to
pass on the constitutionality of Southern miscegenation statutes. The Court could
not bring itself to invalidate such laws and thereby state its approval of interracial
marriage until Loving v. Virginia,388 U.S. 1 (1967).
31 Hobson v. York Studios, Inc., 145 N.Y.S.2d 162, 167 (Mum
Ct. N.Y. County
1955), which refused to so frown and awarded plaintiffs, an interracial couple, a
remedy of $100 each against a hotel that had refused, in violation of the State's Civil
Rights Law, to provide them with accommodations, id. at 167-68.
314A later case that similarly strove to sidestep racial conflict was Raysor v.
Gabbey, 395 N.Y.S.2d 290 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1977). In that case, an AfricanAmerican man who had fathered a child out of wedlock with a white woman sought,
after the woman's death, to recovery custody of the child from its maternal grandparents. The Appellate Division remanded the case to the trial court for
"background investigations by appropriate social agencies into the homelife and
neighborhood environment of both petitioner and respondent" and private interviews of the child, her teachers and "others who might have pertinent information
helpful to the court." Id at 295.
...
See Nelson, Criminality and Sexual Morality in New York, 1920.1980, supra
note 4, at 311-16.
" 262 U.S. 390 (1923), which had reversed the conviction of a teacher for
teaching German in violation of state law. The case contained dictum about the
right of parents to control the education of their children. Id. at 399-40.
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law, to establish a home and bring up children [was] a fundamental one and beyond the reach of any court."317 Declaring that
the grandmother had "assumed the very heavy burden of proving
that a little girl should, by court order, be separated from her
own and her mother's home,"" 8 the court further held that she
had failed to sustain that burden.31 9 It found that the evidence
"as to membership and work in alleged communistic 'Front' organizations" was not "such as to make the mother unfit to rear
her own infant;" that "[o]utside employment and the use of
nursery schools by a mother are not such things that courts
should try to control," and that "the mother's failure to train the
little girl in the faith of her fathers ...
[was] within the parent's

sole control."2 °
The rights-based language of the Portnoy case was cited
prominently the next year in People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky,3 21

involving an unwed 18-year-old mother who had tried for a year
to support her child, until "out of work and nearly out of funds"
she "[i]n desperation ...
entrusted her child to a lawyer ...
to be

placed with a family."3" Although she signed a consent to adoption, the mother contended that "she made it plain that she 'was
not giving ...[her child] up for adoption" and understood only

that it was only "to be boarded out."3" After an adoption order
had been signed in a proceeding of which she received no notice,
the natural mother brought habeas corpus. The trial judge denied the writ, and the Second Department of the Appellate Division, in pursuit of its usual preference for adoptive parents over
unwed mothers, affirmed."
The Court of Appeals reversed." 5 No longer willing to assume, as courts typically had in the past, that a destitute
woman's "offense against society and religion in having been the
mother of an illegitimate child"326 made her less worthy than an
People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 104 N.E.2d 895, 896 (N.Y. 1952) (emphasis
added).
317
"'

Id.

39 Id.

at 898.

.2Id. at 897-98.

...
113 N.E.2d 801 (N.Y. 1953).
2

Id. at 802.

323 id.

3"4
Kropp, 117 N.Y.S.2d 695 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1952), rev'd, 113 N.E.2d 801
(N.Y. 1953).
'2 Kropp, 113 N.E.2d 801 (N.Y. 1953).
2 People ex rel. Gill v. Lapidus, 120 N.Y.S.2d 766, 769 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
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economically secure, middle-class couple seeking to adopt a child,
the court began instead to perceive such a woman as a victim
who, having been misled, had made mistakes. Above all, the
court recognized that natural mothers had rights, including the
"right to the care and custody of a child, superior to that of all
others"-a right that was " 'a fundamental one and beyond the
reach of any court.' ,31

Unlike many other family law decisions by the Court of Appeals, People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky had an immediate impact
on lower courts. Perhaps because of the era's increasing emphasis on rights or perhaps because the unwed mothers they
confronted were more often middle-class women with whom they
could empathize, judges on the lower courts became increasingly
protective of rights of women who, after having given up their
children, sought to prevent their adoption. Especially in cases
involving private placements through individual doctors and
lawyers, 328 where there was special reason to fear that young,
unwed mothers were often overreached,329 courts usually held
that mothers had not intended irrevocably to surrender their
babies.3 ° As a result, it was clear by the early 1970's that a
1953) (rejecting quoted assumption).
327Kropp, 113 N.E.2d at 803; accord People ex rel. Johnson v. Michael, 240
N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963).
328For an example of the judiciary's preference for agency adoptions over private placements, see People ex rel. Anonymous v. Talbot Perkins Adoption Serv.,
259 N.Y.S.2d 440, 442 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1965).
"" See In re Anonymous, 170 N.Y.S.2d 178, 183 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1958)
(discouraging practice of taking infant from natural mother at time when she is under threat of public disapproval and stigma); cf Hector M. v. Commissioner of Soc.
Serv., 425 N.Y.S.2d 199, 207-08 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1980) (upholding claim of
overreaching by socil worker to obtain adoption consent).
30 See In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n of N.Y., 156 N.E.2d 700, 703 (N.Y. 1959);
In re Adoption of King, 316 N.Y.S.2d 686, 686-87 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1970); People
ex rel. Anonymous v. Louise Wise Serv., 250 N.Y.S.2d 507, 510 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1964); People ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 195 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1013 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1959); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 181 N.Y.S.2d 311, 314 (Sup. Ct.
Erie County 1959); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 304 N.Y.S.2d 46, 50 (Sur. Ct. Suffolk County 1969); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 261 N.Y.S.2d 439, 442 (Faro. Ct.
Dutchess County 1965); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 257 N.Y.S.2d 665, 666 (Sur.
Ct. Westchester County 1965); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 223 N.Y.S.2d 792, 796
(Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1962); In re Adoption of Van Allen, 170 N.Y.S.2d 400,
401 (Erie County Ct. 1958). But see People ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 210
N.Y.S.2d 698, 705 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1960), rev'd, 217 N.Y.S.2d 374 (App. Div.
2d Dep't), rev'd, 179 N.E.2d 200 (N.Y. 1961); In re ittenthal, 235 N.Y.S.2d 729, 739
(Fain. Ct. Bronx County 1962); In re Anonymous, 177 N.Y.S.2d 784, 787 (Sur. Ct.
Suffolk County 1958); In re Knapp, 156 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671 (Sur. Ct. Kings County
1956).
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"baby born out-of-wedlock, even of a troubled mother .... [was]

not 'up for grabs,'" nor "a waif claimable by the first finder, however highly qualified."331
Not even the legislature could undermine this fundamental
right of natural parents to raise their own children. Concerned
that adoptive parents needed the benefit of some procedure to
guarantee that they could adopt a child without fear that the
natural mother would revoke her consent, the legislature in 1972
adopted a statute making a consent executed in open court irrevocable.3 2 Although some cases decided after 1972 upheld consents in accordance with the spirit of the new law,333 most cases
continued to hold it "fundamental to our legal and social system,
that it is in the best interest of a child to be raised by his parents,"334 and, as a result, to allow natural parents to revoke their
adoption consents.33 Indeed, a judge who processed adoptions in
'' Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 274 N.E.2d 431, 433 (N.Y. 1971).
132 See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 115-b(2)(a) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996).
3 Thus, some cases applied the 1972 statute to properly executed consents, see
In re Adoption of T.W.C., 341 N.E.2d 526, 526 (N.Y. 1975); In re Adoption of Baby E,
427 N.Y.S.2d 705, 711 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1980); In re Adoption of E.W.C., 389
N.Y.S.2d 743, 749-50 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1976), including surrenders of children to properly authorized adoption agencies, see In re Nicky, 364 N.Y.S.2d 970,
981-82 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1975), and other cases, perhaps in response to the
policy underlying the statute, appeared more willing to find abandonment by a
natural parent, see In re Anonymous, 351 N.E.2d 707, 711 (N.Y. 1976); In re Dennis
and Denise, 405 N.Y.S.2d 584,588-89 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1978); In re Vanessa F.,
351 N.Y.S.2d 337, 343 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1974); In re Jennifer "S," 333 N.Y.S.2d
79, 84 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1972); cf In re Daniel A.D., 403 N.E.2d 451, 452 (N.Y.
1980).
"
In re Sanjivini K., 391 N.E.2d 1316, 1321 (N.Y. 1979); accord In re Paul M,
393 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1977); State ex rel. Wallace v. Lhotan,
363 N.Y.S.2d 425, 431 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1974); In re Denlow, 384 N.Y.S.2d
621, 629-30 (Faro. Ct. Kings County 1976); cf Apgar v. Beauter, 347 N.Y.S.2d 872,
876 (Sup. Ct. Tioga County 1973).
See In re Adoption of Male M, 428 N.Y.S.2d 489, 490 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1980); Franciska J. GG v. Duquette, 407 N.Y.S.2d 750, 752 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1978); Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 324 N.Y.S.2d 238, 241 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't), affd, 274 N.E.2d 431 (N.Y. 1971); Janet G. v. N.Y. Foundling Hosp., 403
N.Y.S.2d 646, 653 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1978); cf. In re Adoption by Emanuel T.,
365 N.Y.S.2d 709, 715-17 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1975). Judges sometimes remained
prepared, however, to proceed with adoptions which they thought to be in "the best
interests of the child" even though a natural parent opposed the adoption. See In re
Danielson, 427 N.Y.S.2d 572, 575 (Fain. Ct. Rensselaer County 1980); accord In re
Roy, 393 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517-18 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1977); cf. Bennett v. Marrow,
399 N.Y.S.2d 697, 698-99 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1977); In re Kimberly P., 376 N.Y.S.2d
791, 795-96 (Fain. Ct. Rensselaer County 1975). Judges also refused to invalidate
procedures for placing children in institutional or foster care when parents were
found unfit. See Boone v. Wyman, 295 F. Supp. 1143, 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd,
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Manhattan went so far as to suggest that he would carefully
scrutinize future consents in private placement cases even in the
36
absence of claims by mothers of impropriety."
2. The Right to Divorce
The most decisive shift from law based on traditional family
values to law emphasizing individual rights and happiness occurred as the New York courts, beginning in the late 1930's,
slowly retreated from the state's century-old policy of keeping
marriage indissoluble. This policy, it will be recalled, rested on
restricting in-state divorce only to cases involving adultery, limiting the recognition accorded to out-of-state divorce, and constraining relief in the form of annulments.
The first sign of change occurred in the old New York rule
according recognition to out-of-state divorces only when they had
been granted on the ground of adultery. The earliest case was
Glaser v. Glaser,337 where the Court of Appeals recognized the
validity of a Nevada divorce in a case where both spouses had
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Nevada court,
even though the New York judges continued to insist that their
action was not required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
that they had acted only as a matter "of state policy over which
the United States Supreme Court ha[d] no jurisdiction."338 In
both a slightly earlier339 and a slightly later case," ° the court had
similarly held a husband and his successors in interest estopped
from challenging the validity of a divorce he had sought. The
lower courts, in turn, began to behave in a more mixed fashion,
sometimes upholding341 and sometimes invalidating out-of-state
judgments.342
412 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1024 (1970); In re Jabril P., 431
N.Y.S.2d 899, 903 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1980); In re Jonathan D, 412 N.Y.S.2d 733,
739-40 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
'3 See In re Anonymous (G.), 393 N.Y.S.2d 900, 903 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1977).
37 12 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1938); accord Ansorge v. Armour,
196 N.E. 546, 548
(N.Y. 1935).
m Glaser, 12 N.E.2d at 306.
39 Hynes v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 7 N.E.2d 719, 721 (N.Y. 1937).
40 Krause v. Krause, 26 N.E.2d 290, 292 (N.Y. 1940).
' See Hansen v. Hansen, 8 N.Y.S.2d 655, 656 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1938); Pike v.
Pike, 19 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1940); Leviton v. Leviton, 6
N.Y.S.2d 535, 541 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), modified, 4 N.Y.S.2d 992 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1938); ef Robinson v. Robinson, 3 N.Y.S.2d 882, 883 (App. Div. 2d Dep't), affd,
17 N.E.2d 448 (N.Y. 1938).
342 See Langsam v. Langsam, 24 N.Y.S.2d 510, 513 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1940);
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Next came the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
Williams v. North Carolina8" holding that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause determined the effect that one state was required
to accord the divorce decrees of a sister state. Although the
Court of Appeals promptly recognized its obligation to abide by
at least the first Williams decision,' it simultaneously continued to apply much old law, such as the rule recognizing decrees
from other courts when both spouses had submitted to the jurisdiction of those courts,8" but holding such decrees void when
one spouse had neither submitted, nor been properly served.8"
More significantly, the lower courts held that they were free
to inquire into the jurisdiction of any sister-state tribunal and
that they were not required to obey a sister-state decree if they
found the rendering tribunal without jurisdiction.8" In 1944, the
Court of Appeals agreed' and, as the lower courts continued to
follow along,8" thereby nullified the opportunity that Williams
Kelly v. Kelly, 20 N.Y.S.2d 273, 274-75 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), aff'd, 31 N.E.2d 765
(N.Y. 1940); Pignatelli v. Pignatelli, 8 N.Y.S.2d 10, 18 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1938);
In re Bingham's Estate, 36 N.Y.S.2d 584, 586 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1942), affd, 39
N.Y.S.2d 756 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1943); Gill v. Gill, 18 N.Y.S.2d 114, 120 (Dom. Rel.
Ct. Kings County 1940); cf. Lederkremer v. Lederkremer, 18 N.Y.S.2d 725, 728-29
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1940).
317 U.S. 287 (1942) and 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
See In re Holmes' Estate, 52 N.E.2d 424,427-28 (N.Y. 1943).
See Lynn v. Lynn, 97 N.E.2d 748, 751 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849
(1951); Shea v. Shea, 60 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1946); In re Jiranek,
47 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1944); Wickett v. Wickett, 98 N.Y.S.2d 849,
851 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1950); Bane v. Bane, 80 N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1948); Schacht v. Schacht, 54 N.Y.S.2d 515, 516-17 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1945), rev'd, 60 N.Y.S.2d 523 (App. Div. 2d Dep't), rev'd, 68 N.E.2d 433, 434
(N.Y. 1946); Peri v. Groves, 50 N.Y.S.2d 300, 306 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1944).
3'6 See Caldwell v. Caldwell, 81 N.E.2d 60, 62 (N.Y. 1948); Querze v. Querze, 47
N.E.2d 423,424 (N.Y. 1943).
37 See Fondiller v. Fondiller, 50 N.Y.S.2d 393, 395 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1944);
Stevralia v. Stevralia, 48 N.Y.S.2d 646, 650 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1944); Finan v.
Finan, 47 N.Y.S.2d 429, 433 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1944); Forster v. Forster, 46
N.Y.S.2d 320, 325-26 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1944); Fondiller v. Fondiller, 42
N.Y.S.2d 477,478 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1943), affid, 45 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1943); Baker v. Baker, 40 N.Y.S.2d 445,445-46 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1943).
. See In re Lindgren's Estate, 55 N.E.2d 849, 851 (N.Y. 1944).
'9 See Rose v. Rose, 101 N.Y.S.2d 172, 173 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1950); Ravaud v.
Ravaud, 78 N.Y.S.2d 138, 140 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), af/d, 83 N.E.2d 148 (N.Y. 1948);
Bardonek v. Bardonek, 56 N.Y.S.2d 4, 5 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1945); Uvino v. Uvino,
82 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1948); Thalassinos v. Thalassinos, 77
N.Y.S.2d 311, 313 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1947), affd, 81 N.Y.S.2d 155 (App.
Div. Dep't 1948); Lane v. Lane, 68 N.Y.S.2d 712, 714 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947);
Pomerance v. Pomerance, 61 N.Y.S.2d 227, 229 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1946); Sitterly v. Sitterly, 58 N.Y.S.2d 424, 426 (Sup. Ct. Herkimer County 1945); Palmer v.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:435

had given New York residents to obtain out-of-state divorces
which they could not obtain in-state. Indeed, one lower court
judge in 1948 acted as if the Williams decision had never been
rendered when, citing the 1920 case of Hubbard v. Hubbard,"'
he declared it "the well-settled policy of this State to refuse to
recognize as binding a decree of divorce obtained in a court of a
sister state ...
upon grounds insufficient for that purpose in this

State, where the divorced spouse resided in this State and was
not personally served with process and did not appear in the
foreign action."351
However, when the Court of Appeals in a 1950 case352 reiterated its 1944 holding authorizing inquiry into the jurisdiction of
sister state courts, the Supreme Court reversed, 53 declaring that
the "faith and credit given is not to be niggardly but generous,
full"35 4 and that " 'Ilocal policy must at times be required to give

way.' ""' Fifteen years of confusion followed, as some lower
courts continued to inquire into the jurisdictional basis of and to
refuse to give effect to out-of-state decrees,356 while others
Palmer, 53 N.Y.S.2d 784, 785 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1945); Hultz v. Hultz, 51
N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1944); Shuart v. Shuart, 51
N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1944); Rosenberg v. Perles, 50 N.Y.S.2d 24,
25 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1944); Morton v. Morton, 99 N.Y.S.2d 155, 159-60 (Dom.
Rel. Ct. Bronx County 1950); Montague v. Montague, 68 N.Y.S.2d 185, 190 (Dom.
Rel. Ct. Kings County 1946); ef Michell v. Michell, 96 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (App. Div.
2d Dep't 1950); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 62 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272-73 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1946). On occasion, New York courts determined that out-of-state tribunals had acquired jurisdiction, and then they enforced the out-of-state decrees. See Adler v.
Adler, 81 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799-800 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1948); Liss v. Liss, 77
N.Y.S.2d 242, 244-45 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1948).
310See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
3 Ruderman v. Ruderman, 82 N.Y.S.2d 479, 481 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948),
affd, 89 N.Y.S.2d 894 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1949).
352 In
re Johnson's Estate, 92 N.E.2d 44 (N.Y. 1950), rev'd sub. nom., 340 U.S.
581 (1951).
53 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340
U.S. 581 (1951).
Id. at 584.
3*5
Id. at 584 (quoting Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948)). New York
has nonetheless continued to adhere to the view that at least one spouse must be
domiciled within a state in order for the state to have jurisdiction to render a divorce. See Carr v. Carr, 385 N.E.2d 1234, 1236 (N.Y. 1978).
*5 See Edelman v. Edelman, 161 N.Y.S.2d 717, 718 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1957);
Snyder v. Snyder, 143 N.Y.S.2d 12, 13 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1955) (per curiam);
Hartman v. Hartman, 122 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1953); Goshin v.
Goshin, 108 N.Y.S.2d 18, 18-19 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1951); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 219
N.Y.S.2d 751, 752 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961); In re Veltri's Estate, 113 N.Y.S.2d
146, 154 (Sur.Ct. Kings County 1952); Astor v. Astor, 128 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641-42
(Dom. Rel. Ct. Bronx County 1954); In re Cahall, 143 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (Children's
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reached the opposite result.35 Cases addressing other issues,
such as the effect of out-of-state custody and support decrees,"'
Ct. Schenectady County 1955); see also Harris v. Harris, 110 N.Y.S.2d 824, 826
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1952); ef. Schoenbrod v. Siegler, 230 N.E.2d 638, 640 (N.Y.
1967); Aghnides v. Aghnides, 159 N.Y.S.2d 343, 347-48 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), affd,
167 N.Y.S.2d 201 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958); Niver
v. Niver, 111 N.Y.S.2d 889, 890-91 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951).
'7 See Magowan v. Magowan, 226 N.E.2d 304, 305 (N.Y. 1967); Weisner
v.
Weisner, 218 N.E.2d 300, 301 (N.Y. 1966) (per curiam); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,
135 N.E.2d 553, 555 (N.Y. 1956), affd, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Maray v. Maray, 313
N.Y.S.2d 488, 489 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1970); Guibord v. Guibord, 153 N.Y.S.2d 457,
459 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1956); La Barr v. La Barr, 125 N.Y.S.2d 714 (App. Div. 3d
Dep't 1953); Wasserman v. Wasserman, 268 N.Y.S.2d 200, 201 (Sup. Ct. Oneida
County 1966); Dominick v. Dominick, 205 N.Y.S.2d 503, 503 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1960); Phillips v. Phillips, 180 N.Y.S.2d 475, 481-82 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1958); Hollis v. Hollis, 159 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1957); Bruce v.
Bruce, 129 N.Y.S.2d 454 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1954); Algazy v. Algazy, 129
N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954).
3 Compare Forbes v. Galway, 266 F. Supp. 762, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (declaring
New Jersey alimony award not enforceable in New York if award subject to retroactive modification in New Jersey); Berlin v. Berlin, 235 N.E.2d 109, 112-13 (N.Y.
1967) (modifying Maryland custody decree), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968);
Bachman v. Mejias, 136 N.E.2d 866, 868-69 (N.Y. 1956) (denying full faith and
credit to Puerto Rican custody decree when children physically were in New York);
Vanderbilt, 135 N.E.2d at 558 (allowing suit for support despite prior Nevada decree); Langerman v. Langerman, 104 N.E.2d 857, 860-61 (N.Y. 1952) (allowing suit
for increase in child support); Appelblom v. Appelblom, 412 N.Y.S.2d 517, 519 (App.
Div. 4th Dep't 1979) ("settled that ... full faith and credit ... does not apply to custody decrees"); Fisbman v. Fishman, 400 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1977) (denying effect to California support decree); Duke v. Duke, 322 N.Y.S.2d 261,
263 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1971) (modifying Connecticut custody decree on basis of
new facts); Bittson v. Bittson, 182 N.Y.S.2d 104 , 105 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1959)
(refusing to honor Portuguese custody award); MacKay v. MacKay, 110 N.Y.S.2d 82,
87 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1952) (refusing to honor Nevada custody decree); Quintana v.
Quintana, 101 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950) (refusing to honor Cuban custody decree); Fernndez v. Rodriguez, 411 N.Y.S.2d 134, 137 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1978) (refusing to honor Puerto Rican default custody decree), with
Martin v. Martin, 380 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1978) (enforcing Florida custody decree); In
re Lang, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763, 765 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1959) (upholding Swiss custody
decree), affd, 166 N.E.2d 861 (N.Y. 1960); Marshall v. Marshall, 113 N.Y.S.2d 602,
603 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1952) (enforcing Florida support order), affd, 110 N.E.2d
889 (N.Y. 1953); Porges v. Louis-Dreyfus, 113 N.Y.S.2d 86 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1952)
(enforcing French support decree); Stewart v. Stewart, 190 N.Y.S. 369, 370 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1921) (upholding Nevada support award); In re Wasserman, 203
N.Y.S.2d 554 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1960) (refusing to alter Alabama custody decree); Stern v. Stern, 132 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818-19 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1954)
(requiring application to Florida courts to change Florida support order); Fuchs v.
Fuchs, 106 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1951) (holding that Arizona
custody decree was entitled to full faith and credit); In re Forbell, 103 N.Y.S.2d 242
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1950) (refusing to alter Florida custody decree), affd, 105
N.Y.S.2d 992 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1951); People ex rel. McGrath v. Gimler, 60
N.Y.S.2d 622, 624 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1946) (refusing to alter Wyoming custody
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only added to the confusion.
An especially nettlesome issue during the 1950's and 1960's
concerned the validity of Mexican divorces. Of course, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause did not require New York to give them
effect, and many cases, as a result, treated them as a nullity.359
Other cases, however, recognized Mexican decrees when one
spouse had appeared in Mexico and the other had been represented by an attorney,36 ° or, at the very least, estopped spouses
who had participated in obtaining Mexican divorces from challenging their validity.36 '
Rosenstiel v. Rosenstie362 put the issue to rest by upholding a
divorce granted in Mexico to a husband, who had spent one hour
in the country signing an official book of residents and filing a
petition for divorce on grounds of incompatibility, and a wife,
whose attorney on the next day had submitted to the jurisdiction
of the Mexican court and admitted the allegations of the petition.363 The effect of the decision, as noted by the dissent, was "to
ignore the basic concepts and value judgments" of New York's
divorce legislation, which for 170 years had permitted divorce
decree), affd, 62 N.Y.S.2d 846 (App. Div. 2d Dep't); Armstrong v. Grimes, 334
N.Y.S.2d 558 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1972) (refusing to amend Texas custody decree). Other cases dealt with uniform laws designed to assist in support and custody
cases transcending state lines. See Landes v. Landes, 135 N.E.2d 562, 567 (N.Y.
1956) (holding constitutional reciprocal enforcement of minor's support under California Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act and New York Uniform Support of Dependents Law); Pitrowski v. Pitrowski, 412 N.Y.S.2d 316, 319 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1979) (holding that New York matrimonial long arm statute does
not provide basis for in personam jurisdiction over non-resident spouse).
'9 See Maltese v. Maltese, 224 N.Y.S.2d 946, 947-48 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1962); Johannsen v. Kennedy, 198 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649-50 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1960); Verdone v. Verdone, 188 N.Y.S.2d 689, 690 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1959);
Vesci v. Vesci, 181 N.Y.S.2d 221, 222 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1958); Liebman v.
Liebman, 169 N.Y.S.2d 510, 512 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1957); Alfaro v. Alfaro,
142 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864-65 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1955).
360 See Busk v. Busk, 229 N.Y.S.2d 904, 905-06 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), modified, 236 N.Y.S.2d 336 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1962); Skolnick v. Skolnick, 204 N.Y.S.2d
63, 64-65 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1960); Mountain v. Mountain, 109 N.Y.S.2d 828,
830 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1952); cf. Hytell v. Hytell, 254 N.Y.S.2d 851, 855 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1964).
"" See Deshler v. Rivas, 108 N.Y.S.2d 837, 841 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1951),
affid, 113 N.Y.S.2d 673 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1952).
.12 209 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 971 (1966).
363 By upholding Mr. Rosenstiels Mexican divorce from his first
wife, the Court
of Appeals legitimized his marriage to his second wife, from whom he was then
seeking to escape. Litigation over this second marriage continued for many years.
See Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 368 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 503 F.2d 1397
(2d Cir. 1974).
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only on grounds of adultery, out of "a design to restrict the availability of divorce and in so doing to preserve the family unit ...
considered vital and indispensable to the welfare and stability of
the family, the ultimate goal being a climate conducive to the
better development of our society." The dissent accordingly accused the majority of "sanction[ing] the casual and consensual
dissolution of the marriage contract"3" by giving spouses, in the
view of another member of the court, the power of "going to other
jurisdictions to evade our laws by obtaining divorces after short
sojourns and on grounds not cognizable here."365
The same tension between preserving traditional family values and giving individuals freedom to control their marital ties
also appeared in a line of annulment cases occurring between the
late 1930's and mid-1960's. In the earlier cases, judges had protected traditional values, as in Application of Sood,366 when they
denied a marriage license to a Hindu migrant from India because
he had left a wife behind there, even though under Indian law
she could not stop him from remarrying, and in In re Levy's Estate, 67 when they declared a woman who had gone through a
marriage ceremony with Samuel Levy to be his widow, even
though Levy had intended only to make her his housekeeper and
therefore had obtained no license for the marriage.
Later cases like Siecht v. Siecht368 were more willing to relieve individuals from hard marriages. The Siecht case arose
nearly two decades after Joseph Siecht and his wife Eva had
both migrated to the United States, where Joseph quickly became a citizen. When they married in 1925, Eva also had promised to become a citizen, but in fact had never done so. Then, in
1939, when Joseph learned that Eva was a member of the
Deutsch Bund, he left her. Two years later she persuaded him to
return with a promise to become a citizen, but she failed again to
honor the promise or to quit the Bund. On February 20, 1942,
Joseph left his wife again, after the following conversation reported in the court's opinion:
"Q. About two days before that did you have a talk with your
Rosensteil, 209 N.E.2d at 720.
Id. at 714.
:"' 142 N.Y.S.2d 591, 593 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1955); accord People ex
rel. Kay v. Kay, 252 N.Y.S. 518 (Magis. Ct. N.Y. County 1931).
7 6 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1938).
3S341 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1943).
""

5
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wife about her becoming a citizen?"
"A. I did. And she said there was no use of her trying to become a citizen because she said 'these shitty British and stupid
Americans can't win this war, because that man has prepared a
long time for this and he will rule everything.'"
"The Referee: That was Hitler?"
"The Witness: Yes. I said 'who is the man', and she said 'Hitler,
he is going to be the boss, and whatever he says will go.' 369
The court thereupon held that "the refusal of the defendant to
become a citizen of the United States and her membership and
activities in the Deutscher Bund, and her general attitude of
disloyalty to our country" constituted "valid grounds for an
annulment"370 of Joseph's marriage, even though Eva's 1925
promise to become a citizen must have had little, if any,
materiality at that time in inducing him to marry her.
The final case exhibiting the tension between traditional
values and the right of an individual to be free of a harsh marriage was Kober v. Kober."1 The case arose when Jaqueline
Kober sought an annulment of her marriage to Josef Kober on
the ground that he had failed to inform her that he had been an
officer in the German army during World War II and
that he was a Nazi and hated Jewish people and was fanatically
anti-semitic; that he believed in, advocated, approved and applauded Hitler's 'Final Solution' of extermination of the Jewish
people and that he would require plaintiff to weed out her Jewish friends and cease socializing with them. 2
In denying Josefs motion to dismiss this claim, the trial
court found his views "more than distasteful beliefs; they are absolutely repugnant and insufferable to all persons who believe in
the divine nature of man."373
Out of concern for the competing set of values, the Appellate
Division reversed. Although it took note of "the extreme and
horrible character of the husband's past and present beliefs," the
majority also knew that "the limited ground on which a divorce
may be obtained in this State, produces pressure to extend the
9 Id. at 394.
370
371
272

court).

Id.

256 N.Y.S.2d 615 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), rev'd, 211 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1965).
Kober, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 620 (Rabin, J., dissenting) (quoting opinion of trial

373Id.
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action for annulment to embrace more than it ... logically
should." The majority was concerned that "the extension" of doctrine needed to authorize annulments on the ground of political
beliefs would "unleash an uncontrollable mass of collateral
problems and effects."374 The Appellate Division majority, to
quote an earlier case, knew that it could not "grant annulments
solely because of sympathy" when to do so would constitute "an
extension of the legislative enactment by judicial decree" and
amount to "legislation by the judiciary"375 that would have the
capacity to undermine the State's entire law of marriage and divorce.
Three judges on the Court of Appeals adopted the view of the
Appellate Division 6 but four judges voted to reverse. In their
view, the defendant's "fanatical conviction ... that a race or group
of people living in the same community should be put to death as
at Auschwitz, Belsen, Dachau or Buchenwald, evidence[d] a diseased mind" that might warrant annulment on the statutory
ground of insanity or lunacy. In any event, the four-judge majority was convinced that the defendant's views would "plainly
make the marital relationship unworkable in this jurisdiction,"3 77
which, as has been shown elsewhere, had only recently committed itself to integrating minorities like Jews and blacks into the
mainstream of the community's life. 8
Decided in the same year by the same four-judge majority, 9
the Rosenstiel and Kober cases nonetheless had exactly the effect
that the dissenters had feared: they opened the floodgates to allow New Yorkers to obtain easy divorces out of state and easy
annulments at home. Although the two cases show that traditional values of family preservation through limitation of divorce
still commanded considerable adherence, they tipped the legislature's hand and forced it to enact the reforms of 1966-67,'80 which
finally brought about a "modernization and liberalization of ...
Kober, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
3"' Darling v. Darling, 105 N.Y.S.2d 475,478 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1951).
3" See Kober, 211 N.E.2d at 821.
314

377Id.

378 See Nelson, The ChangingMeaning of Equality in Twentieth-Century Constitutional Law, supra note 4, at 39-52, 71-76 (outlining evolution of judicial attitudes
towards minorities and towards minorities' struggle for equality).
...Judges Bergan, Dye, Fuld, and VanVoorhis constituted the majority of the
seven-member court in both Rosenstiel and Kober.
...
See Laws of N.Y., ch. 648 (1967).
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[New York's] medieval divorce law." 8'
After September 1, 1967, New York finally began to allow
divorce on grounds in addition to adultery. 2 One of the new
grounds was cruelty. This upgrading of the significance of cruelty produced little change, however, in its definition. Although
intoxication and laziness,38 "strained and unpleasant" relations
between spouses,38 4 "isolated threat[s],"38 5 even "riotous quarrels, " 36 still did not constitute cruel and inhuman treatment,87
repeated acts of violence,3 8 acts of adultery made known to the
innocent spouse," 9 and false accusations of adultery still did.380
381 Yoli

v. Yoli, 285 N.Y.S.2d 470,474 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1967).

32 Chapter 263 of the Laws of New York, enacted in 1935, was the forerunner of
the family law legislation enacted in the 1960's. The 1935 legislation eliminated the
causes of action of criminal conversation and seduction for adultery, as well as the
causes of action for alienation of affection and breach of promise to marry. See Laws
of N.Y., ch. 263 (1935). The constitutionality of the legislation, which put an end to a
good deal of preexisting caselaw, see Oppenheim v. Kridel, 140 N.E. 227 (N.Y. 1923);
Leonard v. Bulkley, 229 N.Y.S. 481 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1928); Deming v. Leising,
212 N.Y.S. 213 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1925); Modica v. Martino, 207 N.Y.S. 479 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1925); Botwinick v. Annenberg, 198 N.Y.S. 151 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1923); Madison v. Neuburger, 224 N.Y.S. 461 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1927); Buteau v.
Naegeli, 208 N.Y.S. 504 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1925), affd as modified, 215 N.Y.S.
823 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1926), was upheld by the Court of Appeals in Fearon v. Treanor, 5 N.E.2d 815 (N.Y. 1936), and Hanfgarnv. Mark, 8 N.E.2d 47 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 641 (1937). New York remained willing, however, to enforce judgments rendered by sister-state courts on similar causes of action in their own states.
See Parker v. Hoefer, 142 N.E.2d 194 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 833 (1957).
3 See Pierone v. Piereone, 293 N.Y.S.2d 256, 258 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County
1968).
384Orloffv. Orloff, 373 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1975).
385

Id.

386Filippi v. Filippi, 384 N.Y.S.2d 1010,
387 See Hessen v. Hessen, 308 N.E.2d

1011 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1976).
891 (N.Y. 1974); Denny v. Denny, 409

N.Y.S.2d 443, 444 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1978), affid, 401 N.E.2d 213 (N.Y. 1979); Underwood v. Underwood, 391 N.Y.S.2d 213, 213 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1977); Gandelman v. Gandelman, 331 N.Y.S.2d 977, 978 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1972); Rios v. Rios,
311 N.Y.S.2d 664, 666 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1970), affd, 277 N.E.2d 786 (N.Y. 1971);
Wenderlich v. Wenderlich, 311 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1970).
388 See McPherson v. McPherson, 385 N.Y.S.2d 177, 177 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1976); Chiarello v. Chiarello, 381 N.Y.S.2d 156 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1976); Cinquemani v. Cinquemani, 346 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1973); Yaron v.
Yaron, 378 N.Y.S.2d 285, 288 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975); Woicik v. Woicik, 321
N.Y.S.2d 5, 7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
388See Chiarello, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 156, 157; Armstrong v. Armstrong, 365
N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1975); Good v. Good, 323 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1971); cf Anderson v. Anderson, 395 N.Y.S.2d 743, 744 (App.
Div. 3d Dep't 1977); Bloom v. Bloom, 384 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1976).
" See Ash v. Ash, 386 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1976); Cinque-
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There was one change when the Court of Appeals held that
"[e]ven one beating"39' could constitute cruel and inhuman
treatment authorizing a wife to obtain a divorce. There were
also remedial changes as a result of the reform legislation, which
authorized the courts to grant a dual divorce in favor of both
parties when both were guilty of cruelty39 and to grant a separation even when there was no finding of cruelty."'
The reform legislation of 1967 also upgraded abandonment
into a ground for divorce,394 provided the abandonment had continued for at least two years.3"' As had been true in regard to
cruelty, the definition of abandonment underwent little change.
Refusal to engage in sexual intercourse continued to be defined
as abandonment,396 as did one spouse's exclusion of the other
from the marital abode.397
Adultery also remained a ground for divorce,39 and old rules
authorizing judges to infer adultery from circumstantial evidence
remained in place. 9 Thus, one jury's inference of adultery was
upheld on the basis of evidence "that defendant and ...[her]
neighbor [had been] seen in the latter's apartment, engaged in
loveplay, followed by a dousing of lights; [and] defendant
emerged four hours thereafter.""9 It also remained the rule that
when both parties were guilty of adultery, neither was entitled
mani,346 N.Y.S.2d at 877 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1973); Mante v. Mante, 309 N.Y.S.2d
944, 947-48 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1970). But see Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 413 N.Y.S.2d
179, 180 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1979).
3 Echevarria v. Echevarria, 353 N.E.2d 565, 566 (N.Y. 1976).
See Fomenko v. Fomenko, 374 N.Y.S.2d 882, 884 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1975);
John W.S. v. Jeanne F.S., 367 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1975); Zagarow
v. Zagarow, 430 N.Y.S.2d 247, 249 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1980).
See Wang v. Wang, 386 N.Y.S.2d 922, 923-24 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976).
34 See Wolfson v. Wolfson, 331 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1972).
See DeAngelis v. DeAngelis, 388 N.Y.S.2d 744, 745 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
...
1976); Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 288 N.Y.S.2d 285, 289 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1968); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 329 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1972). Subsequently, the period was changed to one year. See Rossiter v. Rossiter, 399
N.Y.S.2d 596, 597 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1977).
3 See Dudzick v. Dudzick, 378 N.Y.S.2d 234, 238 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk. County
1975). Perhaps it also continued to constitute cruelty. See Duke v. Black, 353
N.Y.S.2d 680, 682 (Farn. Ct. N.Y. County 1974).
33'See Schine v. Schine, 286 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y. 1972).
.. See Schlachet v. Schlachet, 378 N.Y.S.2d 308, 311 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1976).
'" See, e.g., Van Patten v. Van Patten, 360 N.Y.S.2d 588, 591 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga
County 1974).
4" Lee v. Lee, 378 N.Y.S.2d 459, 461 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1976).
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to a divorce on that ground.4 '
The reform legislation also added two new grounds for divorce. The first, which paid no heed to fault,4 2 allowed a divorce
to parties who had lived separate and apart for two years, 4 3a

period later reduced to one year,4 4 provided the parties had substantially performed all the terms of their separation agreement
or judgment of separation.4 5 Consensual divorce thus became
available in New York after a two-year, later reduced to a oneyear waiting period. 46 The second new ground authorized divorce when a defendant spouse was imprisoned for a term of
three or more years."'
With the 1967 statutory changes, New Yorkers seeking divorce rushed into their own courts.4 8 With divorce readily available, plaintiffs no longer needed to turn to annulment law to cir401 See

Anonymous v. Anonymous, 395 N.Y.S.2d 103, 104 (App. Div. 2d Dep't

1977); Recht v. Recht, 321 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1971) (per curiam);
But see Bigelow v. Bigelow, 308 N.Y.S.2d 618, 621 (Sup. Ct. Jefferson County 1969).
402 See Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 853 (N.Y. 1977); Jay v. Jay, 323
N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (Sup. Ct. Niagara County 1971); Adelman v. Adelman, 296
N.Y.S.2d 999, 1003 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969). But see Church v. Church, 296
N.Y.S.2d 716, 718-19 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1968).
413 See Gleason v. Gleason, 256 N.E.2d 513, 515 (N.Y. 1970); Pearson
v. Pearson,
311 N.Y.S.2d 749, 751 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1970) (dictum).
4o4See Christian, 365 N.E.2d at 854; Blauner v. Blauner, 400 N.Y.S.2d 335, 336
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1977).
405 See Timmins v. Timmins, 375 N.Y.S.2d 71, 72 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1975);
Wilkins v. Wilkins, 382 N.Y.S.2d 240, 242 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1976); Roth v.
Roth, 344 N.Y.S.2d 739, 742 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973); Littlejohns v. Littlejohns, 349 N.Y.S.2d 462, 465 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972), affd, 348 N.Y.S.2d 959
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1973); Van Vort v. Van Vort, 310 N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1970). A separation agreement had to be properly executed in order
to provide an adequate basis for a subsequent divorce. See Cicerale v. Cicerale, 382
N.Y.S.2d 430, 431 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1976), affd, 387 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1976).
40 See Orange v. Orange, 337 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63-65 (Sup. Ct. Albany 1972).
407See Cerami v. Cerami, 408 N.Y.S.2d 591, 595 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1978);
Colascione v. Colascione, 291 N.Y.S.2d 559, 561 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968).
Prior law had given a spouse a right to terminate the marriage when the other
spouse was sentenced to life imprisonment. See Zizzo v. Zizzo, 247 N.Y.S.2d 38, 40
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964).
408 Based on a random sample of approximately 100 cases per
year from trial
courts in Erie, Nassau, New York, and Tompkins counties, it can be stated with a 95
percent level of confidence and a margin of error of +/-3 percentage points that divorce represented 4.35% of the cases brought to court between 1920 and 1967.
Based on a comparable sample and with the same level of confidence and margin of
error, it can be stated that divorce rose to 15.98% of the cases brought in these
counties between 1968 and 1980 and 22.86% of the cases brought between 1970 and
1980.
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cumvent the State's limited divorce law, especially since "a
spouse in an annulment action [no longer had] any greater rights
than in a separation or divorce action."4 "' As a result, annulment
cases almost disappeared from the State's jurisprudence. 10 The
need to seek out-of-state relief similarly vanished, and as it did,
issues of full faith and credit in divorce cases likewise nearly
disappeared.4 1 '
III. THE NEW SEXISM
No one would claim that New York family law was without
sexist underpinnings of a sort during the 1920's and 1930's.
Nevertheless, the sexism of these early decades was constrained.
The law countenanced the dominance of male family heads, but
in return men were held to a duty to preserve the well-being of
the women and children who were their dependents.
Sexism of this sort endured into the 1940's, the 1950's, and
even the 1960's. But during these later decades, the emphasis of
family law also shifted from family preservation to the protection
of individual rights conducive to personal happiness, and, as doctrine changed, male privilege and judicial toleration of men's
misbehavior became increasingly pronounced. Sexism of a new
and arguably more virulent sort thus spread and, in conjunction
with sexist doctrines inherited from earlier times, degraded
women.

"'9 Bruno v. Bruno, 334 N.Y.S.2d 242, 248 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1972), modified, 355 N.Y.S.2d 817 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1974).
4'0 For a few of those cases, see Shamsee v. Shamsee, 381 N.Y.S.2d 127 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1976); Link v. Link, 369 N.Y.S.2d 496, 497 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1975);
In re Estate of Lueke, 358 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1974), affd, 373
N.Y.S.2d 1003 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1975).
411 Such issues continued to arise, for example, in regard to
old marriages which
at least one spouse had sought to terminate prior to the 1967 legislation; there was
then a question whether the attempt at termination had succeeded. See In re Joseph's Estate, 265 N.E.2d 756, 757-58 (N.Y. 1970); De Marco v. De Marco, 426
N.Y.S.2d 127, 128 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1980). Another issue concerned the effect of
out-of-state divorces on property rights in New York; see Fishman v. Fishman, 366
N.E.2d 862, 862 (N.Y. 1977); Blizniak v. Blizniak, 425 N.Y.S.2d 421, 422 (App. Div.
4th Dep't 1980); Zilmer v. Silver, 398 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1977), rev'd, 402 N.Y.S.2d 446 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1978), or issues of support. Occasional cases also arose when New Yorkers turned to foreign courts for a speedier
divorce than they could obtain at home. See Greschler v. Greschler, 414 N.E.2d 694,
696 (N.Y. 1980); Feinberg v. Feinberg, 351 N.E.2d 725, 727 (N.Y. 1976); Santamaria
v. Santamaria, 345 N.Y.S.2d 906, 911-12 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973).
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1. Paternity Cases
One area of newly rampant sexism grew up around the law
dealing with proceedings to determine the paternity of children
born out of wedlock.4 12 Since these proceedings possessed a
quasi-criminal character,4 1 judges required a specially high
412 Proceedings

to establish paternity were usually brought by unwed mothers

seeking support for their illegitimate children. See Mores v. Feel, 343 N.Y.S.2d 220,
228 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1973); Schneider v. Schneider, 339 N.Y.S.2d 52, 56 (Faro.
Ct. Kings County 1972). An expectant mother could also sue to recover the costs of
an abortion. See C. v. L., 305 N.Y.S.2d 69, 72 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1969). But a
mother could not sue for statutory child support if she and the putative father had
made a contract for support in which "the welfare of the child' [was] fully protected." Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1961); cf. Bacon v. Bacon, 386
N.E.2d 1327, 1328 (N.Y. 1979). The mother could bring an action for an increase in
support over the contract amount if changed circumstances so warranted. See Shan
F. v. Francis F., 387 N.Y.S.2d 593, 600-01 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1976); Ellen N. v.
Stuart K., 387 N.Y.S.2d 367, 371 (Fain. Ct. Onondaga County 1976). Suits to determine paternity could also be brought by fathers, see Jaynes v. Tulla, 416 N.Y.S.2d
357, 358 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1979); Edward K. v. Marcy R., 434 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109-10
(Fain. Ct. Kings County 1980); Lock v. Fisher, 428 N.Y.S.2d 868, 870 (Fain. Ct.
Westchester County 1980); but see Hines v. Sullivan, 431 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Fain. Ct.
Onondaga County 1980) (holding that father could not bring suit when, because of
age of mother, his relationship with her was unlawful) and, if a mother was "likely
to become a public charge," Commissioner of Welfare v. Meyers, 264 N.Y.S.2d 440,
442 (Farn. Ct. N.Y. County 1965); accord Anonymous v. Anonymous, 254 N.Y.S.2d
946, 947 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1964), by welfare officials "trying to retrieve from an
available source moneys expended on public assistance," Commissioner of Welfare v.
Jones, 343 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (Fain. Ct. Queens County 1973); accord Mildred D. v.
Oliver P., 412 N.Y.S.2d 987, 989 (Fain. Ct. Kings County 1979); cf In re Wolfe, 334
N.Y.S.2d 689, 690 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1972); Commissioner of Pub. Welfare ex
rel. Stuart v. Chandler, 204 N.Y.S. 187, 188 (Spec. Sess. N.Y. County 1922); St.
Lawrence County Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Dusharm, 382 N.Y.S.2d 428, 429 (Fain. Ct.
St. Lawrence County 1976); Mores, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 224-25. The cases were in conflict as to whether an illegitimate child could bring an action to establish paternity.
Compare Elizabeth H. v. James M., 429 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1007 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County
1980) (upholding right of child to sue), with Lattanzio v. Lattanzio, 373 N.Y.S.2d
989, 990 (Fain. Ct. Suffolk County 1975) (denying child's right to bring action for
support because no allegation was made that man and child's mother entered into
ceremonial marriage, that child was man's child, or that order of filiation was in existence). "[Olne major purpose of paternity proceedings [was] to shift the burden of
support of the child from the State to the putative father...." Moore v. Astor, 423
N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1012 (Fain. Ct. Westchester County 1980). Nonetheless, indemnification of "the community against the possibility that a natural mother or a child
born of an illicit relationship might become a public charge" was not the "sole purpose" of the law and did not fully reflect its "social philosophy." The law on paternity
"recognized more fully the moral obligation of the natural parents toward the offspring of their union ... [and], although providing for indemnification of the community, [was] chiefly concerned with the welfare of the child." Schaschlo v. Taishoff,
141 N.E.2d 562, 563 (N.Y. 1957).
413 The proceedings were described as "civil .... in nature," In re Clausi,
73
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standard of proof: proof "to the point of entire satisfaction by
clear and convincing evidence."414
This evidentiary requirement resulted in the acquittal of
many men accused of being fathers. Among those acquitted were
a man charged, for example, by a woman who testified "that she
had sexual relations with each man with whom she ever had a
date, "415 another man accused by a woman who "had a total of
eight children by at least three different men" and who at "the
time when ...
[she] was intimate with respondent ...
also ...
kept
company with another man ...
who, she stated, had fathered six
of her children,""' and a third man prosecuted by a woman who,
in addition to the two children whose paternity was at issue, had
conceived four other children by four other men.417 Moreover, a
man who engaged in sexual intercourse with an unwed mother
on only one occasion, especially if he wore a condom on the occa-

N.E.2d 548, 549 (N.Y. 1947); accord Commissioner of Soc. Serv. of N.Y. v. S., 348
N.Y.S.2d 831, 838 (Fam.Ct. Bronx County 1973), although "criminal in form,"
Clausi, 73 N.E.2d at 549.
414 Linda WW v. William XX, 415 N.Y.S.2d 275, 275
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 1979);
accord "HH" v. "II," 286 N.E.2d 717, 718-19 (N.Y. 1972); In re Hawthorne, 298
N.Y.S.2d 522, 523 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1969); Commissioner of Welfare v. Wendtland, 268 N.Y.S.2d 547, 549 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1966); Schleimer v. Swam, 402
N.Y.S.2d 897, 898 (Fain. Ct. Rockland County 1978). On the admissibility of particular sorts of evidence, see Dep't of Pub. Welfare of City of N.Y. v. Hamilton, 126
N.Y.S.2d 240, 241 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1953); Lascaris v. Lardeo, 417 N.Y.S.2d 665,
668 (Fain. Ct. Onondaga County 1979); A v. B, 336 N.Y.S.2d 839, 844 (Fain. Ct. Niagara County 1972); but see Elizabeth H., 429 N.Y.S.2d at 1007; Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 348 N.Y.S.2d 938, 939 (Fain. Ct. Rockland County 1973). The mixed
nature of the proceedings led courts to disagree over whether an indigent defendant
had a right to the assignment of free counsel. Compare In re S., 347 N.Y.S.2d 744,
745-46 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1973); M. v. J., 315 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1970); Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Witzel, 398 N.Y.S.2d 86, 87 (Fain. Ct. Rockland County
1977); Trent v. Loru, 292 N.Y.S.2d 524, 528-29 (Fain. Ct. Bronx County 1968), with
Miller v. Gordon, 397 N.Y.S.2d 500, 501 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1977); Bido v. Albizu,
318 N.Y.S.2d 547, 548 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1971). Subsequent legislation, however,
provided for assignment of counsel. See In re Lascaris, 432 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (Fain.
Ct. Onondaga County 1980); Cheryl B. v. Alfred W. D., 418 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272 (Fain.
Ct. N.Y. County 1979). Courts also disagreed over whether any inference could be
drawn from a defendant's exercise of his right not to testify. Compare Commissioner
of Soc. Serv. of N.Y., 348 N.Y.S.2d at 835-40, with Tilson v. Bark, 275 N.Y.S.2d 600,
602 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1966). On the right not to testify, see generally Morizzo
v. Arthur N., 415 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1979).
4,- Edick v. Martin, 312 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1970).
416 Snyder v. Davis, 385 N.Y.S.2d 901, 901-02 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1976).
4 7 Commissioner of Soc. Serv. of N.Y., 348 N.Y.S.2d at 834. The court noted,
however, that this woman was not "promiscuous in the sense of having indiscriminate sex with two or more men in any given period of time." Id. at 834.
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* 418
ol also
l be acquitted if other men had access to the
sion,
would
mother at the approximate time of conception.419
A striking fact about the paternity cases is the absence of
judicial language critical of men who had fathered children out of
wedlock. Men who got unmarried women pregnant were not
subject to condemnation; their behavior, it appears, was regarded simply as natural. Women and children, in contrast,
were condemned. At common law, an illegitimate child was
"nullius filius"-the child of no one, entitled to neither rights nor
standing in the community, and "not looked upon as children for
42
any civil purposes.""
At mid-century, "[e]xcept in the specific
respects provided by statute, a child born [out] of wedlock [was]
still nullius filius," and "the common law conception ... remain[ed] unchanged."421
Nor were mothers of illegitimate children more highly regarded, as is illustrated by a 1950 case12 involving two mothers
of twelve illegitimate children:
This case illustrates the many burdens which are imposed upon

48

See Renee G. v. William H., 360 N.Y.S.2d 514, 515 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1974),

affd, 351 N.E.2d 430 (N.Y. 1976).
"9 See Margie L. v. Gary M., 361 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742-43 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1974);
accord Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Orange County v. Alan K., 415 N.Y.S.2d 447, 448 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1979); Kerwin v. Collins, 381 N.Y.S.2d 68, 68 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1976); Boatwright v. Jones, 325 N.Y.S.2d 734, 735 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1971). On the
other hand, women whose conduct displayed "considerable sexual looseness," Commissioner of Soc. Serv. of N.Y., 348 N.Y.S. 2d at 840, would often win judgments.
Thus, a woman who testified to having sexual relations with no one but the alleged
father around the time of conception won her case when the alleged father admitted
having relations with the woman two or three times per week over an extended period of time, even though he denied having relations with her during the weeks in
question. Stenzel v. D'Agostino, 376 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1975); cf.
A v. B, 301 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1969), affd, 271 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y.
1971). Another woman won a case in which a man's denial of ever having sex with
her was contradicted by a witness who "testified that they had been seen sleeping in
bed together," St. Lawrence County Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. David SS, 432 N.Y.S.2d
651, 653 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1980), while yet a third woman won when she testified
to intercourse with the defendant and he failed to take the witness stand. Jay on
behalf of X v. Y, 367 N.Y.S.2d 333, 334 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1975). Of course, men
who had admitted paternity were held to their admissions. See Ferro v. Bersani, 433
N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1980), affd, 452 N.E.2d 1267 (N.Y. 1983); cf
First v. Lewis, 417 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (Fain. Ct. Queens County 1979); In re Johnson's Estate, 348 N.Y.S.2d 315, 318 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1973).
420 Grillo v. Sherman-Stalter Co., 186 N.Y.S. 810, 812 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1921),
affd, 132 N.E. 913 (N.Y. 1921).
421 In re Vincent's Estate, 71 N.Y.S.2d 165, 168 (Sur. Ct. Kings
County 1947).
42 In re Jones, 98 N.Y.S.2d 524, 525 (Child. Ct. Westchester County 1950).
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the taxpayers through the activities of immoral persons and
through the laxity of welfare departments in not checking up
before relief is granted almost without end.... The public welfare department had for years been supporting the mothers and
their respective broods of children. Year after year new children had been appearing upon the scene, and no one seemed to
have given any thought as to how the law might be invoked to
curb activities of that kind, nor as to the resultant responsibilities which were cast upon the taxpayers.... 423
The judge himself conferred with welfare officials, urged them to
prosecute the mothers for "immorality or depravity ... which had
caused the children to be neglected," and, when the mothers
appeared before him without counsel, he found them guilty.424
Although reports had "come to the Court of [one of] the [women]
and her children stepping into a nice station wagon and starting
off for the beach on a Sunday morning while the neighbors know
that they are all burdens on the taxpayers,"425 the judge
nonetheless suspended the mothers' sentences and left their
children in their custody. He explained:
It appeared, however, that [the children] had received excellent
physical care, and I had to consider the harm which might be
done to the children by separating them abruptly even from
mothers such as I had before me. I, therefore, left them in the
care of their mothers.... 426
The judge also admitted his impotence in dealing with the
father of five of the twelve children, who "was a married man
living with his family in the neighborhood." The mother, however, "consistently refused to give the man's name," and as a result, the court was "blocked in its efforts to bring him to account,
if indeed any useful purpose would be served ... in bringing to
light a state of facts 4which
might simply result in the breaking
2
up of his own family." 1
These mid-century cases represented a marked change from
judicial attitudes a few decades earlier. Men had been permitted
to dominate their families, but the law had expected monogamy
in return. At mid-century, in contrast, the double standard was
judicially tolerated: women were criticized for giving birth to il€- Id. at 526.
424

id.

4 Id. at 527.
421 Id. at 526.
4'

Jones, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
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legitimate children, while male promiscuity was presumed to be
normal and natural. In recognizing such male privilege without
imposing any corresponding duty, judges legitimated a new kind
of sexism.
2. Annulment Cases
New sorts of sexist assumptions also appeared in annulment
cases. In Thurber v. Thurber,428 for example, a "so-called patriotic women [sic]," during World War II had married "a soldier
solely for the purpose of getting an allotment and more if the
soldier [was] killed" but thereafter had refused to live with the
soldier after he had returned home; the court declared such conduct to be "the most brazen kind of a fraud and ... a good ground
for the annulment of the marriage."429 However much the facts
may have supported the court's holding, its stereotype of the
brave soldier seeking love before departing to fight for his country and of the money-grubbing woman selling herself for a government pittance was naive in its view of men and outrageously
unfair to women.
Judicial blindness to the faults of men and indifference to
the difficulties faced by women became increasingly characteristic as the 1940's and 1950's progressed. Similar sexism was
rampant, for example, as courts applied this double standard in
cases in which one spouse sought an annulment on the ground of
sexual activities prior to marriage by the other. Thus, these
cases held a man entitled to an annulment if his wife had failed
to disclose a previous illegitimate pregnancy43 or marriage 43 ' or
even if she turned out not to be the virgin he had expected her to
be. 432 In contrast, wives were denied annulments on account of
" even if
prior undisclosed sexual activities of their husbands,
those activities had resulted in illegitimate births. "34
42 63 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1946).

42 Id. at 402-03. But cf. De Martino v. De Martino, 78 N.Y.S.2d 503, 505 (Sup.
Ct. Onondaga County 1948).
430See Yucabezky v. Yucabezky, 111 N.Y.S.2d 441, 445 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1952).
43 See Smith v. Smith, 77 N.Y.S.2d 902, 903 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1948). But see
Pellerin v. Pellerin, 206 N.Y.S. 33, 34 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1924).
432 See Burdes v. Burdes, 90 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98-99 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County
1949). But cf. Wirth v. Wirth, 23 N.Y.S.2d 289, 292 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1940).
411See Musso v. Musso, 143 N.Y.S.2d 331, 333 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1955).
4 See Pankiw v. Pankiw, 256 N.Y.S.2d 448, 450 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1965).
But judges would annul marriages if husbands failed to disclose prior marriages, see
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Insofar as they denied women control over their reproductive lives, sexism was also inherent in the fraudulent failure to
procreate cases 435 that arose in large numbers in the aftermath of
World War II. As one judge opined, "[m]arital intercourse, so
that children may be born, [was] an obligation of the marriage
contract and is the foundation upon which must rest the perpetuation of society and civilization."4 36 Thus, an annulment was

proper if either the husband or wife insisted on using contraception,437 unless the other acquiesced in the contraceptive practices
for a sufficiently long period of time so as to warrant a finding of
condonation of the practice or waiver of the fraud.438 Since either
a husband or a wife could obtain an annulment, sexism, which
was real if one assumes that reproductive choice is more important to women than to men, was often hidden. In at least one
case, though, it was not, when a judge went so far as to grant a
Minner v. Minner, 144 N.E. 781, 783 (N.Y. 1924), or in order to put an end to ongoing affairs, see Schinker v. Schinker, 68 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472-73 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1947); but cf. Doll v. Doll, 83 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1948).
4,1 See Mirizio v. Mirizio, 150 N.E. 605, 607 (N.Y.
1926).
41' Florio v. Florio, 143 N.Y.S.2d 105, 107 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955); accord
Height v. Height, 187 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1959).
417 See Ehrlich v. Ehrlich, 112 N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1952);
Witten v. Witten, 109 N.Y.S.2d 254, 255-56 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1951); Richardson
v. Richardson, 103 N.Y.S.2d 219, 227-28 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1951); Berger v.
Berger, 73 N.Y.S.2d 384, 386 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1947); Coppo v. Coppo, 297
N.Y.S. 744, 751-52 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1937). But see Attar v. Attar, 181
N.Y.S.2d 265, 266-67 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1958). An annulment would not be
granted merely because one spouse prior to marriage had concealed his or her views
about the number of children the couple should have. See La Monica v. La Monica,
159 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1957); Frost v. Frost, 181 N.Y.S.2d 562,
563 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958); Bohok v. Bohok, 63 N.Y.S.2d 560, 561 (Sup. Ct.
Albany County 1946); Longtin v. Longtin, 22 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
County 1940).
3 See Aghnides v. Aghnides, 127 N.E.2d 323, 324 (N.Y. 1955) (unspecified period); Primmer v. Primmer, 234 N.Y.S.2d 795, 798 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1962)
(unspecified period); Ackerman v. Ackerman, 231 N.Y.S.2d 493, 494 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1962) (ten years); Roger v. Roger, 203 N.Y.S.2d 576, 578 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1960) (three and one-half years); Dougherty v. Dougherty, 169 N.Y.S.2d
242, 244 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1957) (eight years); Antoni v. Antoni, 128
N.Y.S.2d 510, 511 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1954) (seven years); Accardi v. Accardi, 129 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1952) (six years);
Schwind v. Schwind, 99 N.Y.S.2d 108, 111 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1950) (twelve
years); Fish v. Fish, 67 N.Y.S.2d 768, 768 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1947) (voluntary
cohabitation after learning of fraud); Hafner v. Hafner, 66 N.Y.S.2d 442, 445 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1946) (six years); Gerwitz v. Gerwitz, 66 N.Y.S.2d 327, 330 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1945) (three and one-half years); Dodge v. Dodge, 64 N.Y.S.2d 264,
265 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County) (voluntary cohabitation after learning of fraud), affd,
63 N.Y.S.2d 837 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1946).
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husband an annulment because his wife insisted, for the first
time after their marriage, that she439would determine the time at
which she would become pregnant.
3. SeparationCases

Sexism became even more rampant in cases involving judicial elaboration of the grounds for separation. During the years
prior to 1967, when New York permitted divorce only for adultery, its law also allowed the lesser remedy of a judicial separation on grounds of either cruelty or abandonment.
The first ground for separation, as noted, was cruelty, which
encompassed physical violence by one spouse upon the other.
Thus, one early case from the 1920's granted a separation to a
plaintiff wife after her husband had:
repeatedly called the plaintiff vile names, spat in her face,
abused her, ordered her out of the house, struck and beat her,
had the telephone disconnected, published a notice in the newspapers that he would not be responsible for her debts, left her
bills unpaid, refused to give her sufficient money to pay the ordinary and necessary household expenses, hired a detective to
watch her, and refused to eat at the table with her and many
times to speak to or carry on any conversation with her....440
Similarly, when a wife had her husband arrested on several
occasions and permitted her daughter by a prior marriage to assault him with, among other things, "an earthen crock ... , inflict[ing] serious bodily harm,"44' he was entitled to a separation,

as was another man whose wife "bit him, drawing blood,"" 2 and
yet another whose wife
" See Schulman v. Schulman, 46 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1943).
440 Fleischer v. Fleischer, 229 N.Y.S. 77, 78 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1928); accord
McKee v. McKee, 195 N.E. 809, 810 (N.Y. 1935); Howe v. Howe, 109 N.Y.S.2d 125,
126 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1952); Jury v. Jury, 275 N.Y.S. 586, 587 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1934); Nocilla v. Nocilla, 212 N.Y.S.2d 654, 656 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1961);
Mayeri v. Mayeri, 208 N.Y.S.2d 44, 47 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1960); Laff v. Laff,
160 N.Y.S.2d 933, 935 (Sup. Ct. Queens County), aff/d, 166 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div.
2d Dep't 1957); Gluckstern v. Gluckstern, 148 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1955) modified on other grounds, 153 N.Y.S.2d 184 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1956); Maggio v. Maggio, 145 N.Y.S.2d 662, 664 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1955);
Whaley v. Whaley, 205 N.Y.S. 716, 718 (Sup. Ct. Livingston County 1924).
4" Bergman v. Bergman, 245 N.Y.S. 439, 441 (Sup. Ct. Chautauqua County
1930).
"2 Weiner v. Weiner, 35 N.Y.S.2d 864, 865 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1942), affd, 47
N.E.2d 53 (N.Y. 1943).
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beat and mistreated [him], doused him with water to compel
him to leave the apartment, forced him to leave the apartment
early each morning and refused to allow him to return before 6
P.M., [and] took away and refused [him] a key to the apartment... ."'
A double standard in the definition of cruelty existed, however, as cases held that one or two isolated acts of violence by a
husband against his wife did not amount to cruel and inhuman
treatment.' Indeed, the courts became so tolerant of male violence that, among other things, they found one man justified in
striking his wife after he had found her sitting on the lap of another man and kissing him."5 A final case speaks for itself:
The plaintiff admitted ... that prior to the incident in which defendant held her head under the bathtub faucet she had thrown
a pot of water on him and that prior to the incident in which he
had tied her hands and feet, he had sought to make love to her
and she had repulsed him, slapping and kicking him. Such
physical acts as defendant committed were, thus,provoked."6
In contrast, the courts were clear that a single violent act by wife
against her husband amounted to wrongdoing on her part. 7
Traditional forms of sexism also appeared in New York's
"rigid" rules of separation, which failed to "take into account latter-day medical and sociological concepts"' by refusing to recognize "name calling, bickering, [and] threats" 9 as a form of
"3 Stevens v. Stevens, 115 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1952), affd
as modified, 118 N.Y.S.2d 755 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1953).
4" See Smith v. Smith, 7 N.E.2d 272, 273 (N.Y. 1937); Schapiro v. Schapiro, 276
N.Y.S.2d 678. 679-80 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1967); Blessing v. Blessing, 215 N.Y.S.2d
284, 285 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1961); Greene v. Greene, 278 N.Y.S. 954, 957 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1935); Gladstone v. Gladstone, 232 N.Y.S.2d 449, 451 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1962); Fox v. Fox, 186 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958),
affd, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1962); Wendt v. Wendt, 202 N.Y.S. 46,
47 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1923). In one early case, a court refused to denominate
a husband's conduct as "cruel and inhuman" even though he "drank to excess," on
"several occasions ... struck the plaintiff, and treated her in a manner unbecoming a
gentleman or a husband." Lazarczyk v. Lazarczyk, 203 N.Y.S. 291, 294 (Sup. Ct.
Oneida County 1924).
4" See Nilsen v. Nilsen, 183 N.Y.S.2d 210,212 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1959).
'6 Becker v. Becker, 260 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1965)
(emphasis added); accord Feix v. Feix, 100 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1950).
"7 See Axelrod v. Axelrod, 150 N.Y.S.2d 633, 639 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1956).
44 McCarthy v. McCarthy, 103 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Bronx County
1951).
49 Traylor v. Traylor, 159 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1957).
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cruelty. The law was clear. As the Court of Appeals had stated
in 1920:
Incompatibility of temper is no ground for separation in New
York. The misery arising out of domestic quarrels does not justify a termination of the legal rights and duties of husband and
wife. For such ills the patients must minister unto themselves;
our courts of justice offer no cure.410
What the Court labelled a "well-established rule"451 remained in
place into the 1960's452 in response to the continuing "policy of
the law to keep husband and wife together."45 But the burden of
remaining together fell largely on wives. "[S]o long as the wife
ha[d] demonstrated that she [could] live with her husband,
despite his failings," the law would not grant her a separation, 4 "
since she was simply required to "suffer the consequences of the
apparent mistake, made when the marriage took place, in not
discovering any temperamental defects that then existed."455 For
similar reasons, a wife could not obtain a separation because a
husband was "lazy around the house,"41 "indulge[d] in more

liquor than a wise man should,"457 or gambled for high stakes.458
450 Pearson

v. Pearson, 129 N.E. 349, 351 (N.Y. 1920); accord Tell v. Tell, 53

N.Y.S.2d 94, 100 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1944).
4 Pearson,129 N.E. at 351.
412 See Smith v. Smith, 200 N.Y.S.2d 542, 542 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1960); Russ v.
Russ, 161 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1957), affd, 148 N.E.2d 911 (N.Y.
1958); Schechter v. Schechter, 44 N.Y.S.2d 864, 865 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1943), affd,
56 N.E.2d 262 (N.Y. 1944); Avdoyan v. Avdoyan, 40 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667-68 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1943); Morris v. Morris, 20 N.Y.S.2d 782, 783 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1940);
Strnad v. Strnad, 266 N.Y.S. 159, 159 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1933); Otton v. Otton, 188
N.Y.S. 255, 256 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1921); Reese v. Reese, 185 N.Y.S. 110, 111 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1920); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 216 N.Y.S.2d 330, 332 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1961); Bruckner v. Bruckner, 209 N.Y.S.2d 347, 350 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1960); Kronenberg v. Kronenberg, 203 N.Y.S.2d 218, 219-20 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1960), modified on other grounds, 213 N.Y.S.2d 811 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1961); Anderson v. Anderson, 189 N.Y.S.2d 930, 932-33 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959);
Camp v. Camp, 189 N.Y.S.2d 561, 568-69 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1959); Marino v.
Marino, 145 N.Y.S.2d 571, 575 (Sup. Ct. Ontario County 1955); Gelardi v. Gelardi,
127 N.Y.S.2d 802, 804 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1953); Treherne-Thomas v.
Treherne-Thomas, 35 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1942); Brown v.
Brown, 208 N.Y.S. 17, 18 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1924).
Reese, 185 N.Y.S. at 111.
Baker v. Baker, 228 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1962).
4" McClinton v. McClinton, 200 N.Y.S.2d 987, 989-90 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County
1960) (quoting Averett v. Averett, 178 N.Y.S. 405, 406 (1919), affd, 134 N.E. 554
(1921)).
4 In re Smith's Will, 72 N.Y.S.2d 609, 612 (Sur. Ct. Monroe County 1947).
47 Straub v. Straub, 204 N.Y.S. 61, 62 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1924).
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On the other hand, a wife's "denial" of her husband's
"marital rights""9 or her demand that he use contraceptives was
"contrary to the principles and policy" of New York law and
thereby constituted "a violation of her obligations under the
marriage contract" in the nature of cruelty.46 In contrast, a husband's lack of sexual interest in his wife461 or other failure to
have sexual relations 462 did not constitute cruelty.463
Traditional forms of sexism also manifested themselves in
holdings that a wife was guilty of cruelty if she refused to accompany her husband socially or to assist him in business." A
particularly interesting case arose when "a very ambitious
lady"46 sought to return to college and medical school, as a result
of which she failed to keep Jewish dietary laws in her home and
to pay as much attention to her daughter as her husband felt she
should.466 The court held that her husband had "no obligation ...
4-"See Brown v. Brown, 208 N.Y.S. 17, 19 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1924).
'9 Di Croce v. Di Croce, 209 N.Y.S.2d 624, 627 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961);
accord People ex rel. Roosevelt v. Roosevelt, 216 N.Y.S.2d 604, 607 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1961), affd sub. nom., People ex rel. Anonymous No. I for 1962 v. Anonymous,
182 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1962); cf. Diemer v. Diemer, 149 N.Y.S.2d 146, 151 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1956), affd as modified, 168 N.E.2d 654 (N.Y. 1960). But see Vernoia
v. Vernoia, 71 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947).
4" Barretta v. Barretta, 46 N.Y.S.2d 261, 263 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1944).
But see Dahnken v. Dahnken, 161 N.Y.S.2d 539, 540 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1957).
4" McClinton v. McClinton, 200 N.Y.S.2d 987, 989 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County
1960).
42 Shepetin v. Shepetin, 229 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1962).
4' But male conduct described by a court as "sexual raids," "unreasonable exercise of marital rights," and "excessive and unreasonable sexual indulgence" would be
held cruel. Harnish v. Harnish, 60 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1946).
Cruel and inhuman treatment would also be found when one spouse openly committed adultery. See Hofmann v. Hofinann, 133 N.E. 450, 451 (N.Y. 1921); Haas v.
Haas, 64 N.Y.S.2d 9, 11 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1946), rev'd on other grounds,
80 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1948); Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 270 N.Y.S. 47, 49 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1934); cf Morse v. Morse, 123 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1953). But see Lanyon's Detective Agency, Inc. v. Cochrane, 148 N.E. 520, 521 (N.Y.
1925) (stating, in dictum, adultery does not necessarily constitute cruel and inhuman treatment). Cruel and inhuman treatment might also be found if one spouse
falsely accused the other of adultery. See Poppe v. Poppe, 144 N.E.2d 72, 75 (N.Y.
1957); Sherman v. Sherman, 103 N.Y.S.2d 374, 375 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1951),
affd, 110 N.E.2d 736 (N.Y. 1953); Generous v. Generous, 99 N.Y.S.2d 416, 418 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1950); Armour v. Armour, 88 N.Y.S.2d 111, 112 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County), affd as modified, 89 N.Y.S.2d 577 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1949).
4 See Petrella v. Petrella, 255 N.Y.S.2d 962, 963 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1965); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 216 N.Y.S.2d 330, 332 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961).
4" Rosner v. Rosner, 108 N.Y.S.2d 196, 200 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Queens County
1951).
4'Id. at 198-99.
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. to provide for his wife the funds which she require[d] to attain a
professional status" and that she had constructively abandoned
him by failing to provide proper meals and breached her "duty"
as a "parent" when she failed to maintain "an atmosphere at
home which [would] redound favorably to the46 growth
emotion7
ally, intellectually, and spiritually of the child."

Traditional sexist assumptions finally pervaded the cases
explicating the second of the statutory grounds for separationabandonment.468 It was clear, for example, that a husband who
ceased supporting his wife would be deemed to have abandoned
her,469 while a wife would be guilty of abandonment if she refused
to have sexual relations with her husband.47 ° Another sexist rule
467

Id. at 201.

46 Abandonment was defined as a wrongful departure from the marital home
with an intent not to return. See Bohmert v. Botmert, 150 N.E. 511, 512-13 (N.Y.
1926); Davidoff v. Davidoff, 134 N.Y.S.2d 201, 201 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1954);
Lubenstein v. Lubenstein, 45 N.Y.S.2d 740, 742 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1944); Domb v.
Domb, 186 N.Y.S. 306, 308 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1921); Nadler v. Nadler, 224
N.Y.S.2d 297, 298 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1961); Serota v. Serota, 186 N.Y.S.2d 713,
716 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1959); Braun v. Braun, 142 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1955); Purvin v. Purvin, 51 N.Y.S.2d 492, 493 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1944); Harlow v. Harlow, 204 N.Y.S. 128, 130 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1924). A
separation, in order to constitute an abandonment, had to "be obstinate and hardened." Mirizio v. Mirizio, 161 N.E. 461, 462 (N.Y. 1928); accord Schatzberg v.
Schatzberg, 207 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1960); Morris v. Morris, 44
N.Y.S.2d 724, 726 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1943), rev'd, 56 N.E.2d 589 (N.Y. 1944). Of
course, the spouse who had voluntarily departed from the marital home could not
claim abandonment by the other, see Solomon v. Solomon, 49 N.E.2d 470, 472 (N.Y.
1943); Russ v. Russ, 177 N.Y.S.2d 875, 877 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958), unless the
conduct of the other had been so "obnoxious, detestable, arrogant, [or] violative of
decency" as to "amount to a constructive abandonment." Blair v. Blair, 121 N.Y.S.2d
30, 35-36 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1953); accord Meyer v. Meyer, 9 N.Y.S.2d 28
(Sup. Ct. Erie County 1939). No abandonment would be found if both spouses had
misbehaved. See Murphy v. Murphy, 71 N.E.2d 452, 454 (N.Y. 1947); Naphtali v.
Naphtali, 159 N.Y.S.2d 758, 760 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1957); Walker v. Walker, 122
N.Y.S.2d 209, 210 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1953), affd, 121 N.E.2d 553 (N.Y. 1954);
Fragomeni v. Fragomeni, 112 N.Y.S.2d 224, 225-26 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1952).
See Sengstack v. Sengstack, 151 N.E.2d 887, 889 (N.Y. 1958); Batchelor v.
Batchelor, 68 N.E.2d 681, 682 (N.Y. 1946); Berg v. Berg, 46 N.E.2d 910, 911 (N.Y.
1943); Champagne v. Champagne, 14 N.Y.S.2d 715, 715 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1939);
Garfinkel v. Garfinkel, 210 N.Y.S.2d 674, 676 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1960), affd,
226 N.Y.S.2d 675 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1962); Winterry v. Winterry, 140 N.Y.S.2d
287, 288 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955); List v. List, 61 N.Y.S.2d 809, 812 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1946), modified, 95 N.Y.S.2d 604 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1950); Pompilio v.
Pompilio, 221 N.Y.S. 594, 596 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1927).
470 See Diemer v. Diemer, 168 N.E.2d 654, 656-57 (N.Y. 1960); Mirizio v.
Mirizio,
150 N.E. 605, 607-08 (N.Y. 1926); Bentz v. Bentz, 67 N.Y.S.2d 345, 347 (Sup. Ct.
Steuben County 1947); Rothman v. Rothman, 67 N.Y.S.2d 96, 98 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1946); Tepper v. Tepper, 64 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213-14 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County
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was that a husband had the right to determine where47' and with
whom472 he and his wife would reside. It was "a wife's burden to
move with her husband to a location selected by him in good
faith," at least when the move was related to the husband's employment;473 "her duty" was "'to go with her husband to the home
which he had provided,"'474 and, if she refused, she would be
deemed to have abandoned him."7
4. The Law of Support
Prior to 1967, a determination of guilt of cruelty or abandonment was significant because, as we have seen, it determined
the amount of support that a husband owed his wife.476 What we
1946). However, a wife could also raise her husband's refusal to have sexual intercourse as grounds for abandonment. See Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 130 N.Y.S.2d 762,
766 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1954). But cf Devon v. Devon, 214 N.Y.S.2d 109, 111
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961) (holding that no abandonment occurs when parties
agree not to have sexual relations).
n' See Vetrano v. Vetrano, 54 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538-39 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1945). But see Tausik v. Tausik, 235 N.Y.S.2d 776, 784 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1962)
(stating that husband must exercise right in reasonable manner); Eftimiou v.
Eftimiou, 204 N.Y.S.2d 785, 790 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1960) (holding that husband
"must exercise his rights in a reasonable manner").
472 See Palese v. Palese, 267 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1966);
Crutchfield v. Crutchfield, 75 N.Y.S.2d 339, 340 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947);
Brandt v. Brandt, 259 N.Y.S. 100, 102 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1932), affd, 262 N.Y.S.
973 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1933). But see Bruch v. Bruch, 67 N.Y.S.2d 89, 90 (App. Div.
2d Dep't 1946) (holding presence of husband's mother, whose conduct made wife's
living conditions intolerable, constituted constructive desertion).
413 Cavallo v. Cavallo, 359 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County
1974).
474 Vetrano, 54 N.Y.S.2d at 538.
475 Id. at 539 (citing Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Gray, 16 N.E.2d 373, 375
(N.Y.
1938)); In re Roessler's Estate 12 N.Y.S.2d 572, 575 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1939).
4'a This is true unless the parties had agreed on the amount of support pursuant
to a separation agreement. See Borax v. Borax, 149 N.E.2d 326, 326 (N.Y. 1958)
(holding that separation agreement containing provision for support and maintenance barred separate action); Oatman v. Oatman, 46 N.Y.S.2d 269, 269 (App. Div.
4th Dep't 1943) (holding that action for separation was barred by separation agreement); Doty v. Rensselaer County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 185 N.Y.S. 466, 468 (App. Div.
3d Dep't 1921) (stating that agreement under which husband agreed to provide and
maintain home for wife's life precluded wife from bringing action for separation); see
also Peer v. Peer, 220 N.Y.S.2d 813, 813-14 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1961) (regarding
separation agreement allegedly abandoned by reconciliation and resumption of
marriage). But ef Jackson v. Jackson, 49 N.E.2d 988, 990 (N.Y. 1943) (holding that
lump-sum separation agreement does not bar judicial award of support). As we have
already seen, a guilty husband was required to support an innocent wife according
to his means in the style to which she had become accustomed during marriage,
whereas an innocent husband was required to provide a guilty wife only with the
support necessary to prevent her from becoming a public charge. See Mills v. Mills,
62 N.Y.S.2d 344, 345-46 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Queens County 1946). A wife could also ob-
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have yet to examine, however, is the extent to which sexist assumptions riddled the rules governing the judicial award of support.
An old sexist assumption, going back even beyond the
1920's, was based upon alleged "considerations of equity and
public policy;" it held that an "obligation" existed growing "out of
the marriage relation that the husband must support his wife
and family."477 Especially if there were young children, a wife, it
was thought, "should not be compelled to work to the[ir] detriment," but "should be encouraged" to maintain "a normal mother
and child relationship," in which she would "devote a considerable portion of her time to their care, guidance and well-being."47
In the postwar era, however, the courts never put excessive pressure on men in a fashion that would interfere with their practitain support according to means if both spouses were equally guilty or innocent, see
Sacks v. Sacks, 271 N.Y.S.2d 358, 360-61 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1966), unless the marital relationship was continuing, see Weiss v. Weiss, 148 N.Y.S.2d 80, 81 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1956) (holding that marital relationship so intimately continued that separation action was precluded); Duffy v. Duffy, 200 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151-52 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1960) (stating that the general rule is that judgment of separation will
not be granted if the parties voluntarily continue to live in the same premises), but
see Sonnenberg v. Sonnenberg, 203 N.Y.S.2d 118, 121 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960)
(stating that in order to invalidate separation agreement, cohabitation must consist
of more than sexual intercourse).
477 Brandt v. Brandt, 233 N.Y.S.2d 993, 995 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1962); accord
Phillips v. Phillips, 150 N.Y.S.2d 646, 648-49 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), affd, 138 N.E.2d
738 (N.Y. 1956); Surut v. Surut, 181 N.Y.S. 631, 632 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1920). In
light of this sexism, it is not surprising that the legislature created and the courts
enforced special remedies for needy wives and children. In one case, for example,
the Court of Appeals took account of "the frequent inequality of mobility and financial means" between husbands and wives, who typically "were unable to pursue
their itinerant spouses and obtain support rights in foreign jurisdictions." Loeb v.
Loeb, 152 N.E.2d 36, 39 (N.Y. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959). It accordingly
recognized the existence of a special "protective ... remedy" for wives residing in
New York, "whose property rights might be jeopardized by an ex parte divorce by
their spouses." Id. Judges similarly recognized that alimony, which was "merely the
enforcement of a common law liability of a husband to support his wife," Anastasiadis v. Anastasiadis, 279 N.Y.S.2d 936, 937 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967), was a
remedy exclusively for women, and accordingly they denied requests for alimony by
men.
47' Brownstein v. Brownstein, 268 N.Y.S.2d 115, 123 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1966).
In addition, support was mandated "to prevent abandoned wives and children from
becoming public charges." People ex rel. Heinle v. Heinle, 188 N.Y.S. 399, 400
(Bronx County Ct. 1921). Fearful of public burdens, courts also upheld the statutory
liability of grandparents to support a grandchild when welfare authorities were
"unable to secure adequate support for such child from its parents." Kinsey v. Lawrence, 100 N.Y.S.2d 597, 605 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Queens County 1950) (citing DOM. REL.
CT. AcT, § 101 (3)).
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cal right to devote their own resources to the pursuit of their own
happiness. Thus, they urged that a woman who had "separated
from her husband, should be encouraged, if consistent with her
...
obligations to her children and family, to ... make herself eco-

nomically useful."479

As another judge added, "Alimony was

to protect those without power of ownership
originally devised ...

or earning resources. It was never intended," he continued, "to
assure a perpetual state of secured indolence. It should not be
suffered to convert a host of physically and mentally competent
women into an army of alimony drones."480 Alimony "was not
a status of leisure and uselessness in socidesigned to confer ...

ety."481 For like reasons, alimony was a remedy available only to
women and could never be recovered by men, who were deemed
competent to support themselves.482 Indeed, were a "husband ...
[to] look to his wife for support," he would be "placed in an unnatural relationship," since he was supposed to be "the breadwinner and provid[er] for the family."4"
Nothing better encapsulates the sexism of the 1940's, 1950's,
and 1960's than the support cases just discussed. That sexism
grew, in part, out of the earlier sexism of the 1920's and 1930's,
which had focused on what was "natural" in the relationship between the genders. The early sexism had found it "natural" for
men to be somewhat violent and sexually promiscuous, but at
the same time to serve their families as providers. It had been
equally "natural" for women to remain in the home, nurture
young children, and accept their subordination to men. The
courts turned this early sexism into something even more perverse, however, when, with a post-World-War II emphasis on
individual rights, they translated what had been simply
"natural" into a set of legal entitlements. In the new translation,
much of what had been "natural" in the 1920's and 1930's-the
duties that had corresponded to the rights-could find no place,
Brownstein, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 122.
Doyle v. Doyle, 158 N.Y.S.2d 909, 912 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957); accord
Bruno v. Bruno, 334 N.Y.S.2d 242, 248 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1972), modified, 355
N.Y.S.2d 817 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1974); Palmieri v. Palmieri, 168 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1957).
4;1Brownstein, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 121-22.
4"2See Steinberg v. Steinberg, 360 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1974);
Anastasiadis,279 N.Y.S.2d at 937; Posner v. Posner, 110 N.Y.S.2d 515, 518 (Doam.
Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1952).
4" Anastasiadis,279 N.Y.S.2d at 937.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:435

and male privilege was left standing by itself.
This same postwar change in family law can also be described in an alternative fashion. In a wide variety of legal doctrines in New York, the years around World War II saw an end
to the traditional moral underpinnings of the law. New values
emerged in place of the older moral ones. In the context of family law, the new values were cast in the language of rights which
their bearers could enjoy without assuming any corresponding
duties or responsibilities. When these new ideas about rights
became attached to older assumptions about normal and natural
male behavior, the social advantages men had customarily enjoyed became reified into formal legal privileges standing apart
from the social obligations with which traditional morality had
encumbered them. As a result, men gained increased legal
power, and women lost significant legal protections.
IV. EQUALITY iN THE FAMILY
With the 1963 publication of Betty Friedan's The Feminine
Mystique,4 the 1964 passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
with its goal of equal employment opportunities for women, and
the 1965 founding of NOW, the National Organization for
Women, a new feminist movement was born.4
Initially, the
movement was moderate and reformist in tone. Some feminists
rapidly headed in more radical directions,4 88 however, with the
result that by 1970 "the ideological complexity of the movement
[was] too great to be categorized ...
simply;"487 disagreement existed over a myriad of issues ranging from the structures that
should be adopted for the internal governance of women's
groups, through the significance to be attached to issues of race
and class, to the proper place of lesbian sexuality in a future
feminist utopia.488
4'4BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).

4' See SARAH

EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION

IN THE CiL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFT 18-19 (1979).
"' The earlier radical work included SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF
SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST REVOLUTION (1970); ANNE KOEDT,RADICAL FEMINISM

(Ellen Levine and Anita Rapone eds., 1973); JULIET MITCHELL, WOMAN'S ESTATE
(1971). More recent work includes ANDREA DWORKIN, OuR BLOOD: PROPHECIES AND
DISCOURSES ON SEXUAL POLITICS (1976), and CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987).
48 JO FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION: A CASE STUDY OF AN
EMERGING SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND ITS RELATION TO THE POLICY PROCESS 51 (1975).
"8

For a detailed analysis of the divisions in feminism in the years around 1970,
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Nonetheless, virtually all feminists agreed that the family
law doctrines on which this article has so far focused were badly
in need of change. Thus, there were familiar complaints about
"men's and women's unequal status in the family" as the law
"gives men an advantage in marriage."489 Some feminists went
so far as to imply that marriage as a legal institution ought to be
abolished. They argued that marriage persisted, at least in part,
because "it is difficult to change any institution;" they also urged
that "[M]any of the needs that marriage fulfills ... [could] be met

in other ways."49 Other feminists, in contrast, strove for less
radical solutions, such as no-fault divorce, which "worked hand
in glove with women's search for equality through the rejection
of the patriarchal family."491 These "creators of no-fault divorce
law," in turn, "intended to establish norms for property settlements and alimony based on the concept of wives as full economic partners."492
The efforts to change family law were part and parcel of a
more general effort by feminists in the late 1960's and 1970's to
promote gender equality. As explained by NOW, the goal was
"to bring women into full participation in the mainstream of
American society ... in truly equal partnership with men.'"49 3
The women's movement achieved substantial successes in the
areas of employment law,494 abortion,495 and gender-related
crimes.496 The movement for equality also produced many
changes in family law, but the changes paradoxically brought
greater tangible benefits to men than to women.
The doctrinal change from which women gained the most
tangible benefit occurred when the Court of Appeals in the 1976
case of Echevarria v. Echevarria497 held that "lelven one beatsee generally ALICE ECHOLS, DARING TO BE BAD: RADICAL FEMINISM IN AMERICA,
1967-1979 (1989).
49 AMY SWERDLOW, ET AL., HOUSEHOLD AND KIN: FAMILIES IN FLUX 94 (1981).
4 ' Id. at 96.
411 MARYANN MASON, THE EQUALITY TRAP 51 (1988).
42 GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 166 (1991).
493 FRIEDAN, supra note 485, at 384 (quoting Statement of Purpose of National
Organization for Women).
"' See Nelson, The ChangingMeaning of Equality in Twentieth-Century ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 4, at 89-96.
415 See id. at 96-97.
See Nelson, Criminality and Sexual Morality in New York, 1920-1980, supra
note 4, at 324-35.
47 353 N.E.2d 565 (N.Y.
1976).
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ing"498 could constitute cruel and inhuman treatment; earlier
cases, it will be recalled, had declared that a single beating, no
matter how severe, would not alone constitute cruelty.
Another change that unequivocally helped women occurred
with the rejection of the old rule that a wife had to follow her
husband and reside with him at the location of his choice. While
one case decided in the 1970's reaffirmed the traditional view
that it was "still a wife's burden to move with her husband to a
location selected by him in good faith," at least when the move
was related to the husband's employment,4 9 another case declared that a wife's right to remain "in a well-paying, full-time
job she ha[d] held for a considerable length of time" could "not be
defeated by the husband's arbitrary decision to change his
domicile without some showing of necessity on his part."500
On one subject - the law involving children born out of
wedlock - egalitarian change helped children. As far back as
1953, a lower court judge had declared that the "antipathy toward those born out of wedlock should not be extended beyond
its historical bounds where to do so would result in injustice.""0 '
The legal position of illegitimate children did not improve significantly, however, until fifteen years later, when the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Levy v. Louisiana °2 made it
clear that "state law could not operate to deprive an illegitimate
child of any right if the ground for depriving him of that right
was merely the fact of his illegitimacy.""3 On this basis, even the
illegitimate children of alien immigrants were given the same
visa preferences for entering the United States as legitimate
children enjoyed.' 4
But every other change in the law wrought by equality conferred tangible benefits on men. Consider, for example, the
relative rights of mothers and fathers of illegitimate children,
especially in regard to custody. Since the putative father of an
498Id. at

566.
4"Cavallo v. Cavallo, 359 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1974).
600 Weintraub v. Weintraub, 356 N.Y.S.2d 450, 453 (Fain. Ct. Queens County
1974).
501In re Anonymous' Estate, 126 N.Y.S.2d 749, 754 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1953),
affd, 134 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1956).
502 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
...
In re Industrial Transp. Corp., 344 F. Supp. 1311, 1313-14 n.3 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); accordIn re Johnson's Estate, 348 N.Y.S.2d 315, 318 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County
1973).
5"See Lau v. Kiley, 563 F.2d 543, 551 (2d Cir. 1977).
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illegitimate child at common law had no legal relationship to the
child, New York courts as late as the 1920's were "of the opinion
that the mother of... illegitimate children, as guardian by nurture, had the right to custody and control of their affairs.""5 After mid-century, however, as the "harsh view of the common law
that a natural child was filius nullius"05 went into decline, so too
did the rule "that only the mother [could], whatever the circumstances, have custody of a child born out of wedlock."5"7 There
remained a "presumption of custody in favor of the natural
mother,"0 which was, on occasion at least, overcome on the facts
of individual cases 09 and which some thought "should be reconsidered and abolished."510 By the end of the 1970's, new legislation providing that no parent should have any prima facie right
to custody had in fact abolished the old presumption, as the new
law was "applie[d] to unwed as well as wed parents," and judges
determined "the issue of custody ... without any artificial gender

based distinctions. 51'
Changes in the law regarding custody of legitimate children
. Grillo v. Sherman-Stalter County, 186 N.Y.S. 810, 812 (App. Div. 3d Dep't),
affd, 132 N.E. 913 (N.Y. 1921).
8 In re "Virginia Norman," 205 N.Y.S.2d 260, 264 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1960).
,o7

Id. at 262.

'osGodinez v. Russo, 266 N.Y.S.2d 636, 639 (Farn. Ct. Westchester County
1966); accord Z. v. A., 320 N.Y.S.2d 997, 999 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1971); Norcia v.
Richard, 300 N.Y.S.2d 608, 608 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1969), affd, 357 N.E.2d 288
(N.Y. 1970); Roe v. Doe, 296 N.Y.S.2d 865, 868-69 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1968);
Cornell v. Hartley, 283 N.Y.S.2d 318, 320 (Fain. Ct. Ulster County 1967). In the
event of the mother's death, the father was presumptively entitled to custody as
against non-parents. See Fierro v. Ljubicich, 165 N.Y.S.2d 290, 291-92 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1957); People ex rel. Blake v. Charger, 351 N.Y.S.2d 322, 326 (Fain.
Ct. Queens County 1974).
' See People ex rel. Coage v. Colbert, 75 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1947).
"'o

Godinez, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 639.

r In re Anonymous, 416 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731-32 (Fain. Ct. Albany County 1979);
cf. State ex rel. Spence-Chapin Serv. to Families & Children v. Tedeno, 421 N.Y.S.2d
297, 299-300 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979) (neither parent has right to change surname of illegitimate child). For cases giving custody to fathers, see Richard D. v.
Wendy P., 393 N.E.2d 1022, 1022 (N.Y. 1979); Wallace v. Teal, 420 N.Y.S.2d 336,
339 (Fain. Ct. Monroe County 1979); Boatwright v. Otero, 398 N.Y.S.2d 391, 394
(Fain. Ct. Onondaga County 1977). If neither parent was fit, custody would be given
to someone else. See State ex rel. Olivo v. Foglio, 385 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79 (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1976). Normally, a noncustodial parent would have visitation rights, but not
where a 61-year-old man had impregnated a 13-year-old girl and her parents objected to his visiting the baby. See E R v. D T, 353 N.Y.S.2d 612, 615 (Fain. Ct.
Genesee County 1974).
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likewise were of greater benefit to men than to women. By the
late 1970's, the efforts of women to achieve equality had somewhat perversely proved damaging to their interests on the subject of child custody. As one court explained at the close of the
decade, "outdated principles of 'maternal superiority"' could not
properly "influence [ ] ... determination[s] in awarding custody,"
since statutory law had made it "clear that there shall be no
prima facie right to the custody of a child in either parent. "5' u By
recourse to these new views of gender equality, fathers appear to
have been more successful in obtaining custody in the later years
of the 1970's than they had been in earlier years.513
The law also changed in favor of men on the issue whether
the consent of fathers was required before their illegitimate children could be adopted. Throughout much of the 1970's confusion
reigned on this issue as the cases addressed it only tangentially.
Thus, one case held that a father's consent was not required under Wisconsin law,514 while another avoided the consent issue by
finding that the natural father, as well as the natural mother,
had abandoned the infant who was being adopted.5 15 A 1958
case, 51 6 however, assumed, without deciding, that the consent of
the natural father, who was in prison, would be required, while a
1961 case5 17 held that the forged signature of the mother's hus-

" Andrews v. Andrews, 425 N.Y.S.2d 120 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1980), affid, 442
N.E.2d 578 (N.Y. 1981); accord Barkley v. Barkley, 402 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229 (App. Div.
3d Dep't), affd, 383 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1978); Zavasnik v. Zavasnik, 399 N.Y.S.2d
483, 484 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1977); Chavez v. Chavez, 385 N.Y.S.2d 289, 290 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1976); Braitsch v. Braitsch, 384 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562 (App. Div. 4th
Dep't 1976); Hechemy v. Hechemy, 368 N.Y.S.2d 709, 713 (Sup. Ct. Albany County
1975).
51 See Bergson v. Bergson, 414 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1979); Lucey v. Lucey, 400 N.Y.S.2d 610 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1977); O'Neill v. O'Neill, 399
N.Y.S.2d 887, 889 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1977); Harrison v. Harrison, 388 N.Y.S.2d 26,
27 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1976); Amatuccio v. Amatuccio, 355 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1974); Lee v. Lee, 400 N.Y.S.2d 680, 684 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977);
Salk v. Salk, 393 N.Y.S.2d 841, 844 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975), affd, 385 N.Y.S.2d
1015 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1976). But see Dodd v. Dodd, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 406 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1978) (holding that custody of children should go to mother who
was primary caretaker and more sensitive to children's needs).
In re Hardenbergh's Will, 258 N.Y.S. 651, 654 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County
1932).
5"'In re Anonymous, 80 N.Y.S.2d 839, 845-46 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County
1947).
5"'In re Anonymous, 175 N.Y.S.2d 282, 284 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1958),
modified, 187 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1959).
" See In re Anonymous, 209 N.Y.S.2d 360, 363 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1961).
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band, who was not in fact the father of the child in question,
could not be impeached by the natural mother who in the adoption papers had named her husband as the father and procured
the forgery of his signature.
The first contemporary version of the issue arose in a 1971
case involving a child born to a couple that had lived together in
the mid-1960's without being married, but had separated after
the child's birth. Following the mother's marriage, her new husband sought to adopt the child, and the natural father objected.
Citing the early case decided under Wisconsin law, the Appellate
Division held that "the putative father has no parental rights
with respect to a child born out of wedlock" and hence "need not
even be notified of the adoption proceedings."" 8
But one year later, a trial court disagreed. In the interval,
the United States Supreme Court had decided Stanley v. Illinois,"'9 which on due process grounds had upheld the right of a
natural father to custody of his children after their natural
mother's death. The New York court took the view that denial
after Stanley of all rights to a natural father "denie[d] him his
manhood and his fatherhood." The court held that once a man
had "acknowledge[d] having fathered a child" he was entitled to
notice of any adoption proceedings and "an opportunity ... to pre-

sent facts" as to "what is in the best interests of the child," although the father's consent to adoption was still not required. 2 '
Later cases extended the requirement of notice to any man who
there was "reason to believe might be the father,"52' but the New
York Court of Appeals continued to hold that a natural father's
consent was not required for adoption. Nonetheless, one lower
court subsequent to the decision by the Court of Appeals declared that a "father of a child born out of wedlock ha[d] a right
to associat[e] with his child, " "s and, while that right could be lost
5 Doe v. Roe, 326 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424-25 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1971).
"'9 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972).
"2'Doe v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of City of Poughkeepsie, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102, 106-07
(Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1972); accord In re Adoption of Anonymous, 359 N.Y.S.2d
220, 223-24 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1974).
'21In re Guardianship of Donna P., 362 N.Y.S.2d 370, 374 (Fain. Ct. N.Y.
County 1974).
22 See In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 331 N.E.2d 486, 491 (N.Y. 1975); accord
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Trullo, 408 N.Y.S.2d 680, 684 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1978); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 399 N.Y.S.2d 418, 420 (Sur. Ct. Erie County
1977); In re Kenneth M., 383 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1976).
23 In re Gerald G.G., 403 N.Y.S.2d 57, 60 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1978).
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through abandonment, 4 the standard applied is solely that of
the best interests of the child.525
Ultimately, those who believed that unwed fathers should
have the same right as unwed mothers to block the adoption of
illegitimate children won, when the Supreme Court in Caban v.
Mohammed,25 a case arising out of New York, so ruled on gender-equality grounds; at least one lower court relying on Caban
struck down as "too restrictive""7 the effort of the legislature in
the aftermath of Caban to rewrite guidelines for paternal consent.25
In contrast to the confusion that existed in regard to the
rights of unwed fathers, the law was clear as to the rights of divorced fathers. Before a legitimate child could be adopted, generally by a second spouse of the divorced parent who had received custody, the noncustodial parent, usually though not
necessarily the father, had to be given notice of the proposed
adoption,529 and, if the noncustodial parent objected, the adoption
could not proceed unless that parent had abandoned the child.30
52 See In re Male L., 369 N.Y.S.2d 273, 278 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County
1975); cf.

Dickson v. Lascaris, 428 N.Y.S.2d 544, 546 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1980), rev'd, 423
N.E.2d 361 (N.Y. 1981).
'2 See Gerald G.G., 403 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
5W 441 U.S. 380 (1979); accord In re Adoption of Anthony
John P., 422 N.Y.S.2d
570, 572-73 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1979).
527In re Adoption of Female F.D., 433 N.Y.S.2d 318, 322 (Sur. Ct. Nassau
County 1980).
su Other judges, however, continued to rule that the consent of natural fathers
was not required when the fathers were in prison, see In re Guardianship and Custody of Jonathan E.G., 436 N.Y.S.2d 546, 549 (Farn. Ct. Schenectady County 1980);
In re Adoption of Anonymous, 429 N.Y.S.2d 987, 991 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County
1980); In re Anonymous, 359 N.Y.S.2d 738, 743 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1974); but
see In re Robert A.M.'s Adoption, 366 N.Y.S.2d 343, 345 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County
1975), or had never developed any relationship with their illegitimate children, see
In re Adoption of Baby Girl, 426 N.Y.S.2d 398, 403-04 (Fain. Ct. Onondaga County
1980).
"2 See In re Adoption of Anonymous, 323 N.Y.S.2d 358, 359 (Sur. Ct. Queens
County 1971).
530 See Corey L. v. Martin L., 380 N.E.2d 266, 269-70 (N.Y. 1978); In re Adoption
of Goldman, 362 N.E.2d 619, 620-21 (N.Y. 1977); Lance David II v. David II, 429
N.Y.S.2d 312, 313 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1980); In re Adoption of Yanofsky, 321
N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1971); In re Adoption of Ekstrom, 265
N.Y.S.2d 727, 731 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1965); In re Adoption of Serby, 157 N.Y.S.2d
892, 894 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1956); In re Giegerich, 198 N.Y.S.2d 585, 587 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1960); In re Adoption by Catherine G. of "Infant" G., 360 N.Y.S.2d
789, 790 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1974), affd, 362 N.E.2d 619 (N.Y. 1969); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 337 N.Y.S.2d 896, 899 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1972); In re Adoption of Favro, 254 N.Y.S.2d 278, 280-81 (Fain. Ct. Steuben County 1964); In re
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"The natural rights of the parent to his child," it was said, were
"sacred and [were] jealously guarded by the law," with the result
that the "powers of the state over a child [were] not superior to
the natural rights of the parent."531 Hence "a finding of abandonment [could] be made against a parent only after he ha[d]
532
been given the benefit of every controverted fact... ."
Two additional lines of cases that brought tangible benefits
to men flowed from the judiciary's growing concern in the late
1960's and the 1970's with equal protection. The first raised issues about the legitimacy of various discriminations between the
right of men and the right of women to marry, including differences in the minimal age of marriage without parental consent"'
and differences in the jurisdiction of courts, related to whether a
proposed bride or groom was resident in the county in which a
court sat, to grant exemptions from marriage rules stipulated by

Adoption of Nuttall, 208 N.Y.S.2d 271, 274 (Sur. Ct. Cattaraugus County 1960); In
re Adoption of Anonymous, 193 N.Y.S.2d 375, 376 (Sur. Ct. Suffolk County 1959); In
re Adoption of Spinney, 170 N.Y.S.2d 590, 593 (Schenectady County Ct. 1958); In re
Richard, 106 N.Y.S.2d 92, 95 (Chautauqua County Ct. 1951); see also Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1964); Gursky v. Gursky,
242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 412 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1963); ef Strnad v. Strnad, 78
N.Y.S.2d 390, 391 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948); In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345
N.Y.S.2d 430, 435-36 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1973). But see In re Adoption of
Widrick, 212 N.Y.S.2d 350, 352 (Sur. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1960); In re Geiger's
Adoption, 138 N.Y.S.2d 410, 412 (Sur. Ct. Suffolk County 1955); In re Hurter, 181
N.Y.S. 75, 79 (Sur. Ct. Wayne County 1920). Adoption would not, however, interfere
with the visitation rights of the former parent. See Adoption of Widrick, 212
N.Y.S.2d at 354; see also In re Stuart, 20 N.E.2d 741, 744 (N.Y 1939).
5'In re Metzger, 186 N.Y.S. 269, 270 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1921); accord
Caruso v. Caruso, 23 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1940); see also Wasserman v. Weisner, 234 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1962). One rule
that followed was that a child's surname could not be changed without the consent
of its father. See In re Hinrichs, 246 N.Y.S.2d 25, 27-28 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1964); In re Otis, 126 N.Y.S.2d 651, 653 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1954);
Steinbach v. Steinbach, 119 N.Y.S.2d 708, 709 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1953); Young
v. Bd. of Educ., 114 N.Y.S.2d 693, 694 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1952); Nitzberg v. Bd.
of Educ., 104 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1951); In re Baldini, 183
N.Y.S.2d 416, 417 (City Ct. Bronx County 1959); see also Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 354
N.Y.S.2d 854, 856 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1974). But see In re Fein, 274 N.Y.S.2d
547, 551 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1966); In re Almosnino, 122 N.Y.S.2d 277 (City Ct.
N.Y. County 1952).
62 Cocozza v. Antidormi, 316 N.Y.S.2d 471, 473 (App. Div.
2d Dep't 1970); accord W. v. G., 312 N.E.2d 171, 173 (N.Y. 1974), superseded by statute as stated in B.
v. B., 385 N.Y.S.2d 821 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1976).
See Berger v. Adornato, 350 N.Y.S.2d 520, 524 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1973); Friedrich v. Katz, 341 N.Y.S.2d 932, 935 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973), rev'd,
318 N.E.2d 606 (N.Y. 1974).
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statute.534 The second line involved issues of access to the courts
by the poor. The Court in Griffin v. Illinois535 had prohibited
states from discriminating against indigent criminal defendants;
in response to Griffin, the federal courts authorized a class action suit by prisoners, who were overwhelmingly male, seeking
relief from New York legislation declaring them civilly dead for
purposes of matrimonial and family litigation,53 and state courts
authorized the payment of court fees. 7 and the assignment of
counsel to indigent family law litigants.53
The issue on which feminist reformers most needed favorable legal change was support. Again, pressure for change arose
early, as a result of the increasing caseload that matrimonial
litigation imposed on the judiciary during the 1950's. Dealing
with caseloads of 75 or more matrimonial matters per month in a
single borough of New York City, most of which had to be
"determined largely on the basis of widely conflicting affidavits
manifesting a reckless inaccuracy ... [and] perjurious absurdities,""9 judges felt a need to "evolve modernized methods ... in-

troducing wholesome realism" into separation and divorce litigation.5"' Seeking to eliminate the "stream of vituperation and
recrimination" routine in matrimonial cases, 4 ' some judges
urged that the "element of fault should be de-emphasized" in determining whether a wife should receive an award based on her
station in life or only an award designed to prevent her from becoming a public charge."' And, in one important case, the First
Department of the Appellate Division did impose a $3500 annual
alimony payment on "a man of considerable wealth," even
though his wife had abandoned him."'
See In re Ogilvie, 373 N.Y.S.2d 281, 284-85 (Rockland County Ct. 1975).
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
116 See Johnson v. Rockefeller, 58 F.R.D.
42, 51-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
M7 See Kirk v. Kirk, 340 N.Y.S.2d 346, 348
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1973). But see
Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968), rev'd, 330
N.Y.S.2d 550 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1972).
8 See In re Smiley, 330 N.E.2d 53, 56 (N.Y. 1975). But cf Thomas v. Thomas,
340 N.Y.S.2d 753, 754 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1973) (holding indigent husband liable for fees of wife's private attorney).
"39Palmieri v. Palmieri, 168 N.Y.S.2d 48,51 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1957).
54 Id.
at 49.
54' Id. at 52.
"2 Doyle v. Doyle, 158 N.Y.S.2d 909, 911 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957); accord
Dulber v. Dulber, 311 N.Y.S.2d 604, 607 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1970), modified,
322 N.Y.S.2d 862 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1971).
"3 Brownstein v. Brownstein, 268 N.Y.S.2d 115, 123 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1966).
54
65
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The pressure for change was also consistent with "women's
new position in our society," which rendered her "the equal of
man, socially, politically and economically."' It took some time,
however, before women" 'advanced to a position of independence
in most respects fully equal to' " that of men and to a "position of
[full] equality in marriage." 5
Not until the mid-1970's did the New York courts, in response to holdings of the federal Supreme Court,"' declare that
"sexual generalization in the law of support is the quintessence
of unconstitutionality"' 7 and that "the constitutional guarantee
requires a uniform standard of
of equal protection of the law ...

parental liability regardless of sex." " This new approach was of
some value to one "intelligent professional" woman who in the
early 1970's chose to have a baby out of wedlock and live by herself with the child; 9 in an opinion markedly different in tone
from what would have been written even a few years earlier, the
court treated her choice with respect and gave her a substantial
support award against the child's father. The approach also assisted a young wife, who had dropped out of college to finance
her husband's undergraduate and law-school education, only to
face a divorce when he began practice as an associate "at a
prominent Wall Street law firm;"550 holding that the wife was
"entitled to equal treatment,"551 the court ordered her husband to
pay alimony in an amount sufficient to enable her to complete
college and attend medical school.
But, on the whole, equality was of greater financial benefit
to men than women, as courts ruled that, since women were" 'in
men, they must, wherever possimost respects fully equal' to ...

ble, share the economic burden of a dissolved marriage."5 2 Accordingly, courts ruled that New York legislation should be read

5"Doyle, 158 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
'"Dulber,311 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-83 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
Carole M. v. Arnold K, 380 N.Y.S.2d 593, 597 (Faro. Ct. N.Y. County 1976).
m Id. at 596; accord Weaver v. Weaver, 433 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (App. Div. 4th
Dep't 1980); Cary v. Cary, 404 N.Y.S.2d 534, 535-36 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1978).
'"S. v. K, 335 N.Y.S.2d 124, 126 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
Morgan v. Morgan, 366 N.Y.S.2d 977, 979 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975), affid
as modified 383 N.Y.S.2d 343 (App. Div 1st Dep't 1976).
s Id. at 981.
Dulber v. Dulber, 311 N.Y.S.2d 604, 606 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1970).
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to authorize the award of alimony to husbands as well as wives
in appropriate cases55 and that women with the same income as
their former husbands should be required to contribute equally
to the support of their children.5" As one judge observed in explaining these results, "[a] benevolent grant to women of legal
rights unreasonably denied to men may help the women immediately affected but the implicit condescension and maintenance
of a protective stance in the end produces the attitude that
somehow women are not equal to men."555 For women to become
truly equal, this judge argued, it was necessary "to raise the consciousness of women to an appreciation of their true rights and
their potential as functioning individuals" by treating women exactly the same as men. "The edge of sex discrimination" would
thus have "two sides," making it unlawful to "discriminate
against
women" and equally unlawful to "discriminate against
556
men.
In light of decisions such as these, the gender revolution
brought little material benefit to wives undergoing divorce or
separation during the 1970's. Wives and children received as
little support from their husbands during that decade as they
had during the 1920's. Analysis of all published New York cases
for the half century between 1920 and 1970 shows, for example,
that husbands typically were required to provide approximately
one-third of their income for the support of their divorced wives
and their children; husbands kept the remaining two-thirds for
themselves.5 7 For the decade of the 1970's, the portion of hus"5"
See also Navagata v. Navagata, 415 N.Y.S.2d 372 (Sup. Ct. Orange County
1979); Thaler v. Thaler, 391 N.Y.S.2d 331, 340 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), rev'd 396
N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1977); cf Wood v. Wood, 428 N.Y.S.2d 136, 138
(Faro. Ct. Queens County 1980). But see Trask v. Trask, 381 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585 (Sup.
Ct. Albany County 1976); Kroul v. Kroul, 417 N.Y.S.2d 847, 848-49 (Dist. Ct. Nassau
County 1979).
See Kapuscinski v. Kapuscinski, 426 N.Y.S.2d 582, 582-83 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1980); Tessler v. Siegel, 399 N.Y.S.2d 218, 219 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1977); Carter v.
Carter, 397 N.Y.S.2d 88, 93-94 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1977); Lord v. Lord, 409 N.Y.S.2d
46, 48 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978); Conigho v. Coniglio, 428 N.Y.S.2d 440, 442
(Faro. Ct. Monroe County 1980). In another context, neither men nor women gained
any systematic benefit from equality, as a court held that the earnings of a man's
second wife had to be considered as part of the assets available to him for the support of his first wife and child. See Felisa L. v. Allen M., 433 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717
(Faro. Ct. Bronx County 1980).
65 Thaler, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
wId.
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bands' income granted to divorced wives may have declined
slightly, although the decline was not large enough to have statistical significance.5 8 Indeed, the legislature itself gave sanction to the one-third figure in a 1975 statute" 9 allowing those involuntarily divorced on the basis of a separation agreement or
decree obtained prior to January 21, 1970 to recover from their
former spouse the amount they would have taken by intestacy if
the spouse had died immediately prior to the divorce. The statute, it should be noted, merely preserved the economic rights
that any wife in New York, except one divorced on account of her
own adultery, had always possessed. In the case of a husband
and wife with children, those rights were to one-third of the husband's estate.5 '
V. CONCLUSION

The feminist revolution of the late 1960's and 1970's had little of the impact on family law its proponents had hoped for.
Ideas of equality produced the most substantial and tangible
benefits for illegitimate children and their fathers. Fathers of
legitimate children also found their chances to obtain custody in
the context of divorce somewhat improved. But on the key issue
of support, the feminist equality revolution produced no significant change, at least not by the end of the 1970's.
income of the husband had a mean value of 35.92%.
6' Between 1970 and 1980, alimony and child support as a percentage of net
income of the husband had a mean value of 29.37%. This mean, as well as the mean
reported in note 557 supra, is derived from all the reported cases during the period
under analysis, and thus it can be stated with a 100% level of confidence that, according to the reported cases, alimony as a percentage of husband's income declined
6.55% between 1920-1970 and 1970-1980. The reported cases do not constitute a
statistically random sample of all cases, however, and thus it is impossible to be
confident that the slight decline apparent in the reported cases accurately mirrored
a similar pattern of decline in all cases. But the total number of reported cases for
the entire half century is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that judges typically
awarded wives and children approximately one-third of the husband's income as
alimony and child support.
' DOM. REL. L. § 170-a (McKinney 1988).
See Pearson v. Pearson, 429 N.Y.S.2d 851, 854 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1980), affd, 440 N.Y.S.2d. 345 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1981). This article does not consider the impact of New York's equitable distribution law, which took effect in July
of 1980, at the end of the period under study. For an early case under the new law,
see Mercier v. Mercier, 432 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124-25 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1980).
For early cases dealing with procedural aspects of equitable distribution, see
Froelich-Switzer v. Switzer, 436 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980);
Stolowitz v. Stolowitz, 435 N.Y.S.2d 882, 886 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1980).
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Over the course of the six decades under study, more significant changes in family law occurred as a result of the concepts of
individual rights and freedom. Beginning in the late 1930's and
reaching fruition by the early 1960's, concepts of individualism
had enhanced the rights of natural mothers over their children,
for example. On a variety of minor issues dealing with paternity, annulments, and separations, individualistic ideas also had
resulted in the reification into rights of traditional assumptions
about natural male superiority. The most important change,
however, was the gradual rejection of New York's traditional
public policy, which had always been to "promote the permanency of ...
marriage contracts""' and "to restrict the availability

of divorce and in doing so to preserve the family unit."562 The
happiness of individual spouses had long clashed with this policy, and as judges in the 1940's and 1950's gradually paid more
heed to issues of individual well-being, the old policy was slowly
eroded. Following the decision of two key cases in 1965-the Rosenstiel.63 and Kober" cases-the legislature transformed this
area of law when, in essence, it authorized divorce by consent.
No clear utilitarian calculus exists by which to measure
whether divorce by consent brought overall gain or loss to either
men or women. No one has studied the well-being of men after
divorce in any systematic fashion. As for women, it does appear
that some realize emotional gains from divorce. 65 On the other
hand, it seems clear that very few women benefit financially
from divorce, since women and the children of whom they have
custody typically receive a disproportionately small share of a
divorced husband's income and wealth and often live in poverty
after a marriage's breakup. 66 It is simply unclear how to measure possible emotional gains against frequent financial losses.
Children are the clear losers in a divorce since they suffer
both emotional and financial loss. Thus, we should understand
that judges in the 1920's and 1930's were acting on behalf of
5" Hubbard v. Hubbard, 126 N.E. 508, 509 (N.Y. 1920).
512Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E.2d 709, 720 (N.Y. 1965) (Scileppi, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971 (1966).
13 See id. at
713.
"'
See Kober v. Kober, 211 N.E.2d 817, 820-21 (N.Y. 1965).
565 See TERRY ARENDELL, MOTHERS AND DIVORCE: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND

SOCIAL DILEMMAS 145-49 (1986); WErrZMAN, supra note 1, at 345-49.
56 See ARENDELL, supra note 565, at 20-41, 76-79; WEITZMAN, supra note 1, at
323-44, 351-56.
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children as they strove to preserve families that would provide
children with secure and supportive homes. Judges similarly
acted on behalf of children when they placed those without a
home in the closest approximation to an intact family which they
could find.
In contrast, the divorce reforms of 1966-67 took no account
of the interest of children in living with secure and supportive
families. Concerned only with the right of parents to pursue
their own happiness, the legislature conferred on them a right to
obtain a divorce by consent without even permitting courts to inquire into a divorce's impact on children. The law's growing toleration of illegitimacy can likewise be seen to represent a declining commitment to providing children with stable and supportive
families.
It seems, in conclusion, that the major changes in family law
between 1920 and 1980 that were designed to alter the relationship between men and women have had little of their intended
effect. Meanwhile, those changes have had a devastating impact
on children. This conclusion leads, in turn, to some important
insights.
The first is that the law can do little to alter relationships
between men and women; overarching social, cultural, and perhaps biological imperatives have much greater importance in determining what those relationships will be.
The second insight is that family law can be deployed to protect the weak from the strong. Courts can act in a paternalistic
fashion, as they did in the 1920's and 1930's, to protect children
from adults and, perhaps, women from men. To some extent, the
paternalism of those decades worked. In contrast, the egalitarian impulse of the 1960's and 1970's, which strove to uplift
women and arguably children by denying their weakness, did not
have the desired effect.
The third insight, however, is that the practice of paternalism entails high costs. Between 1920 and 1965, the legal system
of New York devoted enormous resources and twisted much doctrine out of shape in an effort to preserve the sanctity of marriage-an effort that was only partially and temporarily successful. Those whom the law successfully constrained often suffered
great unhappiness as a result, while those whom the law protected arguably suffered degradation in the very process of being
protected.
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Thus, it is not clear that judges and legislators were mistaken when they altered New York's family law in 1940's, 1950's
and 1960's in ways that gave adult individuals freedom to pursue their own happiness, even if at the expense of their own children and thus their own society's future.

